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This dissertation argues that a Deweyan reconstruction of philosophical theories 
of human well-being is needed. While philosophical interest about human well-being has 
existed for millennia, significant interest in such theories among philosophers has re-
emerged during the past twenty-five years.  During this same time there has been a 
resurgence of interest in the work of John Dewey.  His critique of the “philosophical 
fallacy” is used to examine the legitimacy and value of the theories of human well-being 
offered by Plato and L.W. Sumner in which the target for evaluation is “happiness” and 
the criterion is, respectively, P-justice or preference fulfillment.  It is argued that these 
theories fail to provide for an authentic account of human well-being because they are 
based upon a false understanding of “experience” as either “epistemic or cognitive” 
instead of “geographic.”  Dewey’s theory of experience is used to redefine both the target 
of evaluation and the criteria for the evaluation of human well-being.  His reconstruction 
of “experience”, “habit” and “situation” leads to rejecting the traditional 
conceptualization of the “private self”’ and to reconstructing it as a “transactionally 
situated self” that is an embodied, enculturated agent.  By placing significant emphasis on 
the importance of the qualitative aspects of a situation the “pervasive quality of the 
situation” emerges as the most plausible criterion for the evaluation of human well-being.  
Dewey’s theories of inquiry, ethics, value and art are employed to further establish the 
naturalistic conditions under which the pervasive quality enters into a situation, i.e., as 
either settled or unsettled.  The problematic situation is shown to be the primary 
condition under which all inquiry initiates whether it is in the context of science, ethics, 
values or art.  Human well-being is shown to have two modes, the instrumental and the 
aesthetic, which are context dependent.  Finally, by showing that a Deweyan account of 
human well-being involves “embodied knowing” instead of the traditional view of 
“cognitive knowledge” it is possible to explain the conditions and mechanisms under 
which human well-being contributes to the enlargement and enrichment of both 
individual and collective human experience.
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having to say something is a very different 
 matter than having something to say. 
      John Dewey, How We Think, 246 
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My motivating interest when I started graduate school in philosophy over twenty-
five years ago was the “quality of life” experienced by persons with disabilities.1  While 
initially working within the philosophical framework of analytic philosophy, it was 
through a fortunate happenstance I became acquainted with the philosophy of John 
Dewey.  Since the early 1990’s  I have continued to maintain my interest in Dewey by 
working to develop connections between his philosophy and the need for reconstruction 
of the current paradigm dominating policies and practices in services for people with 
disabilities.  I am not writing here as a specialist in philosophy, but only as someone who 
has studied and admired Dewey for years. Working with Dewey’s writings, at times, has 
been no easy task.  He once confessed to a friend that although he was “deeply aware of 
my lack of art in writing…in the main I think I am headed in the right direction and it 
will all come out in the wash that needs to….[it] may not be too balanced in thought to 
have a grip on the reader, or to have its meaning very perceptible.  But when it gets a man 
it sticks—so much may be said.”2  I have a great deal of sympathy for what Dewey is 
expressing here.  At times my involvement in working with Dewey’s texts took on an 
almost exegetical quality.  In this respect, I hope this inquiry will be of some interest to 
those seeking a condensed treatment of Dewey’s theories of experience, inquiry, ethics, 
value and aesthetics. 
The initial motivation for this particular inquiry resulted from a seminar on Well-
Being conducted by Professor Karl Hostetler at the University of Nebraska during Spring 
Semester, 2007.  It was during this time I came to understand that my previous interest in 
                                               
1 Upon further reflection, this inquiry has deeper roots.  In 1968 I started college as a philosophy major, but 
soon discovered my interests were more in line with anthropology, which suggests an early preference for 
the “existential experience” of human beings  over the “conceptual experience” of philosophical puzzles.  
2 Dewey, as quoted in Jackson, John Dewey and the Philosopher’s Task, 83. 
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quality of life had been too narrow.  Karl was also gracious in extending me an invitation 
to participate in a second seminar during Spring Semester 2009, which allowed me the 
opportunity to continue my thinking, conversing and writing about what the nature of a 
Deweyan account of human well-being might look like.  The seminars provided exposure 
to recent philosophical scholarship, as well as opportunities for conversation and writing, 
that helped me reconstruct my previous understanding of quality of life into ‘human well-
being’.  One interesting occurrence during this same period is that “well-being” began to 
emerge as a frequent term within the context of disability studies literature.  Although I 
still hold this to be an important area for study, since my intent in this inquiry is to 
provide a Deweyan account of human well-being in a more theoretical context, I do not 
examine it here.  However, my hope is that the account of human well-being proposed in 
this inquiry will also be of interest to those who are now engaged in this emerging area of 
disability studies. 
One reason I find inquiry into human well-being compelling, in not only a 
philosophical sense but in a personal sense as well, is that it involves investigating the 
natural transactional tension between our environment and our own thinking, doing and 
feeling as expressed in habits (thoughts, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, actions) or as 
dispositions (needs, desires, interests, or preferences), as well as in those of others.  What, 
then, does it mean to say that something is in our own best interest and how are we to 
understand such activity within the context of other persons?  This embedded tension 
runs deep in our Western cultural tradition and, at least beginning with the ancient 
Greeks, there has been an almost continuous stream of philosophical discussion about 
moral importance of human well-being and its definition, meaning and measurement.  
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Both Plato and Aristotle, in their search for answers to the question of our purpose as 
human beings, saw philosophy as the only means through which a person could achieve 
the "good life" which has, as its only goal, happiness. 
With the rise of Christianity, the focus of our understanding of “living a good 
life” shifted from the life of the physical person to the person's "everlasting soul", while 
retaining Plato’s “two worlds” theory, Aristotle’s conception of the “soul” and the 
general view among the ancient Greeks that human well-being involves the struggle 
between virtue and vice.  Over time, the religious view of human well-being gained 
increasing dominance and remained dominant until the beginning of the humanistic 
philosophical turn in the Renaissance, which received even fuller expression in the 
modern positivist philosophy of the Enlightenment.  Finally, some of the more recent 
philosophical theories of human well-being are, in many respects, a recasting of some of 
the basic elements of theories from the philosophical past into the philosophical present.3 
It is not surprising, then, that the history of philosophy yields an abundant amount 
of rich material for philosophical inquiry if one is willing to make a serious commitment 
to understanding human well-being. Since it is not feasible here to address all the issues 
that might be important philosophically, this inquiry stipulates, as a given, that human 
well-being begins “in experience.”  This means that whenever we speak about human 
well-being, both our own and that of others, we are saying something about the quality of 
human experience in a fundamental way.  However, even in limiting the focus of the 
inquiry to “experience” there remains considerable philosophical territory through which 
to travel. 
                                               
3 For example: Griffin, WELL-BEING: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance; Sumner, 
Welfare, Happiness and Ethics; and Nussbaum Women and Human Development. 
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The Relevance of Dewey’s Philosophy for this Inquiry 
 Not only are Dewey’s philosophical theories and concepts important for this 
inquiry, but his philosophical method is uniquely well suited to this endeavor as well.  In 
particular, the general orientation of the inquiry rests on Dewey’s claim that one of the 
most important tasks of philosophy is to enable ordinary people to solve their problems 
by improving their methods of inquiry.4  Perhaps this is the ultimate test for any 
contribution that philosophy seeks to make to human well-being, in both its individual 
and collective sense.  If this is the case, then the job of the philosopher is to identify the 
significant disjunctions between our needs, habits, objectives, etc. in order to help us 
rethink what we are doing, i.e., to assist in the “intelligizing” of practice.5  For Dewey, 
experimental or creative intelligence is not only the best way to conduct both 
philosophical and practical inquiries whether in logic, science, social science, ethics or 
aesthetics, but also necessary if one is to live one’s life authentically. 
Although he holds that criticism is essential to inquiry, it is only by joining 
together criticism and experimental or creative intelligence that it is possible for criticism 
to be truly constructive instead of being merely a complaint.  In this sense, criticism is 
simply a part of the work that is involved in applying creative intelligence to rethinking 
and readjusting our principles and practices.  The logic of inquiry that forms the 
foundation for Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge also serves as the basis for the 
organization of the public sphere as well as political actions, practices and policies along 
                                               
4 John Stuhr observes that in America today, most philosophers are not— qua  philosophers—actively 
engaged as citizens and, consequently, philosophy has almost no public voice. On this issue, see his essay 
“Re-visioning Philosophy and the Organization of Knowledges” in his Genealogical Pragmatism: 
Philosophy, Experience, and Community. 
5 The inherent force in Dewey’s philosophical method lies in recognizing that the constructive power of 
criticism can be realized only through the joining together of instrumentalism and criticism (as 
experimental or creative intelligence). 
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democratic lines.  Scientific inquiries, for Dewey, do not differ basically from inquiries 
carried out by ordinary citizens in everyday life: they all aim to grasp problems and to 
reach a better understanding in order to solve them.6  The way in which people assess 
problematic situations cannot just be descriptive but necessarily goes along with 
procedures of judgment, taking into account available means and valuable ends.  Because 
pragmatist inquiry is driven by the logic of experimentation, it not only leads to 
improving factual knowledge but to redefining political values as well which provides a 
powerful justification for democracy.  It is only by adopting democracy as a way of life 
that it becomes possible to create social situations which maximize both these factors; 
doing so leads not only to the breakdown of rigid traditional habits that are undesirable, 
but also to the creation and growth of more desirable habits.7 
Dewey’s philosophical view is characterized as being instrumentalist in terms of 
its theoretical aspects and as being melioristic in terms of its ethical aspects.  It is 
instrumental in at least three aspects.  First, it denies the existence of any special realm of 
“pure” or “formal” thought.  Instead, thought is seen as having an adaptive dimension—it 
serves to mediate interactions with the world.  Second, “thinking” is inseparable from 
“doing”—it is a function of embodied individuals leading to knowledge, however partial 
it may be.  Third, knowledge is sought not just out of curiosity, but because it is 
important for living a good life.  In this context, knowledge and practice are both 
                                               
6 Dewey, Art as Experience, LW 10, 104–5. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Dewey’s works will 
be based on the critical edition published by Southern Illinois University Press using the following 
abbreviations:  EW John Dewey: The Early Works, 5 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1969-72); MW John Dewey: The Middle Works, 14 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1976-88); LW John Dewey: The Later Works, 17 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1981-91). 
7 This is possible, in part, due to the accident of extreme pluralism in America.  More essentially it is due to 
Dewey’s view that democracy should stimulate independent critical reflection, weaken the ability of the 
ruling elite to control and stabilize custom, thus maximizing the opportunities for effective and creative 
reconstruction of social institutions and forms. 
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conceived “as a means of making goods—excellences of all kinds—secure in 
experienced existence.”8  Thus, “nature” is a continuously flowing stream in which 
thought is an “instrument” or “tool” that is used to pass from a given situation, full of 
ambiguities and disharmonies, to a new and better situation.  Although this new situation 
contains elements implied in the former, it is richer and better because of its new meaning 
and greater complexity.  Cognition, then, consists in forging ideal tools or instruments to 
be used in coping with a given situation and the mind is an instrument for realizing 
purposes.  Consequently ideas are seen as being plastic and adaptable, constituting 
teleological weapons of mind which owe their stability to the vital functions which they 
serve, i.e., to be used by human beings to solve their problems. 
Although Dewey believed that perfection might forever elude us, as a meliorist he 
held that our action can be guided by free creative intelligence, thereby making the world 
and our lives better than it is.  His insistence on ethical meliorism allows for the rejection 
of both optimism and pessimism.  Perhaps this is somewhat blunt in characterization, but 
if one insists on choosing improbably successful options in problematic situations, this 
merely suggests it is more likely that one is stupid, not optimistic.  Neither does one have 
reason for pessimism just because of the absence of a guarantee that, at least in principle, 
each problematic situation is capable of being resolved successfully.  Consequently, even 
if it is not possible to entirely avoid the evils of life, it is a likely possibility that they can 
be ameliorated to some extent.  For Dewey, the essence of meliorism means “[t]he belief 
that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or 
                                               
8 Dewey, Quest for Certainty, LW 4, 30. 
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good, in any event may be bettered.”9  The reason to value meliorism over optimism is 
because it arouses confidence and a reasonable sense of hope in that “[i]t encourages 
intelligence to study the positive means of good and the obstructions to their realization, 
and to put forth endeavor for the improvement of conditions.”10 
  Even though Dewey insisted that experimental or creative intelligence is the best 
way in which to conduct inquiry in logic, science, social science, ethics and aesthetics, it 
is only when criticism is joined with experimental or creative intelligence that it is 
possible for it to be constructive, otherwise it is merely complaint.  He also recognized 
that the force of his method of inquiry lies in its constructive power as an approach that is 
intrinsically critical, yet irreducibly moral.  As I read Dewey, the method of philosophical 
reconstruction was developed with such criteria specifically in mind and constitutes the 
general method to be employed in this dissertation.  Reconstruction refers to the work we 
do when we apply creative intelligence to rethinking and readjusting our principles and 
practices.  However, it is clear to me that use of this method offers no “final answer” to 
what human well-being means—it becomes another construction which, itself, is subject 
to further reconstruction.  As such, whatever view that one arrives at can only be 
understood as being piecemeal, multi-perspectival, uncertain and continually in-the-
making. 
One final note, although significant use is made here of Dewey’s writings, the 
account of human well-being that emerges from the inquiry is not simply a description of 
“Dewey’s view of human well-being.”  The purpose here is to construct a theory of 
human well-being that is based upon Dewey’s theories and insights, and it is in this sense 
                                               
9 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, MW 12, 181. 
10 Dewey, MW 12, 182. 
 
 
    
     
    8 
that it is to be understood as a Deweyan account of human well-being.  As Randall 
observed in a volume published in recognition of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Dewey’s 
death, “[t]he best way of honoring Dewey is to work on Dewey’s problems—to 
reconstruct his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw.  If it may be given to 
us to see farther, it will be largely because he pointed out to us where to look.  In that 
way, you and I can be really working with Dewey, as he always wanted us to do, and 
sharing in that enjoyed meaning that was, and is, and will continue to be John Dewey.”11 
In the end, all we can really do is to make a sincere effort to conduct inquiry in a way that 
truly honors Dewey, as Randall would have us do.  It remains to be seen whether this 
inquiry is able to see farther than Dewey saw; I’m not sure doing so is even necessary 
because Dewey never provided a specific or explicit statement about “human well-
being.”12  That said, perhaps it is first necessary to discern as clearly as possible just what 
Dewey “saw” in terms of human well-being which, itself, serves as sufficient justification 
for the present inquiry. 
Method or Approach Undertaken in the Inquiry 
 
Although this inquiry is philosophical, I also see philosophy as involving 
“personal work.”  In this regard I think Santayana’s observation about the work of 
philosophers affords a faithful description of the spirit in which I undertake this inquiry 
since they 
 are compelled to follow the maxim of epic poets and to plunge in media 
res…Perhaps there is no source of things at all, no simpler thing from 
which they evolved, but only an endless succession of different 
                                               
11 Randall, “John Dewey: 1859-1952”, 13. 
12 Perhaps the closest he came to doing this was in his 1937 address to the American College of Physicians 
titled “The Unity of the Human Being”, in Dewey, LW 13, 323-37. 
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complexities.  In that case nothing would be lost in joining the procession 
wherever one happens to come upon it, and following it as long as one’s 
legs hold out…If he begins in the middle he will still be at the beginning 
of something, and perhaps as much at the beginning of things as he could 
possibly begin.13 
Certainly, for me, this inquiry begins “in the middle of things” and, at the end, I still feel 
very much in the “middle of things.”  Perhaps this is because the objects and methods of 
philosophical inquiry necessarily occupy a space that exists literally in the “middle of 
things”, i.e., as the conceptual, methodological and dialogical/conversational “space” 
emerging  from the relational “in between” of philosophical thought and the nature of the 
world in which we live.  It is within such space that this particular inquiry begins and 
concludes as it explores human well-being not only in terms of our “being in the world”, 
but also in terms of how we “navigate” within that world. 
If it is indeed the case, as Santayana suggests, that philosophical inquiry begins in 
the middle of things, what constitutes “being in the middle” for this inquiry?  Perhaps it is 
being in the middle in the following way.  At one end is Dewey’s criticism that all 
philosophical accounts within the Western historical-cultural tradition rest upon a 
philosophical fallacy that renders them false.  It is the resulting cleavage between 
objective reality and subjective appearance that has resulted in a tendency on the part of 
some, if not most, philosophers to discredit experience.  This separation of experience 
from the external world is just one among many dualisms inherited from ancient Greek 
philosophy that continues even into modernist empiricism.  The problem here is that 
                                               
13 Santayana, Scepticism, 65.  
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traditional philosophies have failed “to connect their reflective results with the affairs of 
every-day primary experience.  Three sources of large fallacies have been mentioned 
…the complete separation of subject and object, (of what is experienced from how it is 
experienced); the exaggeration of the features of known objects at the expense of the 
qualities of objects of enjoyment and trouble, friendship and human association, art and 
industry; and the exclusive isolation of the results of various types of selective 
simplification which are undertaken for diverse unavowed purposes.”14 
At the other end is Dewey’s reconstruction of philosophy which corrects the 
philosophical fallacy while also providing for optimism and hope about the human 
condition.15  In working to free philosophy from its search for foundations, he offered an 
alternative view of philosophy by emphasizing its transformative nature that requires 
using it to reconstruct our practices and institutions so as to improve the quality of human 
life, i.e., human well-being.  It is certainly the case for Dewey that “[i]mproved 
experience, not originary truth, is the ultimate philosophical goal and criterion.”16  
Perhaps it is for this reason that the American poet William Carlos Williams wrote: 
And there stand 
    the-banded-together 
    in the name of 
    the Philosophy Dept’s 
   wondering at the nature 
    of the stuff 
poured into 
                                               
14  Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1, 36. 
15 There has been criticism directed at Dewey that he never adequately addressed the tragic in human 
experience, see Haskins, “Dewey’s Romanticism”, 115-123 and Boisvert, “The Nemisis of Tragedy: 
Tragedy’s Challenge to Deweyan Pragmatism”, 151-168. 
16 Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy, 157. 
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the  urinals  
of custom… 
   Oh Dewey!  (John) 
    Oh James! (William) 
     Oh Whitehead! 
      Teach well!17 
Finally, it is being in the middle in yet another sense, in that being so situated creates a 
feeling of “unsettledness” about the subject matter of the inquiry.  Since Dewey did not 
provide a full account of human well-being it appears there is an “open space” for inquiry 
into what such an account might look like.  Perhaps, at the end of this inquiry, the subject 
matter will be more settled, but this is not to be taken as a given and, if achieved, is only 
of brief temporal duration since the cycle of unsettledness and inquiry begins anew. 
The Problem the Philosophical Fallacy Presents for Theories of Human Well-being 
Dewey’s philosophy of experience requires abandoning the philosophical practice 
of converting the function of an event into antecedent forces or causes, or converting 
natural functions into ontologically independent existences.  Such a philosophical fallacy 
fails to provide a sufficient account of the functions of things by confusing intellectual 
analysis with ontological fact.  Logical principles, mathematical axioms, aesthetic 
qualities, reason, thought, theory, etc., are all natural events and functions.  The fallacy 
lies in transforming the natural functions of things into things that are ontologically prior 
to and independent of nature.  If Dewey is correct about the philosophical fallacy, and he 
presents a strong argument in its defense, then the problem confronting past and present 
philosophical theories of human well-being is that it renders them false.  The nature of 
the problem lies in their claim that experience is mind-dependent (as either an epistemic 
                                               
17 Williams, “ Choral: The Pink Church” in Selected Poems, 123-124. 
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or cognitive state) and that the mind exists as the sole connecting apparatus to the natural 
world when it comes to any legitimate claim about knowledge.18  The very act of 
bifurcating nature into two realms, since it involves the stipulation of antecedent 
definitions that exclude (as non-natural and prior to inquiry) certain aspects of the world, 
means that what constitutes knowledge of the existence of the actual world rests on an 
inference about its existence. This inference is based on either perceptual or linguistic 
sense-data, thereby reducing “experience” to only a cognitive state.   
In this inquiry, those philosophies in which experience is taken as being 
something exclusively mental are referred to as “experienceC” so as to distinguish such 
conceptualizations from the way in which Dewey uses the term.19   Regardless of what 
“experience” consists in, such accounts claim that it is located in the dimension of a 
private consciousness where it is essentially cut off from nature and the world, i.e., from 
the objective state of affairs of every-day primary experience.  The mistake here is the 
result of what Dewey referred to as the “exaggerated subjectivization” of experience.  He 
rejected such traditional accounts on the grounds they lack a naturalistic base and 
criticized them as affording mere intellectual entertainment.  Although some may regard 
the latter claim as being a somewhat harsh criticism, I find that I agree with the general 
merit of it.  However, I think it goes much deeper, perhaps to the extent of becoming an 
avoidance mechanism for some philosophers, i.e., a philosophical manifestation of 
Dewey’s “failure of nerve”.  It serves as a way to avoid or remove oneself from the press 
and pull of the day-to-day “lived experience” of human existence.  Consequently, the 
                                               
18 This is specifically a criticism against the empiricism of Locke as well as later philosophers such as 
Bertrand Russell. 
19 From this point forward, whenever discussion involves the traditional conception of experience, it is to 
be understood as referring only to experienceC. 
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work of philosophy comes to involve merely solving intellectual “puzzles” instead of 
solving real human problems. 
Given the sheer volume of philosophical theories about human well-being, it is 
clearly not feasible to address all of them in this inquiry.  In order to establish a 
manageable context for the inquiry, my critique focuses on theories of well-being as 
advanced by Plato and L.W. Sumner.  They are similar in that both theories regard 
“happiness”, in some form, as being the central feature in human well-being.  They have 
radically different ideas, however, about what constitutes the correct target of and 
criterion for its evaluation. Although there are a number of problems associated with each 
theory that deserve attention, this inquiry will focus only on the following three problems 
shared by both accounts: 
1. A formalistic conception of human well-being as consisting 
only in an epistemic or cognitive state. 
2. A formalistic conception of human well-being as being either a 
fixed-form or fixed-state. 
3. A formalistic conception of human well-being solely as a final-
end, as either an ethical or a prudential value.20 
I argue these problems are significant because holding such commitments results in the 
disconnection of human well-being from experience that results in its falsification. 
Certainly, this is a strong indictment to make against these theories, although I believe the 
examination and analysis provided in this inquiry supports this claim. 
 
                                               
20 Ethics and prudence certainly are important contexts in which to think about well-being, but this does not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that there may be good grounds for an account of human well-being 
notably different from most ancient, modern and contemporary philosophical theories. 
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A Geographic Understanding of Experience and Human Well-being 
  In making the effort to understand, both conceptually and practically, what a 
Deweyan account of human well-being might look like, I have considerable sympathy 
with James Griffin’s observation that a proper explanation of human well-being requires 
that we “have to know the context in which it needs to appear and the work it needs to do 
there.”21  My intent in this inquiry is to argue that the context in which human well-being 
needs to appear is as a human response to “being in the world.”  The primary conceptual 
element operating here is experienceG in that it provides the grounds for understanding 
the work that well-being needs to do in that context, i.e., navigating in the world.  The use 
of this term designates that “experience” must be understood in its geographic sense and 
not merely as an epistemic or a cognitive state.22  In addition, navigating in the world is 
understood as involving two modes of human well-being, the instrumental mode and the 
aesthetic mode, which serve to describe the kinds of work that an account of human well-
being needs to do.  Given the heavy lifting that is required of experienceG for the account 
of human well-being under development here, it is critically important to be clear about 
the use of the term within the context of this inquiry. 
Making such a commitment to experienceG also requires that the inquiry proceed 
on naturalistic grounds, i.e., it must be consistent with nature and human experience.  In 
choosing to use the term “naturalistic”, however, it is important to recognize that it cuts 
                                               
21 Griffin, WELL-BEING, 1. 
22 Late in his career Dewey expressed regret about using “experience” as a term and suggested he would 
substitute “culture.”  Because this alternative seems too limiting, I propose using “geographic” which is 
much larger and best reflects the scope and extent of organism-environment transactions that Dewey 
intended and sought to emphasize with his use of experience.  
 
 
    
     
   15 
across a variety of philosophical traditions.23  In this inquiry, it is used to designate the 
particular philosophical form of pragmatic or experimental naturalism. 24  Pragmatic 
naturalism holds that everything we encounter, experience or talk about is natural and a 
part of nature.  Dewey argued forcefully that, “[i]n experience, human relations, 
institutions, and traditions are as much a part of nature in which and by which we live as 
is the physical world.  Nature, in this meaning is not “outside.”  It is in us and we are in it 
and of it.  But there are multiple ways of participating in it, and these ways are 
characteristic not only of various experiences of the same individual, but of attitudes of 
aspiration, need and achievement that belong to civilizations in their collective aspect.”25 
The most fully developed account of pragmatic naturalism is found in his 
Experience and Nature.26  It recognizes that the transformation of the biological organism 
can be realized through cultural influences.  Adopting such a thoroughly naturalistic and 
empirical metaphysics has significant applications to virtually every form of inquiry and 
activity because the very “character of inquiry, knowledge, evaluation and value is a 
consequence of the particular inter-minglings of the actual traits of nature; and so are all 
events of experience.”27  Perhaps the most significant implication, in terms of this 
inquiry, is that Dewey’s theory of experience constitutes a reaction to conceptions that 
                                               
23 For a brief introduction to “modern” naturalism see Winn, “Naturalism” in A Survey of American 
Philosophy, 203-10. 
24 Paul Kurtz provides a concise summary of the development of pragmatic (experimental) naturalism in his 
Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism, 11-59.  However, his account: 1) gives short shrift to the 
melioristic constraints that Dewey placed on instrumentalism and 2) overlooks the later aesthetic turn taken 
by Dewey.  As a result, Kurtz’s description is insufficient as a fully developed and robust version of 
pragmatic naturalism, which requires conjoining “instrumental-melioristic” naturalism of the Dewey in the 
Middle Works period with the “aesthetic” naturalism of the Dewey in the Later Works period. 
25 Dewey, LW 10, 336. 
26 See Dewey, LW 1, 10-68. 
27 Gouinlock, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value, 10. 
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reduce experience to the cognitive content of a “mind”, even though philosophers holding 
such a view still have to stand in this world to ask the question in the first place.28  
Furthermore, his reconstruction of experience provides the only legitimate starting 
point for philosophical analysis in that it is wholly empirical and analyzable in terms of a 
naturalistic metaphysics.  Although Dewey is an empiricist, it is important to understand 
that such empiricism is, as James’ held, radical in that it 
must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly 
experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly 
experienced.  For such a philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of 
relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the 
system.  Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of 
things corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing 
experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic 
arrangement.29 
Following James’ lead, Dewey later described a genuine empirical method as being one 
that “sets out from the actual subject-matter of primary experience, recognizes that 
reflection discriminates a new factor in it, the act of seeing, makes an object out of that, 
and then uses that new object, the organic response to light, to regulate, when needed, 
further experiences of the subject matter already contained in primary experience.”30 
                                               
28 If one clear unifying theme exits in pragmatic naturalism, although appearing in many variations, it 
would be ‘experience’.  This is so evident and pervasive in the writings of Dewey that Geiger finds “…all 
of them part of a long, discriminating celebration of experience.” Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective, 7. 
29 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe, 42. 
30 Dewey, LW 1, 25-26. 
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His reconstruction of experience also has significant implications for his theories of 
inquiry, valuation, ethics and aesthetics, of which perhaps the most important is that 
human beings and their behavior are thereby open for study as natural phenomena. 
Dewey recognized that, as human beings, our situation is that we live in an 
environment upon which, on the one hand, we depend not only for maintaining our lives 
but which, on the other hand, is altered by our activity.  He saw environment not as an 
encompassing context, but as the conditions that allow a body to exercise its capacities 
and develop itself.  However, he went even further by intrinsically linking environment to 
experience and interactions, thereby defining actions and situations as the result of a 
process of interaction between an organism and a given environment.31  When 
experienceG is understood as a transactional process it is taken to include not only 
physical states and mental states or cognitive processes, but the qualitative aspects of a 
situation resulting from the organism-environment interaction as well.  Shusterman 
describes the point of Dewey’s philosophy of experience as “not so much aimed at 
proving theoretical continuity but instead at enhancing continuity in practice, at healing 
the painfully (though often unconsciously) experienced fragmentation of human life.”32 
Finally, some philosophical theories of human well-being make the claim that 
self-interest and morality are co-extensive, in some way, but disagree as to how they are 
reconcilable.  This disagreement results from the differences among theories in terms of 
their conception and/or description of the target of evaluation and the criteria for 
                                               
31 Dewey distinguishes between “pre-reflective” and “reflective” experience to demarcate two different 
kinds of primary experience.  However, the former is not synonymous with “non-reflective” which fails to 
convey that what begins in pre-reflective experience, which comes before reflective experience, can 
transform into reflective experience given the nature of one’s transaction with the environment, and vice 
versa. 
32 Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy, 171. 
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evaluation of human well-being.  Since these terms will be used throughout the course of 
this inquiry, perhaps the following example will be helpful to understanding what they 
mean in this context.  Plato and Aristotle both identified eudaimonia (a form of 
happiness) as the proposed “target of evaluation” and character (as virtue in some form) 
as the proposed “criterion for evaluation” of human well-being.  From the perspective of 
this inquiry, one of the most vexing problems for ancient, modern and contemporary 
theories of human well-being is that they totally ignore, virtually neglect or greatly 
diminish the relevance of the aesthetic dimension (as creation and creativity) in human 
experience.  Not only do general typologies of theories of human well-being not give 
recognition to any aesthetic theories, some contemporary philosophers go so far to argue 
that an aesthetic theory of human well-being is not plausible.33  However, this need not 
be the case given the virtually explosive resurgence of contemporary interest in Dewey, 
particularly his theory of art and aesthetics.34  The reconstruction of human well-being in 
this inquiry recognizes that it is necessary to give equal attention to the instrumental and 
the aesthetic (and perhaps even somaesthetic) aspects of human well-being.35 
  
                                               
33 Thomas Nagel claims the relationship of aesthetic values to human interests is too “obscure, though they 
are revealed to us by the capacity of certain things outside us to command our interest and respect.” Nagel, 
The View from Nowhere, 164.  Unfortunately Nagel adds to their obscurity by saying little else about why 
they are obscure.  As we will see in Chapter 1, Sumner explicitly rejects the plausibility of theory of well-
being based on aesthetic values because “well-being would be subordinated to artistic accomplishment.”  
Sumner, Welfare, 165. 
34 For example, see: Alexander, John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience and Nature; Shusterman, 
Pragmatist Aesthetics; and Jackson, John Dewey and the Lessons of Art. 
35 The pragmatic naturalism of Dewey during his “Middle Works” period is instrumentalist in terms of its 
theoretical aspects and melioristic in terms of its ethical aspects.  Whenever I use the term “instrumental” in 
this inquiry, it is to be understood as denoting “instrumental/melioristic” thereby emphasizing the 
inseparability of value, in this case understood morally, from inquiry (knowledge) and, later on, I adopt the 
designation instrumentalM to signify this inseparability. 
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Chapter Summaries 
Chapter One examines and analyzes the three problems identified in the 
Introduction that are associated with theories of human well-being, within the context of 
pragmatic naturalism.  A trajectory of theories of human well-being, beginning with 
Plato’s virtue-based eudaimonic theory and concluding with Sumner’s authentic 
happiness theory, is presented in order to understand the specific nature of Dewey’s 
criticism of such accounts.  Although a brief account of the trajectory of the development 
of theories of human well-being between Plato and Sumner is also presented, those 
theories are not examined and analyzed in terms of their legitimacy and value.  After an 
examination and analysis of the theories advanced by Plato and Sumner, their legitimacy 
and value are assessed.  I conclude that their legitimacy and value are limited because 
such theories result in the disconnection of human well-being from experience and 
nature, which results in their falsification.  
Chapter Two represents the first step in developing the theoretical bases for a 
naturalistic account of human well-being that reconnects human well-being to nature and 
experience (as geographic).  Examining the legitimacy and value of Dewey’s Theory of 
Experience (DTE) shows that it is not only consistent with nature and human experience, 
but it also has the conceptual power necessary for developing a thoroughly naturalistic, 
holistic account of human well-being.  Perhaps the most important implication of DTE is 
that it leads to a radical reconstruction of our understanding of the person or self, i.e., not 
as a separate, individualistic and private “mind”, but in terms of the continuous 
interaction of human beings with the environment as mediated by habit.  Such a 
reconstructed view of self requires a shift away from viewing human well-being as solely 
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a cognitive state to viewing it geographically, as the transactional field of organism-
environment interactions.  Finally, a basic understanding of DTE is necessary for the 
subsequent examination and analysis of other theories of Dewey presented in later 
chapters and for assessing their legitimacy and value for the account of well-being under 
development in this inquiry. 
Chapter Three assesses the legitimacy and value of the nature, function and 
operation of inquiry (as creative intelligence) in human experience.  This involves an 
examination and analysis of: 1) what inquiry consists in or has as its features, i.e., the 
techniques, attitudes and temperament it requires, 2) the contexts in which inquiry 
operates or the problems it is called upon to solve, and 3) the mechanics of inquiry, i.e. 
how we form and handle conceptions, abstractions, propositions and inferences.  What 
marks a successful inquiry is that it transforms an indeterminate or conflicted situation 
into a unified whole for which the pervasive quality of the experience is this unity.  By 
coupling the biological and cultural conditions of inquiry with intelligence, as the 
function of the interacting conditions in a particular situation with respect to a certain 
problem and its outcome, Dewey’s theory of inquiry provides a generalized description 
of the organic, cultural and formal conditions of intelligent action.  Inquiry, as creative 
intelligence, is a powerful tool for use in successfully navigating through our world and, 
as such, is central to human well-being. 
Chapter Four assesses the legitimacy and value that Dewey’s theory of ethics and 
theory of value have for the account of well-being under development here.  All forms of 
inquiry involve value because it is a process that results a judgment as to whether the 
problematic situation has been resolved or not.  The foremost function of creative 
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intelligence in moral life is value formation because whatever functions as value in 
experience, and is the subject of reconstruction by intelligence, is the crucial determinant 
of voluntary conduct.  However, for it to be of moral significance, the agent must be self-
conscious, well-informed and interested in a given act whose projected consequences 
coincide with her preferences and/or long-term projects.  Dewey’s theories of ethics and 
valuation are shown to provide an empirical grounding for both the valuation and 
evaluation of the consequences of chance, choice and change in association with human 
activity.  The further unification of Dewey’s theories of inquiry, ethics, and valuation 
provides the basis for an account of human well-being referred to as InstrumentalM Well-
being, wherein the target for evaluation is “betterment” as opposed to “happiness.”  This 
is the result of reconstructing human well-being in terms of the situation and its pervasive 
quality, i.e., the resulting field of organism-environment transaction which can be 
evaluated empirically as being better. Although sufficient on empirical grounds, this 
account remains partial or incomplete in that it conceives human well-being only in terms 
of its instrumental mode. 
Chapter Five examines Dewey’s theory of art and aesthetics to assess its 
legitimacy and value for the account of human well-being under development in this 
inquiry.  The work here is to extend the InstrumentalM mode of human well-being 
developed in Chapter Four to its logical, existential, and aesthetic conclusion.  His theory 
of art and aesthetics reveals a continual emphasis on the importance of natural, 
transactional features in experience such as continuity, interaction, equilibrium, 
resistance, growth, rhythm and consummation.  For a Deweyan account of human well-
being to be complete, however, it must bring into union his earlier empirical theories of 
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inquiry (as creative intelligence), ethics, and valuation with his later theory of art and 
aesthetics.  Such union affords the necessary context required for bringing together truth 
(inquiry) and meaning (aesthetics) in the service of human well-being. The context 
begins with the “live creature” which, through its transactional engagement with the 
environment and operating under the demands of the principles of continuity and 
interaction, enters into a situation that is qualitative in nature. When interaction and 
continuity intercept and unite, the resulting transactional experience itself becomes a 
living, moving, growing and creative force essentially similar to aesthetics.  This suggests 
the possibility for understanding human well-being in an aesthetic mode that is based 
upon the natural features of experience. 
Chapter Six concludes the inquiry by identifying five key themes that serve to 
insure that the proposed account of human well-being is consistent with nature and 
human experience.  In terms of this inquiry, these themes provide the framework for a 
Deweyan account of human well-being.  This leads to an examination of an alternative 
account of “cognition”, as embodied knowing, and the implications it has for human well-
being.  It is argued that, given that our understanding of the physical universe and the 
human universe continues to grow and undergo reconstruction, the account of human 
well-being that holds the most promise is the one which is most open to continuous 
reconstruction not only philosophically, but in other contexts for inquiry as well, e.g., 
psychology, sociology, education, medicine, and art.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Plato, Sumner and the Falsification of Human Well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For irrespective of whether a satisfaction is conscious, a 
satisfaction or non-satisfaction is an objective thing with 
objective conditions.  Happiness may mark an awareness of 
such satisfaction, and it may be its culminating form.  But 
satisfaction is not subjective, private or personal; it is 
conditioned by objective particularities and defections and 
made real by objective situations and completions. 
 
    John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 59 
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Certainly, “Reason” is among the most common and recognizable philosophical 
terms.  It not only has deep roots in our Western cultural tradition but continues to 
occupy a central place in its ongoing narrative and critique.  Given the “quest for 
certainty” which is a hallmark of Western philosophy, it is of little surprise that reason 
(rationality) stands out as a central feature of most theories of human well-being.  
However, from the perspective of this inquiry, the most significant and detrimental 
consequence of this quest is that it has led repeatedly to formalistic conceptions of well-
being as solely an epistemic or cognitive state.  Such a limited conception of human well-
being is a result of a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes experience and 
the nature, function and operation of reason.  From the perspective of pragmatic 
naturalism, traditional conceptions of reason possess significant metaphysical and 
epistemological problems which provide strong grounds for their rejection. 
Perhaps the root of this rejection is found in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s answer to 
the question “What would we know?”  He answers that what we know is the concrete 
experience of our environment-- it is “The meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan; the 
ballad in the street; the news of the boat; the glance of the eye.”36  Although knowledge 
may come from the patterns or principles derived from reason, it assuredly comes from 
the great variety of “insistent particularities” occurring within the field of environmental 
transaction that constitutes our immediate experience.  Although Charles Sanders Peirce 
and William James developed this line of thinking in the “American grain of thought” 
even further, it was Dewey who offered the most vigorous and sustained critique of the 
traditional conceptions of reason by observing that although the answers of traditional 
                                               
36 As cited in Winn, Survey, 67. 
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philosophy “do not thoroughly agree among themselves….they agree that experience 
never rises above the level of the particular, the contingent, the probable.  Only a power 
transcending in origin and content any and all conceivable experiences can attain to 
universal, necessary and certain authority and direction.  The empiricists…admitted the 
correctness of these assertions.  They only said that since there is no faculty of Pure 
Reason…we must put up with what we have, experience, and make the most possible of 
it.”37  Reason enters into philosophical theories in two forms as either “pure” or 
“practical”; however, it is the former that is problematic because Pure Reason is not only 
held to be the exclusive realm of Absolute Truth, but it also shares a close association 
with oligarchic forms of sacred and secular social arrangements.38 
  The instrumental value of the very idea that there is a faculty such as Pure 
Reason, in Dewey’s view, is almost inconsequential since, “as a means of arriving at 
truth [it] is like the spider who spins a web...The web is orderly and elaborate, but it is 
only a trap.”39  His metaphor suggests that after all the elaborate work that reasoning 
entails, what we end up with ultimately is a trap by which we can catch poorly 
constructed thoughts.  Although, at a more phenomenological level, it may suggest that 
although the spider creates its own web it cannot exist outside of it.  The consequence of 
separating Reason from the natural world of human interaction is that it leads to the 
                                               
37 Dewey, Reconstuction in Philosophy, MW 12, 124; see also Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14 and 
Quest for Certainty, LW 4. 
38 He attributed this view with philosophers such as Plato, Descartes, Locke and Kant.  He also noted that 
one function of the controlling oligarchic power is to select out individuals who possess the “methods of 
Pure Reason” necessary for accessing knowledge of the Truth. This recognition on the part of Dewey 
presages similar philosophical analyses about “power relations” and “dominant culture” that fall under the 
general rubric of “Post-Modernism.”  He also observed that the same cultural tradition assumes that 
knowledge of Truth occurs only within the confines of a private and “spectatorial” mind which has 
implications for how person and self are to be understood in this inquiry. 
39 Dewey, MW 12, 97. 
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construction of a theoretical universe (web) that is merely self-contained in its 
“philosophical geometry”, and from which we cannot escape.40 
Furthermore, any claim that traditional dualistic accounts of Reason afford 
superiority to change, by dominating both its occurrence and understanding, is mistaken 
because “[w]hat has been lost in the theoretical possibility of exact knowledge and exact 
prediction is more than compensated for by the fact that the knowing which occurs within 
nature involves possibility of direction of change.  This conclusion gives intelligence a 
foothold and a function within nature that “reason” never possessed.  That which acts 
outside of nature and is a mere spectator of it is, by definition, not a participator in its 
changes.  Therefore, it is debarred from taking part in directing them.”41  Locating 
Reason outside of nature presents two significant philosophical problems.  On the one 
hand, there is a metaphysical problem in that it is becomes necessary to posit the 
existence of some mysterious ontological relationship between the “world of reason” and 
the “world of ordinary experience.” On the other hand, it is an epistemological problem 
because it emphasizes a fixed linearity and an exact knowledge that are simply not up to 
the task of assisting human beings to negotiate within a universe of chance—a  world of 
constant flux with innumerable possibilities for the direction of change. 
Another problem with the theories of human well-being examined in this chapter 
is that they claim that well-being is a fixed-state or final-end.  I will only mention it 
briefly here, since it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.  The problem with 
the doctrine of fixed and final-ends, Dewey observed, is that it 
                                               
40 This leads Dewey to claim that any account which holds reason to be a faculty separate from experience 
(e.g. Descartes) or a faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience (e.g. Locke, Kant) is 
problematic since both are the “unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to 
elaborate terminology.”  Dewey, MW 12, 134. 
41 Dewey, LW 4, 170. 
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not only diverts attention from examination of the consequences and the 
intelligent creation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two ways of 
regarding the same actuality, it also renders men careless in their 
inspection of existing conditions.  An aim not framed on the basis of a 
survey of those present conditions which are to be employed as means of 
its realization simply throws us back on habits.  We then do not do what 
we intended to do but what we have got used to doing, or else we thrash 
about in a blind ineffectual way. The result is failure.42 
As we will see, Plato clearly viewed human well-being not only as an epistemic 
state but as a fixed or final end in life as well.  As for Sumner, his formalistic 
account of well-being is, in the end, cognitive-state dependent and it seems his 
commitment to welfarism requires that well-being be the final end for ethics. 
Platonic Happiness as Formal Knowledge 
The root cause of the difficulties with Plato’s theory of happiness is two-fold.  
First his theory of knowledge (the “two- world theory”) rests on a dualistic metaphysics.  
He posited that existence consists of two distinct realms: 1) a physical realm consisting of 
physical objects subject to the limitations of space and time and 2) a non-physical realm 
of Forms (objects of the mind or intellectual objects) without such limits.  Since Absolute 
Truth is not derivable from experience, Plato imagined the existence of Forms that lie 
outside the realm of ordinary experience which are fixed, permanent, and not subject to 
the contingencies that the physical world reveals.  Consequently, our knowledge of the 
physical world can never be a source of Absolute or Fixed and Final Truth because it is 
                                               
42 Dewey, MW 14, 160. 
 
 
 
  27 
always in flux.  Thus, the only possibility for true knowledge, as an absolute truth that 
never changes, lies in the latter realm. 
The second difficulty to confront Plato’s conception of human well-being 
involves what it means to be a person.  His conception of personhood is grounded in his 
view of the human soul (psyche) which is divided into three parts:  appetite, passion and 
reason.43  He extended this conception of the individual soul to his conception of the ideal 
or utopian society which is organized around a three-level class structure.  This tri-partite 
structure is fundamental for the realization of the ideal person (the Platonically just 
person) and the ideal state (the Republic of Callipolis) both of which rest heavily on the 
concept of balance.  Plato formulates the following argument to connect Justice to 
Happiness in “Book IV” of the Republic by using a now famous simile in which he 
compares the just soul to a healthy body and the unjust soul to a diseased body: 
(1) One will be happier if she has a healthy soul than if she does not. 
(2) One has a healthy soul if and only if each part of her soul performs the 
task for which it is best suited and no other. 
(3) One is Platonically just if and only if each part of one’s soul performs 
the tasks for which it is best suited and no other. 
(4) Therefore, a person has a healthy soul if and only if she is Platonically 
just. 
(5) Therefore, she will be happier if she is Platonically just than if she is 
not. 
                                               
43 For Plato, the “soul” and the “body” are two distinct things. The soul is, in itself, something rational and 
all irrational aspects of our existence belong to the body.  It is what constitutes the “real self” of a person 
because it is involved in all the activities of the body.  Further, “its proper state is when it is apart from the 
prison of the body.”  Rowe, Plato, 167. 
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Thus, for Plato personal well-being requires the rationally coordinated functioning of the 
soul’s three constituent parts which he also associates with justice.  However, it also 
involves health in that a happy person simply does not want to live with a “diseased” 
soul.  So, although a person is P-just if and only if the three parts of the soul are equally 
proportioned, the problem is that such balance must be found internally.  Thus Plato’s 
particular conception of well-being is subjective, individualistic and non-relational.  In 
basing his theory of well-being on “internality”, Plato ultimately failed to take the world 
into account. 
Plato also viewed “knowledge” as being, at most, a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of virtue, since virtue also requires bringing the non-rational desires of the soul 
under control.44  Education is what serves to fix the character necessary for a P-just life 
such that only one who is P-just can be both happy and good, the result being that a P-just 
person is happier than an evil one.45  Thus, justice is not merely a means to well-being 
but is what constitutes well-being, both personally and socially (politically).  In terms of 
this inquiry, the particular consequence of these two difficulties is that his conception 
reduces human well-being (eudaimonia) to a state of cognitive balance.  Such balance 
involves non-physical “Forms” that occupy a non-physical realm and is achievable (to the 
extent anything non-existent in ordinary experience is achievable) only through the 
development of a power of rigorous rational introspection. 
Platonic Happiness as a Fixed-form and Final End in Ethics 
Plato’s central claim is that happiness can only result from living a P-just life, in 
which all three parts of the soul are coordinated in harmonious relation which requires 
                                               
44 Rowe, Plato, 93. 
45 As an economy, I will use P-just to refer to Platonically just and P-justice to refer to Platonic justice in 
what follows. 
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that all the virtues be in balance.46  In order for happiness to enter into one’s life, in its 
truest sense, a person must possess the right character, that of being P-just, which 
requires that she has achieved the correct balance among the virtues.  This means that 
since virtue, at the most minimal conceptual level, involves having a systematic concern 
to do the morally right thing, then to live a “happy life” entails that one is prepared to do 
the morally right thing systematically and not just occasionally.47  This most likely 
requires developing a certain degree of self-mastery and strength of mind such that one is 
able to overcome all the many and varied incentives one may have for doing something 
else.  Indeed, if there is a route to virtue, it is likely at some point along the way it will 
become difficult to follow, even to the point of its being unpleasant and frustrating.  This 
seems to suggest that virtue demands something more than one simply doing what is 
morally right, i.e., one must also possess a firm disposition to do the morally right thing. 
The way in which one achieves the unified state or balance that being P-just 
requires, for Plato, is through phronesis which involves practical reasoning integrated 
with the motivation to engage in it.  Such motivation is necessary because there can be 
situations in which a person may have the understanding of what a moral action requires, 
but is also fighting contrary motivations to do what it requires.48  However, since he also 
viewed all wrong-doing as involuntary, he believed it possible that virtue could be taught.  
Given that virtue is knowledge, he assumed it must be a good, in fact, the only certain 
good since knowledge is the only sure guide to the good use of what the world says is 
                                               
46 In fact, virtue itself is an ultimate good because each of the virtues is a form of knowledge or because 
each, when taken in its highest sense, involves all the others. 
47 At this conceptual level one is required to have only some grip on the idea of what is morally right or 
wrong, so it isn’t necessary to start with an elaborate theory. 
48 This serves to illustrate the difference between being merely self-controlled and being virtuous, since the 
self-controlled person has to fight against contrary motivation in order to do what a moral action requires.  
In contrast, virtue requires that a person’s motivation go along with her understanding. 
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good.  Although opinion and habit often suffice to regulate action, and this is the key 
here, persistent right opinion presupposes knowledge in its teachers, and the highest rule 
of conduct must be deduced from and referred to a rational apprehension of the ultimate 
good. 
It is precisely in the rational apprehension of the ultimate good that one can 
determine which choice, among several competing choices, constitutes the right action.  
Plato’s account of human well-being, because it rests upon his “two-world theory,” 
disconnects choice from experience by locating the only reliable criteria for the truth in 
the immaterial realm of the ideal.49  Thus one’s contemplation of the Ideal Form of 
Justice, if one possesses the enhanced introspective reasoning such contemplation 
requires, is what must guide one’s choices for one to attain true or authentic happiness. It 
is clear that Plato held this to be a very difficult and genuinely serious undertaking, in 
fact only certain ones among us have the capacity to develop the finely-honed intuitive 
abilities required to make such discriminations. 
Furthermore, it is not surprising that Plato assigns an important role to education 
in the development of character given that the specific and fixed character necessary for 
being P-just does not come naturally.  Indeed, the development of such character requires 
one to undergo a very specific type of education that is lengthy, rigorous and highly 
disciplined.50  Thus, happiness (eudaimonia) can become the final-end for one’s life if 
and only if one possesses the character required for being P-just.  However, one 
consequence of his theory is that the “truest” or most “authentic” form of happiness that 
                                               
49 For Plato, when it really matters and one has to make a choice between whichever of two or more things, 
the ultimate test for knowing what constitutes the right, good or best choice, is the one that bears the 
strongest resemblance to an ideal form of what is right, good or best. 
50 Plato, Republic, translated by G. M. A. Grube, especially Book VIII.  See also Nettleship, The Theory of 
Education in the Republic of Plato. 
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is possible in this world is achievable by only those select few he referred to as the 
Guardians. 
Another key element in Plato’s conception of well-being is the idea that happiness 
applies only to one’s life as a whole.  He viewed this as the measure of the authenticity of 
happiness because it is only in such cases that a person can make any true claim as to 
one’s happiness or to what constitutes a happy life.   However, one must be cautious 
about understanding the conceptual role that Plato gave to happiness and pleasure in that 
it is quite different from modern conceptions of happiness.51  Since he saw the overall 
purpose of or goal in one’s life as happiness, this naturally leads him to seek an answer to 
“What are the routes to it as a destination point?”  Of course, what should immediately 
strike us here is the claim that happiness consists in a destination point—why a 
destination point?  If it is not a destination point or final-end, then what other possibility 
is there?  One alternative would be to claim that happiness lies simply in never deferring 
gratification, but Plato sees this as being a dangerous prescription for living one’s life.52  
Obviously, such a simple form of hedonism would form a weak foundation upon which 
to base a theory of happiness or human well-being.  He rejects simple hedonism as a 
theory because happiness does not involve a demand of immediacy in any sense, which 
leads him to the conclusion that it applies only to one’s life as a whole.53 
                                               
51 Some versions of modern moral philosophy (e.g. utilitarian hedonism) conceive happiness as the 
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Thus, happiness is attributable not only to our lives, but also 
to individual moments and fleeting experiences that are part of living.  For Plato, happiness is not an 
emotion at all since neither feeling good nor being pleased ever enters into it. 
52 Plato’s criticism applies to simple forms of hedonistic theories.  The inability to control your desires has 
an undesirable consequence, i.e., you will likely end up at the mercy of those who can control theirs.  Their 
superior self-mastery secures them an advantage over you and, through their greater success in competition, 
they gain control over your life. 
53 As we will see later in this Chapter, there are more complex forms of hedonism that are able to avoid this 
concern. 
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His answer to the question “What kind of life would that be?” is that such a life 
lies in developing those characteristics (as virtues) that a person needs so that she does 
the right thing systematically.  For one to be of virtuous character she must possess a 
“firm understanding” of morality coupled with a “willingness” to act upon it.  However, 
since developing these characteristics is not easy, by the time someone is virtuous she 
will have made herself to be a certain kind of person.  Plato also recognized that since 
there are a variety of virtues (isolated habits of action) it is necessary to unify them 
through an understanding of what it means for a person to act in a morally appropriate 
way.  It is not enough for one to have merely localized virtues, because for one to be truly 
virtuous one must possess the “unified understanding” which grounds all the virtues, 
which requires achieving knowledge of Justice.  Justice, then, is not merely something 
that is desirable for its own sake, as merely one from among a number of virtues.  
Instead, it is that very thing that makes life worth living and whose presence gives other 
things any value they may possess.  Perhaps the relevant distinction to make here is 
between happiness and pleasure.54  Since in experience we demarcate the latter as 
episodic, consisting of what one can feel now (but not later), it is discriminated in 
experience as something that pertains to the activities one performs that makes up one’s 
life.  Surely, for one to give in constantly to the short-term satisfaction of one’s present 
desire at the cost of a proper concern for the rest of one’s life would be nothing short of 
irresponsible.  Since it is only one’s pleasure that one can judge over the short-term, this 
                                               
54 Thus, Plato’s ethical theory viewed pleasure as being a defective aim for use in structuring one’s life. 
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leads Plato to conclude that any judgment about happiness (eudaimonia) is derivable only 
over the long-term.55 
The Modern Trajectory of Happiness:  From Pleasure to Preference 
Before proceeding to L.W. Sumner’s account of authentic happiness it will be 
helpful to provide a context for understanding the philosophical motivation for the 
development of his theory of human well-being.  This is important because, although he 
offers a theory about happiness, the understanding of happiness on which his account is 
based is radically different from that of Plato.  In contrast to Plato, most modern theories 
presuppose some general account of what it is for something to benefit or harm us and, 
ultimately, what it means for our lives to go well or badly, although some hold that 
human well-being is merely one among a plurality of values to hold seriously.  The first 
major attempt to provide a theory of welfare in the modern period in philosophy is found 
in the work of the Utilitarians, especially Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.  Two 
main traditions have developed around the meaning of utility: 1) as a mental state and 2) 
as a state of the world that fulfills desires or preferences.56 
The first tradition, characteristic of classical utilitarianism (CU), claims the best 
state of affairs among any set is the one that contains the greatest net balance of aggregate 
human pleasure or happiness or satisfaction.57  Within the general theory of utilitarianism, 
in which utility (as determined by the ratio between pleasure and pain) becomes the 
measure of happiness, hedonism finds expression in both a psychological and an ethical 
                                               
55 Eudaimonia is different in meaning from happiness in that it serves to denote  “not so much a man’s 
subjective feeling of contentment as his possession of whatever it is thought desirable for him to possess—
the eudaimon man is literally ‘blessed with good daimon’, fortunate.”  Rowe, Plato, 106. 
56 Assessments of the legitimacy and value of mental-state theories of well-being are presented in 
considerable detail in Rawls, Justice; Parfit, Reasons; Griffin WELL-BEING; and Sumner, Welfare. 
57 As a philosophical theory CU refers to Jeremy Bentham’s ‘systematic quantitative hedonism’ that grew 
out of his work on legal and social theory.  See Bentham, 1948/1967. 
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form.58  CU claims that pleasures (and pains) can be quantified because the quantity of a 
pleasure is a function of both its intensity and its duration. Thus, an increase in the 
amount of pleasure (calculated in this way) achieves a subsequent increase in happiness 
or the good as well.  The most crippling problem for CU, however, is in regard to the 
“interpersonal comparison of utilities” which involves comparing the amount of pleasure 
two different people obtain from the same state of affairs or thing.  The point here is that 
if pleasure is a “subjective” experience, then how can one person know when another 
person is experiencing it or how much of it the other person is experiencing?  In response 
to this problem with CU, Mill’s version measured utility in terms of the “greatest 
happiness principle” which holds that an action is right or good in proportion to its 
tendency to promote the greatest happiness. 59 Conversely, an action is bad or wrong to 
the extent it tends to produce the reverse.  Happiness, then, is either the intended pleasure 
or the absence of pain, while unhappiness is either the presence of pain or deprivation of 
pleasure, as qualified by the greatest number of people who experience either happiness 
or unhappiness. 
It is also possible that hedonism can take a third form, i.e., about the nature of 
welfare.  This seems evident since Mill provides an argument in which he identifies 
happiness with welfare.60  Such identification has relevance for this inquiry because he 
claims that welfare is a final-end because pleasure and freedom from pain “are the only 
things desirable as ends; and…all desirable things…are desirable either for the pleasure 
inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of 
                                               
58 See: Jane Austin, “Pleasure and Happiness” in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 235. 
59 See: Mill, Utilitarianism. 
60 His argument seems to be as follows: 1) only happiness is good in itself, 2) happiness is pleasure and the 
absence of pain, 3) therefore only pleasure and the absence of pain are good in themselves. 
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pain.”61  At another point, however, he claims that it is happiness, not pleasure, that “is 
desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end; all other things are desirable only as a 
means to that end.”62  However, this is a problem in that Mill “derives ethical hedonism 
as a conclusion from two premises: welfarism plus a hedonistic theory of welfare.”63  It 
may be possible to do so, however, by holding that “pleasure and pain characterize the 
primitive attitudes, positive and negative respectively, which subjects may have towards 
objects or states of affairs.  Minding something or caring about whether it happens, will 
ultimately be a matter of finding the experience of it either pleasant or painful.  Such a 
theory will map the polarity of welfare unto the polarity of pleasure and pain.”64  Even 
though equating well-being with happiness is implicit in the utilitarian tradition, it just 
might not rise to the level of a developed theory about the nature of welfare. 
The most difficult and perhaps insurmountable problem for utilitarian theories of 
happiness is that they view utility as consisting in a kind of mental-state.65  In particular, 
CU is inadequate as a subjectivist theory of welfare because of its commitment to 
classical hedonism (CH) which treats pain and pleasure or suffering and enjoyment as 
merely mental states or collections of mental states.  Because all mental state theories 
lack the ‘experience requirement’, they are vulnerable to objections from delusion or 
deception.  If this is the case, then what is it that makes utilitarian theory attractive as a 
theory of human well-being?   Perhaps one answer lies in its systematization since 
utilitarian theory moves from statements about people’s pleasure or happiness to 
                                               
61 Mill, Utilitarianism, 7. 
62 Mill, Utilitarianism, 7. 
63 L. W. Sumner, Welfare, 85. 
64 L.W. Sumner, Welfare, 84-85. 
65 Griffin describes this problem as follows, “we cannot find any one mental state that we regard as having 
utility—eating, reading, creating, helping.  What one mental state runs through them all in virtue of which 
we rank them as we do?” Griffin, WELL-BEING, 8. 
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statements more easily open to empirical confirmation.  However, this presents a problem 
as to how we are to understand such hedonistic quality (at least in a narrow sense), 
although there may be other ways to accomplish this and avoid the problems associated 
with mental state theories, e.g. preference hedonism.  One advantage of the preference 
form of hedonism is that it is possible for someone to reveal her preferences by empirical 
investigation, i.e., the choices she actually makes and their consequences.  One question 
this raises is whether the quest to systematize human aims under a concept of happiness 
remains as the pivotal difficulty for quantitative hedonism as well as desire-fulfillment 
theories of happiness.  In this regard, Parfit argues that the most plausible form a theory 
of self-interest can take is one based on hedonistic desire fulfillment.66  Such a theory is 
subjectivist in that it claims that what ultimately matters for human well-being is the 
hedonic quality of an individual’s experience and nothing more.  Consequently, 
individual happiness will still consist of the balance of pleasant over unpleasant 
experiences that one has, e.g., enjoyments/sufferings, pleasures/pains, etc. 
 Following the course of narrow hedonism (NH) is a problem because it falsely 
assumes that pleasure and pain are two distinctive kinds of experience which means such 
hedonists end up comparing different pleasure experiences that do not contain any 
distinctive common quality.   Even though this makes NH implausible as a theory of self-
interest, some version of preference hedonism (PH) could be more promising because it 
would recognize that what is common to one’s pains and pleasures is their relation to 
one’s desires.67  One advantage of PH is that it need not commit only to the ordinary 
                                               
66 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 493-502. 
67 It might be helpful to think of PH in the following way: generally, when we experience pain as unwanted 
it is worse or greater the more it is unwanted.  Likewise, when we experience pleasure as wanted it is better 
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ways in which “pain” and “pleasure” are used; it can also refer to having a “better” 
experience.68  However, doing so requires shifting the focus from mental states such as 
pain and pleasure to desires.  Desire theories identify well-being with the actual 
fulfillment of an individual’s desires and hold that a condition or state of affairs makes 
one better off by virtue of the fulfillment of some desire on one’s part.  Sumner notes that 
although desire theory “uses these terms in its own way: a desire or preference is satisfied 
just in case its object comes to exist.  However…there is a logical gap between 
fulfillment of your desires and your fulfillment, a gap which is fatal to desire theory.” 69  
Parfit also distinguishes between unrestricted theories (UT) and success theories (ST) of 
desire-fulfillment.  UT can be rejected because they claim that what is best for someone 
is what would fulfill all of one’s desires throughout one’s life and such a claim is not 
plausible.70  ST, on the other hand, appeals only to someone’s desires about her own life.  
PH is different from ST in that it appeals only to preferences about those present features 
of our lives that are introspectively discernible.  Even though ST may be more plausible 
than UT because it appeals only to desires that are about our own lives, the problem with 
ST is that it may be unclear what this excludes.71 
 Although there are questions and objections that arise for both PH and ST, a 
promising candidate seems to be informed desire theories that restrict the desires that 
                                                                                                                                            
or greater the more it is wanted.  Thus, on this view, one of two experiences is more pleasant the more it is 
wanted. 
68 Consider making a choice to go to a party with its associated pleasures or sitting at home reading Dewey.  
Which choice results in the “better” experience?  PH suggests that the one I prefer is the “better” 
experience. 
69 Sumner, Welfare, 149. 
70 Here is the problem:  consider a stranger with a fatal illness who arouses my sympathy but, much later 
and unknown to me, is cured.  UT says this event is good for me and makes my life go better. 
71 Even though ST is more plausible than UT, Parfit offers a number of counter-examples to demonstrate 
the problems with ST.  An interesting development here is a question about the desires that people have 
about what happens after they are dead.  Where PH says that once you are dead, nothing bad can happen to 
you, ST says you should be able to deny this claim. 
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count to ones for which the individual has access to full information (e.g. rationality, 
reflection, etc.).72  Such an account holds that one’s life is going well to the extent one 
succeeds in getting what one wants through the fulfillment of one’s informed desire or 
the achievement of one’s aims.  One attraction of desire theories is that they forge an 
obvious link between an individual’s welfare and motives.  However, the problem here is 
that since the enjoyment of desires is only one source of well-being, and there are other 
ways to advance our good, desire-theory is not adequate for developing or deriving a 
theory of welfare.  One way in which to avoid such criticisms of desire theories is to shift 
criterion for the evaluation from the enjoyment of desires to the fulfillment or satisfaction 
of preferences.  However, Parfit argues for the possibility of revising PH by appealing not 
only to my actual preferences in the alternative I choose, but also to the preferences that I 
would have had if I had chosen the alternative. This suggests that, with either PH or ST, 
the appeal should not be only to desires or preferences that one actually has but also to 
those desires and preferences one would have had, in the various alternatives that were, at 
different times, open to one.  In this case, the best among these alternatives is the one 
which fulfills the strongest preferences and desires.  Finally, both PH and ST can be 
summative when they appeal to all of someone’s desires, actual and hypothetical, about 
one’s life.  However, it is possible to rule out summative theories because they have a 
plausibility problem.  This leads Parfit to conclude that there is another version of both 
theories that does not appeal, in a summative way, to all a person’s desires and 
                                               
72 Should we appeal only to the desires and preferences that someone actually has?  Consider the earlier 
example of staying at home to read Dewey.  Suppose that knowing what both alternatives would be like, I 
choose to stay at home and I never come to regret that choice.  PH says reading at home gave me the better 
evening.  This is a mistake because it might be true that if I had chosen to go to the party, I would have 
never regretted that choice, but according to PH, going to the party would have given me the better 
evening.  Thus, PH implies that each alternative would have been better than the other one, which is 
contradictory. 
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preferences about his own life.  This version would appeal only to global rather than local 
desires and preferences.73 
Preferences, Fulfillment and Authentic Happiness 
 L. W. Sumner’s thinking and writing on human well-being is an excellent 
example of rigorous use of the approach and methods generally associated with the 
philosophy of analysis.  His first task in developing his account involves a detailed, 
thoughtful conceptual analysis of welfare leading to questions about both its nature (what 
is it for a life to be going well) and its value (the role it should play in an ethical theory).  
Although his concern is not in advancing a theory that would determine what is good or 
bad for people, early on he observes that “[s]urely, welfare is valuable in itself, if 
anything is.”74  Since he holds that questions about the value of welfare cannot be 
answered by the sciences, because of their attempt to “expel all questions of value” from 
their domains, they are thus relegated to philosophy.  However, he also notes that science 
is an “obvious place to turn” when it comes to understanding what something is or what it 
is like.  This leads him to argue, by analogy, that a theory of well-being can best be 
conceptualized in a way that is similar to a theory of causation, i.e., it doesn’t tell us what 
causes what, since this is the business of science.  Instead, a theory of causation only tells 
us what constitute the specified conditions required for something to be the cause of 
something else.75  Since a theory of causation seems to occupy a middle ground between 
being merely conceptual and fully empirical, this leads Sumner to claim that “[an] inquiry 
                                               
73 A global preference is a preference about some part of one’s life considered as a whole, or about one’s 
whole life and he claims the global version is more plausible. 
74 Sumner, Welfare, 4. 
75 Such theories are not empirical or scientific since they don’t report causal connections between particular 
events or states of the world; neither are they merely analytic or conceptual in that they claim to tell us 
something about what the world is like and not just remind us of our ideas about it. 
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into the “nature of welfare” seems to occupy the same territory.”76  Although such a 
theory of welfare will not tell us whether a particular thing is good for a person, it will 
specify the conditions under which that particular thing will be good for the person. 
 There are two ways, in Sumner’s view, that a theory of welfare can be considered 
to be adequate, i.e., either in terms of its normative adequacy or in terms of its descriptive 
adequacy.  In regards to the first criterion, a theory of welfare would be normative if its 
background is either rationality (e.g., prescribing that agents maximize their own welfare) 
or morality (e.g., the maximization or equal distribution of the general welfare).  In 
contrast, descriptive adequacy decouples welfare from its role in a normative framework.  
This involves testing a candidate conception in terms of its fit with our ordinary 
experience of and judgments about welfare and favoring one that is “faithful to that 
experience and makes sense of those judgments.”77  Given the number of recent 
competing conceptions or accounts of welfare that focus primarily, if not exclusively, on 
normative adequacy Sumner argues this shows the need for an independent test of 
descriptive adequacy for theories about its nature. 
 The basic test of the descriptive adequacy of a theory of welfare is relatively 
simple: the best theory is the one that is most faithful to our ordinary concepts and our 
ordinary experience.  He characterizes “ordinary experience” as being 
 given by what we think or feel or know about well-being, both our own 
and that of others.  The data which a candidate theory must fit, therefore, 
consist of the prodigious variety of our preanalytic convictions.  We 
manifest these convictions when we judge that our lives are going well or 
                                               
76 Sumner, Welfare, 7. 
77 Sumner, Welfare, 9. 
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badly, that pursuing some objective will be profitable or advantageous for 
us….A theory of welfare tells us what the world must be like in order for 
such judgments to be correct; it offers truth conditions for them.  Its 
degree of fit with our ordinary experience will therefore be a function of 
the extent to which the truth conditions it offers can support and 
systematize our intuitive assessments.78 
In addition, since the concept of welfare is “analytically connected” to related notions 
such as well-being, interest, good, benefit, profit, advantage etc. and their antonyms, an 
adequate theory must preserve this “network of analytic connections” otherwise it is 
merely an interpretation of some other concept. 
Consequently, because of the great number of such connections, it is necessary to 
have many substitution tests for any candidate theory offered.  This has implications in 
terms of the truth conditions because an adequate theory of welfare must be capable of 
supporting judgments within all of the cognate notions.  Ultimately, having “fidelity to 
our experience” involves embracing our “pretheoretical beliefs”, their role in our 
practical deliberations, and our common-sense explanations.  From his initial criterion of 
fidelity, he also derives three additional criteria of descriptive adequacy that form the 
“cardinal virtues” for an adequate theory of welfare: generality, formality and neutrality.  
Although all three are important for Sumner’s theory, the one most relevant from the 
perspective of this inquiry is formality. 
As a criterion for a theory about the nature of welfare, formality requires that the 
theory tell us what it is for someone’s life to go badly, or for someone to benefit from 
                                               
78 Sumner, Welfare, 10. 
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something or be harmed by it.  Such a theory “…must provide the appropriate relation to 
complete such formulas as ‘x benefits y’ if and only if x stands in relation R to y’.”  In 
terms of an adequate theory such a formulation avoids confusing the nature of well-being 
with its sources (direct or intrinsic) in that it also requires an account of what qualifies 
something or anything to be on that list, i.e., it serves to separate the nature of well-being 
from its sources.  This leads Sumner to observe that although “[w]e should expect many 
sources of welfare to vary from individual to individual, and from group to group, 
reflecting differences of taste or situation or constitution….a theory of welfare, because it 
must be both formal and general, must abstract from these contingencies of history, 
culture and even biology.”79  Instead, an adequate theory of welfare will be able to 
answer questions about what the good or well-being of people consists in, what it is for 
their lives to go well or what it takes to make their lives go better.  Such a theory of 
welfare will be unitary at the level of its nature regardless of the plurality of welfare at 
the level of its sources because there is only one answer to these questions which “applies 
equally to all the different varieties of welfare, all of its sources, and all of its many 
subjects.”80  However, because such unity is merely an assumption, Sumner suggests that 
its status is that of an “unproven regulatory hypothesis” whose purpose is to guide his 
inquiry into the nature of welfare. 
The final aspect of descriptive adequacy requires that a theory about the nature of 
welfare must also tell us something about what it is for our lives to either have or lack a 
certain kind of value because our lives are “complex things whose value can be assessed 
                                               
79 Sumner, Welfare, 16-17. 
80 Sumner, Welfare, 17. 
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along a number of different dimensions or from a number of different standpoints.”81 
Since welfare is only one way in which a life can be going well it is also important to 
distinguish it clearly from among other relevant dimensions or standpoints.  The 
distinguishing feature of welfare assessments is their concern with the prudential value of 
life, namely how well the life is going for the individual whose life it is.  Thus, regardless 
how valuable something is, it can promote or hinder my well-being only if it is also good 
or beneficial for me.  An adequate theory of welfare, then, must preserve the “subject 
relativity” that is definitive of prudential evaluation since failing to do so means that it 
wouldn’t be a theory about welfare at all.  However, Sumner requires more in that it must 
also “fit our ordinary concept” of subject-relativity, but also provide “an interpretation” 
of its principal features.  Given that subject-relativity is a “key ingredient” in how we 
conceptualize welfare because it serves to differentiate prudential value from other modes 
of value, an adequate theory must also “tell us what it means for my life to be going well 
not just in itself or from some other standpoint but for me, to explain how it is that lives 
can have this peculiar perspectival kind of value.”82  However, he acknowledges that 
while it is an essential aspect of welfare, it is also “somewhat elusive.” 
Sumner’s Argument that Well-being is not as an Aesthetic Value 
As a value, Sumner distinguishes well-being from aesthetic, perfectionist, and 
ethical values.  The most relevant of these, in terms of this inquiry, are his 
characterizations of aesthetic and ethical value.  Aesthetic values are involved with “the 
domain of feeling and sensibility; we attribute aesthetic value to those objects or 
characteristics which we find in some respect appealing or attractive or admirable….the 
                                               
81 Sumner, Welfare, 20. 
82 Sumner, Welfare, 20. 
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aesthetic standards appropriate for assessing a particular thing will depend on the kind of 
thing it is.”83  However, if we are going to evaluate lives from such a standpoint, this will 
require standards which are warranted by the kind of thing a life is.  Here is one story as 
to how this could play out:  a human life is, in some measure, an artifact capable of being 
“shaped and molded” by both is possessor and/or by others, thus it is something we could 
treat or live as a “work of art.”  As a “temporally extended object or event”, a life can be 
shaped or subjected to “conscious direction” through imposing a structure on the way in 
which it unfolds, so that its development conforms to some conscious pattern; although it 
need not be only one such structure or pattern that confers aesthetic value on a life.  Even 
though there will be many ways of living such a life, the only feature they share is having 
been under some degree of “artistic control.” 
An alternative background story could be to hold that a life acquires “aesthetic 
value” by manifesting an “aesthetic sensibility” through gaining “a suitable degree of 
appreciation” of the aesthetic value of other things in the world.  The problem here is that 
lives are treated as second-order aesthetic objects whose value is dependent on the 
recognition of first-order aesthetic objects.  A third story might be to think that the point 
is to live one’s life with style or panache regardless of the substantive ends one might 
choose to pursue, i.e., it’s not what we do but how we do it.  Due to the “wide range” of 
its possible objects, aesthetic value is unlikely to be confused with welfare, although lives 
are capable of bearing both aesthetic and prudential value.  The problem with accounts 
such as those above is that the fact that a life possesses these features to a high degree 
doesn’t mean that one can conclude that one is faring well since “[k]nowing that your life 
                                               
83 Sumner, Welfare, 21. 
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has a high degree of aesthetic value does not just fail to tell us the full story about your 
well-being—it tells us none of the story.”84  Thus, it is one thing for your life to be going 
well and quite another for it to contain those features that augment its “aesthetic value.”  
This is not to say that if you take on the project of living an aesthetically valuable life, 
your success or failure will have no bearing on your well-being, but the same holds true 
for all your other projects.  Sumner concludes that “…while success in one’s projects is 
arguably an important source of welfare, scoring high on aesthetic value, just considered 
by itself, makes no independent contribution.”85 
Sumner’s Argument for a Subjective-Relative Theory of Welfare 
It is possible to not only distinguish between theories of welfare in terms of value, 
but also as to whether they are objective or subjective in orientation.86  An objective 
theory of human well-being holds that it is independent from, at least in part, experiences 
and preferences.  Sumner views objective theories as being inadequate because 1) they 
lack subject-relativity, and 2) they generally end up being about something other than 
welfare.87  For these reasons, although acknowledging this to be a contentious position, 
Sumner rules them out as a plausible category.  In contrast, subjective theories of welfare 
hold that any judgment one makes about one’s well-being must appeal directly to one’s 
experiences and preferences which serve as the primary criteria for the evaluation of their 
fulfillment.  They are primary in the sense that preferences are what we refer to when 
                                               
84 Sumner, Welfare, 22. 
85 Sumner, Welfare, 23. 
86 Although Sumner admits reluctance to invoking these notion, Griffin observes that the distinction 
between subjective and objective as commonly defined “does not make an especially crucial difference.  It 
would be better if these terms (at least in this sense) were put into retirement.” WELL-BEING, 33.  
87 In regard to the former he claims that they are unable to provide an adequate account of the perspectival 
character (prudential value) of well-being and in terms of the latter he means such concepts as “private 
ownership of intrinsic goods”, “basic needs or goods”, “functionings and capabilities”, or “perfectionism”. 
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making our subjective evaluation of those experiences that we seek out (like) or we avoid 
(dislike).  However, this is not to deny that there may be many other reasons we seek out 
or avoid certain experiences as well, e.g., pleasure, pain, enjoyment, suffering, happiness, 
satisfaction of need, satisfaction of interest, etc. 
One problem, however, is that there can be conflict between and among 
preferences.88  Such conflicts arise, in part, from the fact that, at least for human beings, 
preferences are numerous and not equivalent in strength, thereby resulting in differing 
valuations. This can be a problem for a theory that establishes preferences as criteria for 
the evaluation of happiness especially if the analysis becomes more complex, such as 
when multiple layers of preferences (meta-preferences) are involved.  In such cases one’s 
choice may not result just from one’s preferences, but preferences about one’s 
preferences, and perhaps even preferences about one’s preferences about one’s 
preferences ad infinitum.  Also meta-preferences constitute “second order” preferences 
or, if more than one layer, “higher order” preferences. A troubling implication of meta-
preferences is that since one may have preferences one does not wish to have or of which 
one may not be necessarily aware, one may act in ways one does not wish to act.  So how 
are we to decide which preferences count in making a subjective assessment of one’s life-
satisfaction?89 
                                               
88 If one prefers both “always to be on time” and “to travel in slower moving vehicles”, it is possible that 
one will pay for a wild taxi ride in order to make an important business meeting on time. 
89 Do we need to consider all of the preferences we have or only a sub-set of those preferences?  Since 
under most ordinary circumstances it is unlikely that my aversion to slimy okra will have much effect when 
it comes to making a judgment about my well-being, it is probably the latter. 
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One way is to reduce the number of preferences that count in the assessment of 
one’s well-being.90  A theory of welfare might accomplish this by restricting the scope of 
preference-fulfillment to those that involve a sense of personal satisfaction, although it 
need not.  However, since personal satisfaction is likely too broad in both scope and 
extent to be useful in making any judgment as to whether or not our life is going well, 
perhaps restricting the relevant preferences to those that lead to life satisfaction offers the 
best possibility for narrowing the scope of preferences that are relevant to making 
judgments about one’s well-being.  Life satisfaction, then, forms the conceptual context 
in which the fulfillment or satisfaction of rational preferences, under certain specifiable 
conditions will lead to a judgment that one’s happiness is authentic. 
The two conditions that Sumner’s theory requires for authentic happiness are: 1) 
that one has access to all the information “relevant” for making decisions about one’s 
life, and 2) that such decisions are “autonomous” in that they represent values that are 
truly one’s own and not the result of manipulation or coercive social conditioning.  If it is 
the case these conditions that serve to “fix” the authenticity of one’s judgment because 
they are both necessary and sufficient, then “authentic happiness” consists in a fixed 
cognitive state either at the level of judgments about preference formation or judgments 
about preference fulfillment.  Such necessary and sufficient conditions apply to the 
formation of one’s preferences as well as to one’s subsequent judgment about their 
fulfillment or satisfaction.  In order to avoid the standard problems with subjectivist 
theories, his account requires that he adopt subject relativity as a requirement, which 
                                               
90 Perhaps this could be done by engaging in some non-absolute hierarchical ordering or ranking of our 
preferences.  The rank ordering of one’s preferences can change over time based on one’s experience over 
time or a change in the material conditions of one's life could produce a more immediate re-ordering of 
one’s preferences.  Since this would require some type of elaborate decision-process to weight the priorities 
and calculate the satisfaction coefficient, this does not seem a likely way to go. 
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holds that there is only one possible choice of “authoritative subject” since the prudential 
value of my life is its value for me. 
Adopting subject relativity as a requirement is necessary in order for any 
statement about my well-being to be true because it is the case that only my attitudes and 
inclinations figure in a constitutive account of my well-being.  The root idea here is that 
one’s happiness should reflect a response “of one’s own, to a life of one’s own” in which 
one becomes “the proprietor or manager of a set of attitudes, both positive and negative, 
toward the conditions of your life.  It is these attitudes which constitute the standpoint 
from which these conditions can be assessed as good or bad for you.  Prudential value is 
therefore perspectival because it literally takes the point of view of the subject.”91  
However, in order for his theory to be plausible, subject relativity must explicitly address 
experience, which Sumner does through invoking an experience requirement which 
stipulates “that a state of affairs can make me better off only if, in one way or another, it 
enters or affects my experience….[a] desire theory which incorporated such a 
requirement might look like this:  x makes me better off intrinsically just in case (1) I 
desire x, (2) x occurs, and (3) I am at least aware of x’s occurrence.”92 Since any desire 
theory is a state-of-the-world theory, i.e., the actual occurrence of the desired state of 
affairs is a necessary condition in the analysis, the benefit it affords is that it becomes 
impossible to convert it into a mental state theory. 
Finally, Sumner’s account is welfarist in orientation since it presupposes some 
general account of what welfare ultimately means, which is important because he views 
human well-being as being particularly concerned with prudential value. The experience 
                                               
91 Sumner, Welfare, 43. 
92 Sumner, Welfare, 127.  He also notes that this is necessary for the descriptive adequacy of a theory of 
welfare which was important insight in classical hedonism.  
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requirement and subject relativity are what serve to distinguish subject-relative welfare 
from all other modes of value, because it holds that your life is prudentially valuable only 
if it is going well for you.  Further, since welfare requires such an internal reference to its 
bearer, subject-relativity is an essential feature of our ordinary concept of welfare.  Thus, 
any subjective theory of welfare will make one’s well-being dependent on one’s own 
concerns, e.g., what one cares about, to what one attaches importance, to what matters, 
etc.  As a result, positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) feelings, interests, 
dispositions, attitudes, etc., constitute possible targets for subjective analysis, partly 
because of their moral force.93  However, not all philosophical theories of human well-
being are welfarist in orientation since, just because a value theory holds that human 
well-being is important, does not mean that it qualifies as a theory of welfarism.  Instead, 
such theories must claim that individual well-being is the only thing with final or ultimate 
ethical value.  Consequently, since individual well-being is the only “state of affairs” we 
have a moral reason to promote for its own sake it is the only thing that matters for ethics. 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
The central claim here is that the theories offered by Plato and Sumner are false 
because they commit the philosophical fallacy which results in the disconnection of 
human well-being from experience in the geographic sense.  The analysis began with 
Plato’s conception of happiness as an epistemic state, fixed form and final-end which was 
shown to have unsettling implications as an account of human well-being.  However, this 
is not to suggest that there is nothing about his theory that deserves attention.  For 
                                               
93 For Sumner a legitimate subjectivist theory of welfare will be able to map the polarity of welfare onto the 
polarity of attitudes, so that being well-off requires having a positive (favorable) attitude toward one’s life, 
while being badly-off depends on having a negative (unfavorable) attitude toward it. 
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example, he established an explicit and important connection between human well-being 
and ethics, i.e., that one’s happiness involves possessing a certain fixed character that 
consists in achieving a balance of the virtues.  Also, he viewed education as being central 
to securing the correct type of knowledge and methods necessary for living the life of a 
person who has the right character which makes it essential for the achievement of his 
view of authentic happiness.94  Finally, he recognized almost immediately the importance 
and need to establish the connection between “justice in the individual” and “justice in 
the polis” in order for Justice to take its place as the unifying virtue (i.e., the most 
“authentic” virtue) and the only end worth pursuing for its own sake.   
The picture of the just man and the just city that he created in The Republic 
illustrates the definition of the Form of Justice.  So, for Plato, to understand that picture is 
to grasp the definition of human well-being. In establishing a direct relationship between 
individual happiness and the well-being of the polis, Plato also drew attention to the 
importance of the bi-conditionality of the relationship between individual and community 
well-being, which is certainly consistent with the conceptualization of human well-being 
within which I am working.  The major problem with his theory lies with his claim that 
the physical world and its objects are at best merely “copies” or, at worst, “corruptions” 
of the Forms that exist in an immaterial world (as things-in-themselves).  If this is indeed 
the case, then how will it ever possible to find “authentic”, in this case “True” or 
“Absolute” human well-being, in the natural world—the world of lived experience?95  In 
making P-justice the only and final purpose of one’s life, for Plato, True or Absolute 
                                               
94 His account of character also serves to draw our attention to the concepts of harmony, balance and unity 
that will have relevance later for our discussion about the aesthetic aspect of human well-being. 
95 This is not to say that Plato finds the situation hopeless since he also identifies the true nature of the 
person with the process of thought, thus making it possible for one to transcend the world of experience. 
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Happiness exists, if this can even be said to apply in this case, as only a Form in some 
immaterial place.  However, it seems reasonable for our experience to demand that there 
be more to the notion of the “authenticity” of happiness than merely some mysterious 
relationship to an immaterial Form.96  In fact, the limitations in the very nature of our 
being that Plato recognizes suggest that P-justice, as a form, will always be inaccessible 
or unavailable to us within the context of the natural world of experience.  However this 
isn’t particularly surprising since, depending on the view of happiness we accept, some of 
us are likely to be able to get closer to “True”, “Absolute” or “Authentic” happiness, 
whatever it may mean, than others. 
 In addition, there also exists a significant practical limitation in being able to 
determine whether or not a person is P-just since “only like can know like…only one 
who is dialectically skilled can be a good test or touchstone for the condition of another’s 
soul.”97  Consequently, in conceiving human well-being as P-Justice, it ultimately 
becomes something that is inaccessible to most human beings.  For the vast lot of 
humanity, one’s well-being is determined by whatever “common justice” permits, which 
is whatever the P-just elite determine that to be since most humanity is subject to their 
rule.  This should come as little surprise given the essentially aristocratic origin and 
grounding of ancient Greek philosophy.  Perhaps, then, Plato’s theory should not be 
interpreted as a general theory of human well-being, but instead interpreted as a theory of 
                                               
96 This may sound harsh but, in the end, it seems that Platonic happiness is something that most human 
beings will never be able to experience since they will never be in the position of being among the elite. 
Even if authenticity does lie elsewhere, we should still find it unsettling that that it seems none of us can 
ever be in the possession True Happiness—it will always be a copy or corruption of what is truly authentic. 
97 Teloh, “A Vulgar and Philosophical Test for Justice in Plato’s Republic”, 507. 
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well-being for aristocrats.98  Although one might be tempted to claim that Plato’s account 
could be interpreted as entailing that there is a level of happiness that is appropriate to 
each class, such a claim is problematic in that such happiness, depending on one’s class, 
would be merely a more corrupted form of True Happiness.  
However, even putting aside the above problem, even though Plato offered a 
reasonably sound argument for P-justice that establishes it as the final-end of happiness 
(eudaimonia) and fixes it in the character of the P-just person, in its most “authentic” 
form it remains something which none of us will ever be able to experience.  Even for 
those who are able to attain a P-just character, the truest, absolute and most authentic 
form of happiness possible, in the end even their happiness is at best a copy and, at worst, 
a corruption of the authentic Form of P-justice.  Although for Plato a P-just character is 
the criterion of evaluation for human well-being, it consists in an individualistic, private 
or internal cognitive state (as knowledge or wisdom) that is achievable only through 
one’s detachment from the world of nature and experience.99  Within the context of 
pragmatic naturalism adopting such dualism, itself, represents a falsification of 
experience.  Consequently, since his theory of human well-being is based upon a false 
understanding of experience it represents a total disconnection of well-being from 
experience.  
                                               
98 Although Plato agrees with Socrates that success in life requires knowledge and a successful life is a 
virtuous one, he “tied the knowledge in question to a special set of entities—the Forms—to which only the 
minority can have access.  If, then, the minority is to achieve virtue (to whatever degree) then they must be 
subject to the majority.”  Rowe, Plato, 135. 
99  The relationship of the “body” to “knowledge” in Plato has relevance for later discussion in Chapter 5.  
For example, Plato believes that “[d]eath means ‘release of the soul from the body’; and this is the state 
which the true philosopher will have tried to achieve so far as is possible in life…The body is a hindrance 
to the pursuit of wisdom and truth:  its senses confuse us, and its pleasures distract us.  We must therefore 
purify ourselves of its influences and allow reason to operate alone and unsullied.”  Rowe, Plato, 166-67.  
The solution to this involves a process of purification that Plato describes in The Republic at 67cd. 
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Sumner’s theory of authentic happiness clearly represents an advance over Plato’s 
theory and addresses a significant number of “philosophical puzzles” that plague other 
forms of hedonistic and non-hedonistic theories of human well-being.  However, despite 
his commitment to an “experience requirement”, his account remains grounded in a view 
of experience that commits him to a cognitive conception of human well-being in which 
the target of evaluation is happiness and the criterion for evaluation is preference 
satisfaction or fulfillment. His conception falsifies human well-being in that it fails to 
begin with a non-dualistic theory of experience and allows experience to enter in only as 
a subsidiary criterion or requirement for his theory.  Further, arguing that some form of a 
subjective account of human well-being holds plausibility, as Sumner does, strongly 
suggests that his account of human well-being, from its very beginning, commits the 
philosophical fallacy. 
In failing to begin with a non-dualistic theory of experience Sumner pursues a 
cognitive theory of happiness which fails to address the importance of the “pervasive 
quality” that is characteristic of our situated experience.  As such, “authentic happiness” 
consists only as a cognitive state in which a feeling of “satisfaction” is associated with 
the “fulfillment” of rationally derived preferences, which also consist in a cognitive state.  
In conceiving “happiness” as a cognitive state he reduces it to only a narrow slice from 
within the total spectrum of our discriminations in experience that are important, at least 
equally and perhaps more, for achieving a holistic understanding of human well-being.  
Although Sumner does not reject the possibility that other things, even non-cognitive 
ones, can contribute to our well-being, the problem is that that they fail to serve as 
plausible criteria for evaluating theories of human well-being.   
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Sumner also recognizes that not all instances of preference fulfillment are the 
same and that, under certain conditions, some judgments one makes about satisfaction or 
fulfillment are “authentic” while others are not.  Such “authentic happiness” is possible 
only in the case that the two conditions for information and autonomy are met.  These 
two conditions are necessary in order to establish authentic happiness as a fixed cognitive 
state.  In applying these conditions of authenticity to preference fulfillment, the 
unfortunate result is that, instead of enlarging happiness as a slice of the full spectrum of 
human experience, human well-being is narrowed even further.  It is only by meeting 
both conditions, in terms of the selection of one’s preferences as well as one’s subjective 
relative judgment about their fulfillment, that one can achieve the authenticity necessary 
for happiness as the final-end of preference fulfillment. 
 Finally, Sumner’s theory also represents an attempt to link the prudential 
understanding of human well-being to ethics through his conception of welfarism.  
However, when he says that well-being is “all that matters ethically”, such a claim 
appears similar, at least in some respects, to the claim of ethical egoism, i.e. that one 
should always do what is in one’s self interest.  If welfarism claims that well-being is all 
that matters ethically then in what way is it distinguishable from the claim of ethical 
egoism that “one should always do what is in one’s self-interest”?  If indistinguishable 
from ethical egoism, then it would be difficult for any welfarist theory of human well-
being to withstand the typical arguments advanced against ethical egoism.  Alternatively, 
if the claim is “one always acts in one’s self-interest” then welfarist theories are merely 
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variants of psychological egoism, thus they have nothing to do with ethics.100  Even so, 
psychological egoism is open to dispute since many of us believe that we do act in the 
interest of others, although in the final analysis, it may be that even in these cases we are 
always acting to preserve or advance our own self-interest. 
Obviously, one does not have to deny the existence of the interests of others if one 
adopts a welfarist orientation.  It is certainly possible that such interests have some 
secondary ethical value and are deserving of one’s consideration, even if what really 
matters ethically is one’s self-interest.  Perhaps part of the confusion here rests with what 
we mean when we say that one acts in one’s self-interest.101  Regardless, it seems that in 
claiming that one’s own interest is the only thing that matters ethically welfarist theories 
require some further qualification, such as, “in general” or “in most cases”.  So, when one 
does act in one’s own interest, which may not always be the case, it is the discrimination 
in experience as an “act of self-interest” that matters ethically at that time.  Thus, while 
there may well be other relevant ethical considerations, e.g., regard for others’ interests, 
they are not discriminated in experience as being what matters most when one acts in 
one’s self-interest. 
Finally, “authentic happiness” requires that one’s appraisal about one’s 
satisfaction be one’s own, i.e., it only involves my life and, therefore, my personal 
satisfaction.  However, Sumner’s restrictive subjectivistic theory of human well-being 
fails to recognize that, ultimately, our appraisal of our satisfaction or fulfillment is not 
                                               
100 There are two ways to interpret PE: 1) everyone acts to maximize her self-interest and 2) everyone acts 
to maximize her perceived self-interest.  Of the two, the former is clearly not plausible since it is vulnerable 
to a number of counter-examples, e.g., a person who smokes does so to satisfy his own desires. 
101 At one extreme, total or absolute self-interest disregards the interests of others.  At the other extreme, 
total or absolute altruism disregards one’s self-interest.  It is likely that the set of practitioners of each 
extreme forms a null set. 
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personal and subjective, but objective and inherently social.  The very satisfaction or 
fulfillment of one’s preferences has a lived consequence in the community life of which 
one is a member.  In fact, although the very idea of satisfaction is a social construction, it 
is possible to ground it in a naturalistic metaphysics since, as a concept, its use is only to 
discriminate some quality of our individual experience in given situations.102  If this is the 
case, it seems that in one’s acting to bring about satisfaction for herself, she necessarily 
acts for the public or social good.  Thus, it is through the realization of one’s “individual 
well-being” that she is able to contribute to the well-being of other members of her 
community. 
In conclusion, for Plato happiness must be something more than the episodic or 
fleeting pleasure in our experience.  For this reason, he rejects experience as having 
much, if any, relevance for how human well-being (eudaimonia) should be understood.  
Instead, our happiness involves things that transcend our experience in nature, e.g. fixed 
forms or fixed-ends.  It involves coming into the possession of a certain “cognitive state”, 
i.e., the balance that is achieved though the harmonious coordination of the relations 
among the three aspects of the soul (psyche).  His theory also holds that human well-
being is a matter of ethics since it involves possessing the right character (although as a 
fixed epistemic state) as well as its being the final-end of all human activity.  Thus, it is 
not just that living a P-just life constitutes a final-end in itself, if indeed there is any; it is 
the final-end for one’s life, as well as for all human life.  This means that in Plato’s 
theory of human well-being the primary target for evaluation is happiness (eudaimonia) 
for which the criterion of evaluation is the character that one possesses. 
                                               
102 This view of individuality recognizes that while we are individuated, we are not isolated, each of us is a 
social individual. 
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L.W. Sumner bases his theory of “authentic happiness” on preference formation 
and judgments about their fulfillment that must meet certain necessary and sufficient 
conditions.   Although he retains preferences as the criteria of evaluation of happiness, he 
follows most PH theories by shifting the focus away from the pleasure to betterment as 
the determinative criterion of evaluation for happiness.  His theory is a cognitive state 
theory because he heavily emphasizes the importance of rationality both in the formation 
of one’s preferences as well as in terms of one’s judgment as to the extent of their 
satisfaction.  Although acknowledging the importance of choice in human well-being, his 
emphasis on rational decision-making under certain necessary and sufficient conditions 
serves only to reduce “authentic” human well-being to a very small sliver of human 
experience, qualitatively as well as quantitatively.  A final limitation is that although 
Sumner’s theory stipulates the necessary and sufficient conditions governing one’s 
preference-formation and subsequent judgment about fulfillment, which also form the 
grounds for authenticity as well, they are so stringent that it appears they can be rarely, if 
ever, met in actual experience.
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Dewey on Nature, Experience and the Situated Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not experience which is experienced, but nature— 
 stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature,  
 electricity, and so on.  Things interacting in certain ways  
 are experience, they are what is experienced. 
 
     John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 12 
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Given the irresolvable problems the philosophical fallacy creates for accounts of 
human well-being such as those offered by Plato and Sumner, what is required now is a 
radically different understanding of human well-being.  At this point in the inquiry, it is 
necessary to establish the foundation for a Deweyan account of human well-being in 
which the target for evaluation changes from happiness (as eudaimonia or authentic 
happiness) to betterment and the criterion for evaluation changes from virtuous character 
or preference fulfillment to the pervasive quality of the situation.  The intent is to 
introduce the latter two elements here, but we will return to them occasionally at other 
points during the inquiry.  The starting point for a Deweyan account lies in the 
recognition that human well-being is, fundamentally, a consequence of our response to 
existential situations that involve the naturalistic tension that is always at play in 
achieving a balance between the precarious and the stable in existence. 
This tension, which is most recognizable in the alternating periods of stability and 
instability associated with living, led Dewey to conclude that “the significant problems 
and issues of life and philosophy concern the rate and mode of the conjunction of the 
precarious and the assured, the incomplete and the finished, the repetitious and the 
varying, the safe and sane and the hazardous.  If we trust the evidence of experienced 
things, these traits, and the modes and tempos of their interaction with each other, are 
fundamental features of natural existence.”103  Making ExperienceG the central feature in 
a Deweyan account of human well-being recognizes that it has its roots in the natural 
world.  In such a world “precariousness” and “stability” come to constitute the 
fundamental, brute, and natural features of human existence.  It is also the case that 
                                               
103 Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1, 66-67. 
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human existence involves “to put it baldly, a gamble.  The world is a scene of risk; it is 
uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable.  Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be 
counted upon as to their times or seasons.”104 
However, although we have substituted sophistication for superstition relatively 
successfully, the fact remains that 
[o]ur magical safeguard against the uncertain character of the world is to 
deny the existence of chance, to mumble universal and necessary law, the 
ubiquity of cause and effect, the uniformity of nature, universal progress, 
and the inherent rationality of the universe….But when all is said and 
done, the fundamentally hazardous character of the world is not seriously 
modified, much less eliminated….our attainments are only devices for 
blurring the disagreeable recognition of a fact, instead of means of altering 
the fact itself.105 
It appears there are only two paths open to us when it comes to responding to the 
instability and insecurity that constitute the fundamental natural features of existence.  On 
the one hand, we can attempt to appease the powers which “environ” us and determine 
“our destiny” or, on the other hand, we can “invent arts and by their means turn the 
powers of nature to account….This is the method of changing the world through action, 
as the other is the method of changing the self in emotion and idea.”106  To put it rather 
simply, the choice open to us is either to anchor ourselves to some immaterial and 
transcendent realm or to find a way in which we can achieve stability and security within 
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the natural world of lived experience.  In choosing to pursue the latter course the first step 
is to identify and describe the “common traits of nature” that constitute the foundation for 
all transactional situations and their resultant pervasive qualities. 
The Intelligibility of Nature and the Common Traits in Experience 
A correct theory of experience must begin by working to discriminate the traits 
that are common to all contexts or situations of experience since this makes it possible to 
formulate those traits which belong to nature in its most inclusive sense.107  At a most 
basic level they are the function of interactions between human beings and the natural 
environment (as nature).  Through analysis of the characteristics of particular kinds of 
experience it is not only possible to discriminate among them (e.g., as moral, scientific, 
or aesthetic), but also to determine the specific common traits of nature that are implied 
by all these kinds of experience.  Although Dewey’s conception of “experience” 
recognizes that we make cognitive discriminations (experienceC) it certainly involves a 
great deal more because it consists in the transactional field resulting from the ongoing 
interactions between the organism and the environment.  Consequently, experienceG 
provides a considerable enlargement over the traditional understanding of the term as 
well as avoiding any possibility of dualism entering into it. 
His approach to discriminating the common traits in experience rests on the 
methodological assumption that, “the characterization of nature must be such that 
clarifies and enlightens experience as we actually find it, rather than making it obscure 
and unintelligible.”108  This led him to employ the method of experience or denotative 
empirical method which holds that all inquiries generated by any human experience must 
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lead to concepts and distinctions that are valid only to the extent to which they make 
intelligible the sort of experience that prompted their formulation.  Philosophy then 
ceases to be merely an intellectual diversion and becomes an indispensable function of 
enlightening human experience and conduct.  In fact, the “first-rate test” of the value of 
any philosophy is whether it “ends in conclusions which, when they are referred back to 
ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more 
luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful.”109  One way we seek to 
make our experience intelligible is by organizing our ordinary life-experience and, 
consequently, our inquiries around three principle modes of interaction: 1) those between 
experience and nature, 2) those between body and mind, and 3) those between the 
individual and society.  These also serve as the starting point in Dewey’s metaphysics 
and theories of inquiry, ethics, value and aesthetics. 
As to the “extent and method” of his metaphysics, it involves identifying and 
describing those things that “communicate the genuine features” of the world in which 
we live, i.e., “the large and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, 
failures and successes together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics 
and religion which mark them.”110  Given this context, the challenge lies in specifying the 
kind of world in which such traits take place, i.e., what constitutes the most general and 
irreducible description of that world?  This involves discriminating those traits that are 
common to all occasions of experience, i.e., the most general “generic traits” of nature 
that are present in any encountered subject matter or situation.  Part of the answer relies 
on the methods of scientific inquiry and the concept of evolution in that both lead us 
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towards a description of the natural world as being one in which at least some changes 
take on “evolutionary form.”  In referring to the theme of the evolution of living things, 
Dewey noted “the distinctive trait of metaphysical reflection would not then be its 
attempt to discover some temporarily original feature which caused the development, but 
the irreducible traits of a world in which at least some changes take on evolutionary form.  
A world where some changes proceed in the direction of the appearance of living and 
thinking creatures is a striking sort of world.”111 
Although we know that nature functions in a number of different ways, one clear 
thing it does is bring about qualitatively different events since “it is an affair of affairs, 
wherein each one, no matter how linked up it may be with others, has its own 
qualities.”112  Such “affairs” or “situations” always imply some conscious human 
participation and, if there were no humans (or similar sentient creatures), there would be 
no situations in nature since “[t]he situation is not indifferent to man, because it forms 
man as a desiring, striving, thinking, feeling creature.  It is not egotism that leads man 
from contemplative registration of these traits to interest in managing them, to 
intelligence and purposive art.  Interest, thinking, planning, striving, consummation and 
frustration are a dram enacted by these forces.”113  Situations, then, are the distinctive 
relationships existing between an individual and the objective conditions of the 
environment.  As a result, the relationship that exists between the individual and the 
environment is a product of what both bring to each other and each individual is, to some 
degree, in a unique situation.  
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Certainly, as human beings, we function in a number of different combinations of 
circumstances.  After we discriminate certain ones of them in experience, e.g., as 
cognitive, religious, moral, aesthetic, indeterminate, etc., we then characterize them in 
terms of certain situations.   It is from the quality of the situation (or context) that the kind 
of behavior emerges that effects “…a transition to a particular determination in which 
objects and relations are discriminated, and discriminated in a way which is stimulated by 
the original quality.  Thus situations move by means of their own instrumentalities from 
indeterminate and problematic stages to settled and determinate fulfillments.”114  The fact 
that certain situations are distinguishable in terms of their kind, however, does not mean 
there is only one kind of transaction within the entire set of relations that constitutes the 
pervasive quality associated with each kind of situation.  For Dewey, the work of 
metaphysics is to raise questions about the sort of world in which there is such evolution, 
not to settle the question of the sort of world that causes it.  It is science that traces the 
conditions of their occurrence in detail and connects them in their variety with their 
antecedents.  In fact, we can mark off the “metaphysical subject matter” of science by 
referring to certain irreducible traits that can be found in any and every subject of 
scientific inquiry. 
As we will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, the same holds true for those 
situations that are distinguishable as moral since “[q]ualitative individuality and constant 
relations, contingency and need, movement and arrest are common traits of all existence.  
This fact is a source of values and their precariousness; both of immediate possession 
which is causal and of reflection which is a precondition of secure attainment and 
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approbation.”115  However, it is important to emphasize that his use of “reflection” here 
refers only to those situations “qualified by uncertainty, alternatives, questioning, search, 
hypotheses, tentative trials or experiments which test the worth of thinking.  A 
naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event occurring 
within nature because of traits of the latter.”116  In Chapter Five we will examine how an 
empirically naturalistic metaphysics is able to discriminate the common traits found in 
aesthetic situations as well since “[t]he doings and sufferings that form experience are, in 
the degree in which experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a union of the 
precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured and uniform—a union which also 
defines the artistic and esthetic.”117  Further, the distinguishable common traits in an 
aesthetic situation consist in the “solvent union of the generic, recurrent, ordered, 
established phase of nature with its phase that is incomplete, going on, and hence still 
uncertain, contingent, novel, particular.”118 
What is common to all of the “processes of experiencing” that we discriminate, 
e.g., knowing, valuing, loving, worshipping, desiring and dreaming, is that they go on in 
nature.  The only way to describe and understand such processes is through using the 
method of experience in all forms of inquiry and subjecting them to analysis in terms of 
their naturalistic common traits.  Any other method of analysis constitutes a falsification 
of such processes since it separates them from the common matrix in which they occur.  
The relevance this has for developing an account of human well-being based on Dewey’s 
theory of experience (DTE) is that human well-being must be analyzed in terms of the 
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common matrix in which human existence continually unfolds.  The consequence here is 
that Dewey’s emphasis on the relational nature of situations requires that the description 
of human well-being involve more than just the cognitive state that a person or 
collections of persons might have.  This is not to say that cognition is not important for 
one’s well-being, which would be absurd.  The question then becomes “what are the most 
common traits with which to begin our analysis?” 
Continuity, Interaction and Situation in Human Experience 
William James referred to ‘experience’ as a “double-barreled” word because we 
use it to refer not only to what people “do and suffer, strive for, love, believe and 
endure,” but also to how they act and how things act upon them.  He recognized that one 
of the more significant problems a theory of experience must address is the “conjunctive 
relation” of co-conscious transition.  This is the process by which “one experience passes 
into another when both belong to the same self…My experiences and your experiences 
are ‘with’ each other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours into 
yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another.”119  Clearly, each of 
us has “personal histories” within which subject, object, interest and purpose are 
continuous or may be continuous (this is not to say, however, that discontinuity has no 
place here).  The conjunctive relation of continuous transition is the most important since 
for one to be a radical empiricist means that one must “hold fast to this conjunctive 
relation above all others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a 
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hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into 
our philosophy.”120 
Although these transitions are processes of change in time, the key here is that the 
change itself (as continuous or discontinuous transition) is one of the things we 
experience immediately.  This led him to emphasize the felt nature of the continuity-
discontinuity of experience, “[w]hat I do feel simply when a later moment of my 
experience succeeds an earlier one is that though they are two moments, the transition 
from one to the other is continuous.  Continuity here is a definite sort of experience; just 
as definite as is the discontinuity-experience which I find it impossible to avoid when I 
seek to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of yours.”121 This 
experience constitutes the “what-ness of nature” and contains real empirical content.122  
In fact, even minute feelings include an earlier and later part, along with a sense of their 
continuous procession.123  Although James clearly showed that continuity has importance 
for a theory of experience, it was Dewey who significantly deepened and extended the 
analysis of this common trait in experience. 
The first common trait is continuity, specifically the principle of continuity (PC) 
in experience, which holds that every experience not only retains something from prior 
experience but also modifies the quality of subsequent experience in some way.  As a 
result, PC is involved in every attempt to discriminate between those experiences that are 
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worthwhile and those that are not.124  As Dewey observed, “[e]very experience is a 
moving force.  Its value can be judged only on the grounds of what it moves toward and 
into.”125  Since PC is involved in some way, with every experience, the quality of the 
present experience is what influences the way in which the principle applies.  Although 
universal in its application, the principle of continuity alone does not provide a ground 
for discriminating among experiences.126  Furthermore, experienceG is not something that 
simply goes on “inside” a person; it also influences the formation of one’s desires and 
purpose.  This has important consequences in that our present experience can lead to 
changes in the “objective conditions” under which our future experiences occur.  This has 
significant social implications as well since the world we live in is what it is because of 
what has happened before, i.e., the previous human experience of others, as well as 
ourselves, is what humans carry forward into their present and future experience. 
The second common trait is the principle of interaction (PI) where “interactions” 
are understood as events that have “either tighter or looser ties…which qualify them with 
certain beginnings and endings, and which mark them off from other fields of 
interaction.”127  Although such events themselves are “closed fields,” when their 
conjunction leads to interaction, this forms a larger field which releases new energies and 
to which new qualities belong.  However, these qualities are not “in” objects or 
organisms, but “always were qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things 
                                               
124 At a more fundamental level, however, Dewey claims that PC rests on the principle of habit (PH) which 
holds that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, thus in turn 
affecting the quality of subsequent experience.  I assess the legitimacy and value of Dewey’s concept of 
habit later in this chapter. 
125 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. LW 12, 21. 
126 One possible candidate for discrimination suggested by Dewey is “growth”, although it is necessary to 
specify the direction of the growth, i.e., towards what end.  He claims the only “end” is the creation of 
conditions for future growth, of opening up avenues for future development.  
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and organisms partake.  When named they enable identification and discrimination of 
things to take place as means in a further course of inclusive interaction.  Hence they are 
as much the qualities of the things engaged as of the organisms.”128  Dewey suggests that 
it is possible to discriminate three “plateaus” among such fields:  1) more narrow and 
external interactions, 2) that of life, and 3) association, communication, and participation. 
The first plateau is qualitatively diverse in the physical sense and the distinctive 
properties here are those of the mathematical-mechanical system (physics) that serves to 
define matter as a general character of nature.  The second plateau is where qualitative 
differences are more obvious, e.g., the discrimination of plant from animal life (as lower 
vs. higher); however despite their variety, they have common qualities which define the 
psycho-physical character of nature.  The third plateau is still further internally 
diversified, consisting of “individualities”, and is characterized throughout its diversities 
by “common properties” which define the “mind” as intelligence, understood as the 
possession and response to meanings.  Each plateau has its own characteristic empirical 
traits or own categories of description consisting of the conceptions that are required to 
state the fact in question, but not to explain it.  This is because they do not designate the 
operation of “force”’ as “causes”, but adhere to empirical facts by noting and denoting 
the characteristic qualities and consequences which are unique to various levels of 
interaction.  The function of PI becomes, then, to assign “equal rights” to both the 
“objective factors” and the “internal conditions” in experience.   
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Any “normal” experience consists in an interplay between these two sets which, 
when taken together as interaction, form a situation.  Further, PC and PI are not separable 
but intercept and unite to form the longitudinal and lateral aspects of experience, 
Different situations succeed one another.  But because of the principle of 
continuity something is carried over from the earlier to the later ones.  As 
an individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his 
environment, expands or contracts....What he has learned in the way of 
knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument for 
understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which 
follow...The process goes on as long as life and learning continue.  
Otherwise the course of experience is disorderly since the individual factor 
that enters into making an experience is split...A fully integrated 
personality...exists only when successive experiences are integrated with 
one other.  It can be built up only as a world of related objects is 
constructed.129   
It is precisely the experience of continuity and interaction by an organism, within an 
environment, that leads to a situation.  For Dewey, the very notion that individual human 
beings live in a world means that they live in a series of situations.  He is careful to point 
out that the word “in” means “that interaction is going on between an individual and 
objects and other persons.  The conceptions of situations and interactions are inseparable 
from one another.  An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking 
place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment...The 
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environment is...whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and 
capacities to create the experience which is had.”130  A situation, then, is the field of 
transaction that arises from the negotiations that occur between oneself and one’s 
environment resulting from the give and take of existence.131 
  What is common to each situation is the “pervasive quality” that it manifests.  
This includes not only the immediate aspect of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of 
the experience (the easy part), but also its influence upon later experiences (the hard 
part).  In this sense, the pervasive quality of a situation is a measure of the functional 
operation of the principles of continuity and interaction in experience.  The active union 
of continuity and interaction is what provides the measure of significance and value of an 
experience because “[t]he qualities of situations in which organisms and surrounding 
conditions interact, when discriminated, make sense.  Sense is distinct from feeling…it is 
the qualitative characteristic of something, not just a submerged unidentified quality or 
tone.”132  Consequently, for a Deweyan account of human well-being, what is of the most 
immediate and direct concern are the situations, understood as “objective conditions in 
nature” in which human transactions occur. 
Human Experience as Geographic Not Cognitive 
At this point, Dewey’s answer to the question “What is experience and what is 
experienced?” is that it involves identifying and describing what constitutes the common 
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131 He defines environment not as an encompassing context, but as the conditions that allow a body to 
exercise its capacities and develop itself.  He goes even further by intrinsically linking the environment to 
experience and interactions, designing action and situations as the result of a process of interaction between 
an organism and a given environment.  See: Dewey, LW 13, 25–41. 
132 Dewey, LW 1, 200. 
 
 
 
  71 
traits and preconditions of experience.133  However, they are not always so readily 
apparent because the underlying structure, traits and preconditions of experience may not 
be obvious to everyone.134  This may tempt us to ask the question “What is the form or 
structure of experience?”, but providing an answer is not such an easy task.  A problem 
arises whenever we try to step back from experience to examine it because we remain 
locked within it.  The result is that whatever we are trying to develop conforms to the 
same structures and circumstances of that which we are seeking to describe.  Thus, if the 
substance of experience is always contingent upon the “situation as a whole,” the same 
holds for what we say about it—it, too, is situated.  Consequently, there is no privileged 
place outside experience from which to make our observations—there is no completely 
neutral ground on which to stand.  As such, what we say about the nature of experience 
must be provisional in the sense of being open to revision in light of subsequent 
experience.   
A final question to consider is “Can we really know what experience is like 
generically?”  Clearly, in mastering how we communicate with others, each of us 
develops a perspective on what it means to be human based on any number of tacit 
assumptions and beliefs (as “common-sense”) about the nature of experience.135  
However, these can be problematic when it comes to our willingness to entertain 
                                               
133 Clearly, ordinary experience is historically prior to all its variants, e.g. the more specialized forms of 
experience encountered in the arts, the sciences or religion that make their appearance secondarily. These 
more highly evolved forms of interaction, although derived from ordinary experience, would never have 
come into being if ordinary experience were not the way it is.  
134 Dewey reminds us that “It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—stones, plants, animals, 
diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on.  Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they 
are what is experienced.”  Dewey, LW 1, 12. 
135 Perhaps some are built directly into our language, becoming a part of our thinking without our realizing 
it, while others are transmitted more explicitly.  Both can be immensely helpful, perhaps in the sense of 
being “common sense”, in that they save us from having to construct a world-view entirely from scratch. 
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alternative perspectives, since we have the tendency to believe that whatever appears 
commonsensical usually seems incontrovertible.  All too often, unfortunately, this results 
in our unwillingness to give up our assumptions and beliefs without a struggle.136  These 
“inherited ways” of looking at things, in particular the dualistic way, constitute historical 
obstacles in that they lead us to separate subjects from objects or facts from values.  
Clearly, such distinctions can be useful, perhaps even necessary in some cases, and 
Dewey sees no difficulty in our continuing to use them as instruments of thought.  
However, it is not the case that these distinctions, which we have come to recognize 
through reflection, were there to begin with and, therefore, constitute reality pure and 
simple, i.e., as an intellectual invention that is treated as the discovery of an 
unquestionable truth.137  
Perhaps the most problematic consequence of the conventional view is that it 
treats experience as a purely psychological concept or a mental state of some sort, forced 
upon us by Nature, that happens within us (the philosophical fallacy).  In so doing, such a 
view places experience inside the one having “an experience” such that, although each of 
us can report our experiences to others, we can never share them directly.  Dewey 
challenged us to abandon this conventional view of experience and offered a far more 
inclusive conception that embraces the “experiencer” as well as the “experienced” so that 
“[i]nstead of signifying being shut up within one’s own private feelings and 
                                               
136 He was acutely aware of these difficulties and almost defeated by them, “I would abandon the term 
‘experience’ because of my growing realization that the historical obstacles which prevented understanding 
of my use of ‘experience’ are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable.” Dewey, LW 1, 361. 
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sensations…[experience] signifies active and alert commerce with the world; at its height 
it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events.”138   
His reconstructed view recognizes the essential fact that experience is 
transactional, including not only what registers on our consciousness as we make our way 
through the world, but the objects and events that compose the world as well.  Such full 
immersion in experience occurs only when its components so “interpenetrate” one 
another that all sense of separation between self, object, and event is lost.139  Another trait 
of experience is its temporality or history—that it exists in time and changes over time.140  
Also, changes that occur within experience may or may not be intentional, since chance 
and accident often play as large a part as do ideas and intentions.141   
Finally, we also demarcate some segments of ordinary experience by a sense of 
wholeness and unity often accompanied by feelings of fulfillment or delight.  Dewey 
spoke of these singly, as each one being an experience.  An experience, then, is a discrete 
unit with discernible boundaries that serve to distinguish it from the general flow of 
events, 
We have an experience when the material experienced runs in its course to 
fulfillment.  Then and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in 
the general stream of experiences from other experiences.  A piece of 
work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its 
                                               
138 Dewey, LW 10, 25. 
139 It is only when situations become problematic that such distinctions become evident and useful for 
isolating this or that element within experience so that we might better deal with the situation as a whole. 
140 He reminds us that “[a]n instantaneous experience is an impossibility, biologically and 
psychologically…An experience is a product, one might almost say a by-product, of continuous and 
cumulative interaction of an organic self with the world.” Dewey, LW 10, 224. 
141 Consequently, from the standpoint of the one that is experiencing, things do not always unfold in a 
predictable and smooth flow or turn out as one planned or intended and, when they do, it is likely to be the 
exception rather than the rule. 
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solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a 
meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, 
or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded that its close is a 
consummation and not a cessation.  Such an experience is a whole and 
carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.  It is an 
experience.142 
Here we return to the significance of the “pervasive quality of the situation” in an 
experience.  The distinguishing feature of the situation, as its pervasive quality, is that it 
constitutes a sense of fulfillment which results in its subsequent demarcation in and 
integration within one’s general experience.  However, it is fulfillment only in the sense 
of consummation, not cessation, which gives it its own individualizing quality and self-
sufficiency.  In making the “pervasive quality of the situation” the criterion of evaluation 
for well-being, what comes to matter most is its pervasive quality i.e., the sense of 
fulfillment as consummation that is the consequence of the unification of all elements 
within the transactional field of organism-environment interaction. 
Habits as the Organized Response in Human Situations 
 
After describing the primary traits of experience and explaining how they 
function in experience, it seems appropriate at this time to ask the question “What is it 
that connects continuity and interaction to the situation in human experience?”  
Answering this question, at least from the standpoint of pragmatic naturalism, involves 
examining both the biological and the cultural workings of habit.  Habits play a critical 
role in a Deweyan account of human well-being because they are responsible for 
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organizing the transactional negotiations that occur between the organism and the 
environment within nature.  They play a constitutive role in human well-being in that, as 
organized responses of the organism to the environment, they have a direct relationship to 
the pervasive quality of the resultant transactional situation.  Thus, in terms of DTE, the 
concept of habit is as central to the theory as are the concepts of continuity and 
interaction. 
 The concept has a long tradition within pragmatic naturalism and appeared, 
initially, in the pragmatic thought of Charles Sanders Peirce and was developed further 
by William James.  Peirce defined habit as being the “effect that attention produces upon 
the nervous system”, but later came to use the term “fixation of belief” to refer to the way 
that ideas “settle down” in the minds of people as habits, customs, traditions, and 
folkways of thought.143  A belief is something of which we are aware, that settles the 
“irritation of doubt” and becomes established in our nature as a rule of action or a 
habit.144  However, it “is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind 
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and like other 
habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its dissolution) perfectly 
satisfied.”145  Because the essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, it also follows 
that we can distinguish different beliefs according to the different modes of action to 
which they give rise.146  Further, in identifying the primary and fundamental law of 
mental action as consisting in a tendency to generalization, the general conceptions so 
                                               
143 See “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868) and “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) in Weiner, 
Values in a Universe of Chance, pages 39-72 and 91-112 respectively. 
144 Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in Weiner, Values, 121. 
145 Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is” in Weiner Values, 189. 
146 He noted, “If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same 
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beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes.”  In Weiner, Values, 121. 
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derived are, themselves, the result of the formation of habits consisting of “molecular 
changes that are consequent upon the activity of the nerve matter and connected with its 
nutrition.”147 
 Although it may appear that habits, for Peirce, are purely mental actions, this is 
not the case because, as rational persons, we believe we can exert a measure of control 
over our future actions.  Although it is not possible to give our future actions any 
“assignable character”, such control is possible through the process of “self-
preparation.”148  In holding that the highest aim or good of thought consists in the 
“process of evolution wherein human beings exercise self-control,” that is guided by 
“socially reasonable purposes,” deliberate conduct is self-controlled conduct.149  This 
leads him to claim that a “Reasoning Power” can only refer to the future because “its 
meaning refers to conduct, and since it is reasoned calculation, must refer to deliberate 
conduct, which is controllable conduct.  But the only controllable conduct is future 
conduct.”150  Thought, which is the product of this power, is not something to which 
“silence and darkness are favorable”, but something that covers “all relational life, so that 
an experiment shall be an operation of thought.  Of course, that ultimate state of habit to 
which the action of self-control ultimately tends, where no room is left for further self-
control, is, in the case of thought, the state of fixed belief, or perfect knowledge.”151  
Although habits of beliefs are mental, Peirce claimed that they are empirical because they 
are something of which we are aware that not only “calms the irritation of doubt”, but 
they also constitute rules for action that influence future thought and action. 
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 Habit, as understood by James, covered a very large part of life by functioning as 
“the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent.”152  He saw all 
living creatures as being “bundles of habits.”153  Given the immensity of habit, anyone 
engaged in studying the “objective manifestations of mind” must begin by defining its 
limits clearly.154  In this regard, he distinguished between “simple and complex 
habits.”155  One of the key traits of habits is their plasticity, i.e., “their structure is weak 
enough to yield to influence, yet strong enough not to do so all at once.”156  It is the 
achievement of a relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure that serves to 
mark-off a new set of habits. 
The primary consequence of habits is psycho-physiological growth, which 
depends upon the particular mode of exercise of the nervous system, although any human 
being “is born with a tendency to do more things than he has ready-made arrangements 
for in his nerve-centers.  Most of the performances of other animals are automatic.  But, 
in him the number of them is so enormous, that most of them must be the fruit of painful 
study.  If practice did not make perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous and 
muscular energy, he would therefore be in a sorry plight.” 157  Given this context, the 
function of habit is to diminish fatigue by simplifying and making more accurate the 
movements required for achieving a given result, and reducing the conscious attention 
                                               
152 James, Principles of Psychology, 121. 
153 Habits that exhibit an innate tendency he called instincts, while some of those due to education he 
referred to as “acts of reason”. 
154 James, Psychology, 104. 
155 James, Psychology, 108. 
156 In this regard James notes that “[o]rganic matter, especially the nervous tissue, seems endowed with a 
very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we may without hesitation lay down as our first 
proposition the following, that the phenomena of habit in living beings are due to plasticity of the organic 
materials of which their bodies are composed.”  It is the organic nature of this plasticity that led James to 
conclude that the philosophy of habit is “in the first instance, a chapter in physics rather than in physiology 
or psychology.” James, Psychology, 105. 
157 James, Psychology, 113. 
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with which we perform acts.158  An action becomes habitual when “what instigates each 
new muscular contraction to take place in its appointed order is not a thought or a 
perception, but the sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just finished.”159  
For James, if something is “habitual” this means that it is not only the case that we do the 
right thing at the right time involuntarily, but the wrong thing as well.  Consequently, in 
many cases sensation can serve as a sufficient guide for habitual action.  However, for an 
act to be strictly voluntary, it is necessary that idea, perception, and volition guide it 
throughout its course until completion. 
So, how are we to go about strengthening our (good) habits?  For James, the 
answer lies in the following three maxims of the “law of habit”:  1) that we should be 
resolute when seeking to acquire a new habit or cease an old one, 2) that we must 
remember the importance of continuity and that the best way to acquire a new habit is 
quickly, but only if this is a real possibility, and 3) we must act on every resolution made 
at the first opportunity.160  The desired consequence of acting in accord with these 
maxims is a will as “an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and definite 
way upon all the principal emergencies of life.  A tendency to act only becomes 
effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the 
actions actually occur, and the brain ‘grows’ to their use.”161  By following the three 
maxims above, one is in the position to follow James’ final practical maxim:  Exercise 
the will on a daily basis. 
 
                                               
158 James, Psychology, 114. 
159 James, Psychology, 115. 
160 James, Psychology, 123-124. 
161 James, Psychology, 125. 
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In essence, this maxim holds that we must “[k]eep the faculty of effort alive in you 
by a little gratuitous exercise every day.  That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in 
little unnecessary points, do every day or two something for no other reason than that you 
would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not 
unnerved and untrained to stand the test.”162  Failure to act in accordance with these 
maxims has consequences that range from our “character” to our “nervous system.”  
James admonishes us that 
[t]he hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than 
the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our 
characters in the wrong way.  Could the young but realize how soon they 
will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed 
to their conduct while in a plastic state.  We are spinning our own fates, 
good or evil, and never to be undone.  Every smallest stroke of virtue or 
vice leaves its never so little scar…Down among…nerve-cells and fibers 
the molecules are counting it, registering it and storing it up… Nothing we 
ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out.”163   
The above discussion of the concept of habit in the work of Peirce and James not only 
serves to set the background for Dewey’s pioneering work in this area, but has 
implications for the theory of human well-being being under development here.   
As I read Peirce, when one’s “habits of mind” are “perfectly satisfied”, as occurs 
with the “fixation of belief”, what one experiences is not just a sense of equilibrium in a 
cognitive sense but in a somatic sense as well.  It is precisely this somatic sense of 
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  80 
equilibrium that has central importance for one’s well-being.  James, as well, recognized 
the psycho-physiological growth dimension of habit (plasticity) and understood the need 
for the “constant exercise” of habits.  Since the primary function of the “three maxims of 
the law of habit” was to exercise the “will.”  I read James as claiming that one’s will is 
what is of central importance to one’s well-being, i.e., the more resolute one’s will, the 
better off one will be.  Finally, both Peirce and James draw our attention to the projective 
power that emanates from the interaction between our habits (as thought and will) and the 
environment we inhabit. 
The Unification of Habit in Pre-reflective and Reflective Experience 
As with the earlier discussion around the continuity in experience, although Peirce 
and James provided a necessary foundation for understanding the operation of habit, it 
was Dewey who significantly deepened the analysis of habit and its operation in 
experience.  Habits, as the controlled adjustments of individuals and environments that 
are readily available within a given situation, are functions because they require, “the 
cooperation of the organism and environment.  Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as 
the lungs…We may shift from the biological to the mathematical use of the word 
function, and say natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like 
speech and honesty, are the functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person.  They 
are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired 
dispositions.”164  They consist of the acquired tendencies to act which, in experience, we 
discriminate as ideas, beliefs and emotions.  Dewey often referred to them as “arts” 
because “[t]hey involve skill of sensory and motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective 
                                               
164 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14, 15. 
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materials.  They assimilate objective energies and eventuate in command of the 
environment.  They require order, discipline, and manifest technique.  They have a 
beginning, middle and end.  Each stage marks progress in dealing with materials and 
tools, advance in converting material to active use.”165 
In its most general sense, however, “a habit” refers to a sequence of acts 
following upon some internal or external cue that leads to the satisfaction of needs.166  
Furthermore, since it is energy harnessed for a particular purpose and converted to active 
use, habit is “in itself energetic.”  Nor is habit something that just involves interactions of 
individuals with the physical and natural environment, e.g., the habits of breathing, 
eating, etc.  They pertain to the social environment as well since, in regards to what 
individuals learn and what groups teach, habits are social not only in terms of their 
origins but in the sense of their being shared as well.167  Kestenbaum argues that the only 
way to understand human experience is “as the experience of a variety of habits that are 
formed as a result of the transactions of humans with their surroundings.  The meaning 
carried by the objects of experience, including human beings, is expressive of pre-
conscious habitual meaning.  They, in turn, are to a large extent responsible for the way 
the world, including ourselves, is experienced.  Consequently, the existence of meaning 
can be found in the formation of habits and is a pre-condition of reflection and 
knowledge.”168  
                                               
165  Dewey, MW 14, 15-16. 
166 He uses the term to refer to a broad range of phenomena, from the gross behavioral phenomena of the 
individual to the skills that are involved in the social and cultural activities of the group, including patterns 
of verbal phenomena that constitute the language of the group. 
167 We commonly call such shared habits “customs” which not only enable us to act in the environment, but 
also serve to define the environment in which we act. 
168 Kestenbaum, The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey: Habit and Meaning, 91.  
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What is common to all forms of habit in human experience is interaction with a 
physical, natural and social environment that is undergoing constant modification by the 
action of human agents.  In relation to the account of human well-being which forms the 
focus of this inquiry, habit plays a central role not only in terms of the formation of one’s 
individual conception of well-being and attainment of it, but also at the social level in 
terms of the societal formation of our concepts and theories of human well-being.  A 
habit, in essence, is “an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to 
particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving….[it] 
means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimulus, standing 
predilections and aversions.  It means will.” 169  It is through the operation of concrete 
habits that we come to understand our experience since they “do all the perceiving, 
recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done.”170  
Whether at the organic (individual) level or the social level of operation, they consist of 
the acquired mechanisms or organized activities that are available for dealing with 
repeated classes of stimuli.  Furthermore, they are empirical in that they constitute “lines 
of activity” that are observable, recurring and subject to reconstruction. 
Habits operate at both the pre-reflective and the reflective levels of experience, 
with the former accounting for much of our experience and the latter accounting for a 
much smaller part.  At the pre-reflective level, habits operate silently and go unnoticed; 
however, when our concrete habits fail to operate successfully, our pre-reflective 
experience immediately transforms itself into reflective experience.  This transformation, 
which is a result of continuous interactions between the organism and the environment, is 
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what produces the “challenges” and initiates reflective thought.  In such cases, the 
operation of reflective thought transforms “…a situation in which there is experienced 
obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a situation that is clear, coherent, 
settled, harmonious.”171  Although the basic architecture or blueprint for this concept is 
Peirce’s “crisis of doubt”, Dewey’s contribution was to enlarge Peirce’s conception so 
that it could include the development of the self as well as of cultural movements. 
In terms of its importance for an account of human well-being, the “principle of 
habit” is wide-ranging in its scope since it applies to “the formation of attitudes...that are 
emotional and intellectual….[and] to all our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and 
responding to all the conditions we meet in living.”172  As long as concrete habits operate 
successfully during environmental transactions and negotiations in which one engages in 
order to live, it is likely that one is not thinking about her well-being at all.  Instead, one’s 
well-being comes to matter existentially when the operation of habit begins with a felt 
“unsettledness” as discriminated in doubt, irritation, discomfort, disturbance, etc., that 
serves as a necessary but not sufficient condition for reflective activity.173   
Dewey referred to this as a problematic situation in which we experience a 
hesitation or uncertainty as to how to proceed combined with an urgent need to find a 
way out.174  It is at times such as these that our well-being comes to matter to us most 
urgently.  Further, depending upon its degree, such unsettledness can further disrupt 
                                               
171Dewey, How We Think, 100. 
172Dewey, LW 12, 19. 
173 It is not sufficient because in some unsettled situations non-reflective habits do an adequate job and 
reflective activity is not needed.  
174 Although Dewey placed emphasis on “problematic situations”, Alexander suggests it might be better to 
describe them as tensional situations in order to stress the importance such readjustments hold for 
constructive growth and learning.  See: Alexander, John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: 
The Horizons of Feeling, 301, Fn. 32. 
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settled habits to the extent they are no longer able to reduce doubt or irritation by 
restoring one’s settled experience.  If this is the case, then the degree to which a situation 
is unsettled can serve as a comparative measure for the evaluation of human well-being, 
i.e., the more unsettled the situation is the less well-off one will be.   
Obviously, our experience shows us that habits do not always work successfully 
since there can be alterations in the physical, natural or social environment that render old 
habits obsolete or generate conflicts among our habits so the performance of one inhibits 
the performance of another.  Conflict occurs in situations where the flow of activity is 
blocked, restoration is frustrated and one is uncertain how to proceed.  In such situations, 
the energy that was previously channeled through habit is obstructed.  It then overflows 
into uncontrolled “impulse” which, without habit to guide it, is directionless and random.  
Ultimately, if the unsettled situation remains then further reflective activity is necessary 
in order to establish new habits.  Consequently, the success of any restorative effort 
depends on the instrumental effectiveness of the pre-reflective or reflective habits 
operating to achieve restoration.  If new habits are successfully established, then they are 
available when needed in future experience.   
At the reflective level of experience, the problematic situation also functions to 
engage the operation of intelligence, i.e., deliberation and reflection.175  As we will see in 
Chapter 3, deliberation begins with working to recognize what the problem is by 
diagnosing the confronting difficulty, which often requires an inquiry into the character 
of the situation and then re-conceptualizing it.  Before taking any overt action, such 
                                               
175 Thinking arises when habit is blocked, when a problem arises and initiates the process of inquiry that, if 
successful, will solve the problem.  So long as habit works and there is no conflict, there is no occasion for 
thought—action becomes automatic and no thought is required.  It is when the habit no longer works that 
something goes awry and we are compelled to think. 
 
 
 
  85 
deliberation involves, in part simultaneously, the use of a “dramatic rehearsal in 
imagination” of alternative courses of action that might resolve the conflict.  Only 
afterwards can intelligence play its essential part by not only enabling us to judge, from 
among the possible courses of action, the one that seems most likely to offer the solution 
sought, but to make a rational choice from among the alternatives considered as well.176  
Testing or actually trying out the plan of action to see what happens is necessary because, 
without such verification, our knowledge is only hypothetical.  It is through verification 
of the hypothesis that energy is enabled to flow smoothly once more into consummation 
and, with the problem solved, the necessity for deliberation ends. 
However, the establishment of a new habit is likely to entail further conflicts, 
inquiries, and changes so that the process of inquiry continues.  Since inquiry is always 
context specific—it is usually the case that we do not think in general terms, but more 
often about specific problems, what often comes to be in question is the specific habits 
involved in the conflict.  Although we usually take our habits for granted, they provide us 
with the tools for developing solutions or determining alternative courses of action that 
may involve altering either the environment or some aspect of our own behavior, or both.  
When the need to do so arises, we have to use the tools we have at hand, i.e., the habits 
we have already learned and still use.  They provide the mechanisms we can use to 
design and execute new modes of behavior, create new institutions, and modify the 
environment.  Even though we can’t question everything at once (e.g., Descartes), we can 
question different habits as different problems arise.  But this must be done against the 
background of existing habits which, in that situation, are taken for granted.  Therefore, 
                                               
176 Dewey is not committed to the claim that a solution actually exists or that we will be able to put it into 
effect.  In fact, he recognizes that our choice may very well be wrong, i.e., the choice we believe is a 
rational one may not work out in practice. 
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inquiry must be piecemeal in order to be effective, and hypotheses about future courses 
of action must rest upon a solid foundation of successful past action. 
Analysis and Conclusion 
Kestenbaum sees Dewey’s pragmatism as an effort to establish the outlines of a 
philosophy of experience which, by beginning with the “entrance points to the world of 
the ordinary, opens up to the extraordinary and transcendent.”177 The examination of 
Dewey’s theory of experience undertaken here reveals two fundamentally important facts 
to bear in mind: 1) the generic traits Dewey does distinguish are the essential ingredients 
of any intelligible naturalistic metaphysics, and 2) the analysis of these traits shows that 
they are indissolubly interrelated in the existential context of nature.  Perhaps Dewey’s 
accomplishment here is that he “progressed rather far in characterizing the diversity of 
experience with common concepts.…[and] developed a metaphysics which restored to 
nature all the traits and qualities of which it had been divested by the dualisms of modern 
thought, and he thereby made all of human experience subject matter for experimental 
intelligence.”178  Among the more important features identified in DTE are: its 
characterization of natural existence as a constant mixture of the precarious and the 
stable; its sensitivity to the qualitative and aesthetic dimensions of primary experience; its 
complexly developed conception of the circular interdependence between primary and 
reflective experience; its demand for open-mindedness to the contingency of the world in 
which we live; and offering an empirical-experimentalist account of all kinds of knowing 
(knowledge). 
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DTE offers a perspective on the intimate relationship that exists between 
knowing and making, and by making primary experience the source and telos of 
all reflection, opens up a view on life that acknowledges the indeterminate, vague, 
obscure and fuzzy dimensions of human existence in an extremely frank manner.  
Alexander observes that 
 [b]alancing this teleological dimension of experience is Dewey’s 
conception of experience as a total field of action which has a complex 
structure at each and every moment and different degrees of focus, clarity, 
obscurity, and organization.  It is this which changes from one moment to 
the next, not by a jerky series of mechanical actions, but by increasing 
articulation, illumination, meaning and apprehension.  To summarize: one 
must keep vividly in mind that experience for Dewey is both process and 
field—a “field-process” if you will.  Structure is temporarily dynamic; 
activity is ordered.179 
  In claiming that “the cognitive never is all-inclusive,” his philosophical 
experimentalism rejected all rationalistic attempts at symbolic closure for the benefit of 
appreciating the varieties and perplexities of human life-experience as it is lived in the 
concrete.180  The advantage is that this allows for a vision of a universe that is still “in the 
making”—an open and pluralistic universe in which there is space for something new and 
better to happen. Further, since DTE claims that life is neither “bound" nor "reduced” to 
the surrounding environment but is the consequence of transactions within it, this means 
that circumstances both in and of nature contribute to the making of a “person” or “self.”  
                                               
179 Alexander, “John Dewey and the Aesthetics of Human Experience”, 128. 
180 Dewey, LW 1, 30. 
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However, the “philosophical fallacy” again comes into play here because most accounts 
of human well-being, including those offered by Plato and Sumner, equate the self or 
person with a “private consciousness.”  Doing so reduces human well-being exclusively 
to a cognitive state and thus provides only a partial account.  In contrast, a Deweyan 
account of human well-being views the self as an agent operating in an environmental 
“field of transaction” instead of a spectator who possesses a “private inner life.”  The 
implication this has for our understanding of human well-being is that any account that 
contains a “privatistic conception” of the self continues the fallacy of a private self or 
“inner life” from which the “world” is merely inferred.  Such falsification of ordinary life 
is a problem for an account of human well-being because, ultimately, it would mean that 
human well-being is nothing more than a logical inference that is solely cognitive. 
In a Deweyan account of human well-being, one’s valuation or judgment about 
one’s well-being must be made in terms of the qualities of a situation that are of 
immediate concern for the self-in-situation and, as such, are empirical judgments.  In 
particular, some experiences (perhaps not that many) can be described as consummatory 
in that one experiences a situation in which the qualities of harmony and unity are both 
present.  Shifting the locus of well-being to the qualitative features of the situation, as 
experienced by the self, offers another way to think about well-being that goes beyond 
merely satisfying one’s desires or preferences.  However, this does not mean rejecting 
that desires, preferences, flourishing or objective lists are involved in human well-being.  
The problem here is that theories based on desire fulfillment, preference satisfaction or 
objective lists provide only a partial or incomplete account human of well-being.  Such 
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incompleteness raises a question as to whether they rise to the level of constituting a 
satisfactory theory of human well-being.   
Understanding what it means to be an “individual” in terms of a Deweyan account 
of human well-being, given the significant emphasis that is placed on the importance of 
habit, can be accomplished only by relating such understanding to the context of the 
social group, since no individual exists in total isolation.181  In fact, since the very 
generation of the human “self” resides in habits there is no reason to make any claim of a 
separate substantive self, i.e., to invoke either a “metaphysical soul” or “transcendental 
knower.”  Instead, of a substantive thing, the self is to be understood as a dynamic 
construct that consists in a particular organization of relatively stable and enduring habits.  
Although habits can actualize only under appropriate conditions, they exist continuously 
in a latent form as pre-dispositions to a particular mode of behavior and are at the ready 
whenever the necessary circumstances are present.  The self, as the dynamic structure of 
these latent or actual habits, although itself an enduring structure, can change and develop 
as new habits form and old ones are modified.  This is the case because habits 
“interpenetrate” and are not wholly discrete entities—they can combine, interact, conflict 
and reinforce each other.  On this view, the “self” is similar to “character” in that it is 
“the interpenetration of habits,” which suggests that we know a person or their character 
when we know how she habitually acts.182 
Kestenbaum notes that the value in clarifying Dewey’s view of habit from the 
standpoint of pre-reflective intentionality “helps to make the greatest sense out of this 
concept.  The dramatic, creative meaning of habit, the human meaning of habit, simply 
                                               
181 A social group’s immature members become effective adult members through socialization which 
involves learning the ‘”habits” or the modes of behavior that are successful in satisfying needs. 
182 Dewey, MW 14, 29. 
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cannot be grasped until its sense-producing character is traced to its pre-reflective, pre-
predicative foundation.”183   The essence of the operation of habit lies in permitting the 
“stream of action” that is involved in organism-environment interaction to flow without 
interruption, thereby bringing with it the satisfactions which human needs demand.  This 
helps to demonstrate the importance of habit for well-being since, whenever the flow of 
the stream of action is interrupted, human well-being will most likely suffer.  Similarly, 
efforts undertaken to restore the flow will contribute to the improvement in well-being.  
Whether successful or not, our habits provide us with the necessary reconstructive 
patterns that are enlivened by flexible readjustments to new experiences that are 
important for growth and learning.  Dewey’s theory of habit also offers an interactive 
phenomenology that helps us to understand the intimate relationship of constructions, 
reconstructions and deconstructions at the personal level as well as in terms of cultural 
practices, routines and institutions.  On the one hand, cultural viability rests on the 
operation of habits that inform our active capacities to master new situations, while on 
the other hand our individual habits incorporate the customs of our life-world.   
The self-in-situation or the transactionally situated self is understood as the 
conscious awareness of the continuity of one’s experience achieved through one’s use of 
a flexible set of pre-reflective and reflective habits that are brought forth in consequence 
of one’s interactions with the environment.  Such a self is continuously engaged in 
numerous transactions that involve knowing, doing and feeling within the context of a 
situation and it is through such engagement that habit, situation, and self become linked 
together.  The self-in-situation, when grounded in the fundamental concepts of 
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experience, is an ongoing process of self-reconstruction in relation to the fundamental 
workings of habit.  The reconstructed self-in-situation identifies the human organism with 
the relations that constitute its situation and the habits used in negotiating transactions 
within the environment.  Human well-being, in this sense, is the consequence of the 
negotiations or transactions of a self within its situation.  This has importance for 
understanding the “subject relativity” requirement for judgments about one’s well-being 
discussed in Chapter 1.  The valuations or judgments one makes about one’s well-being 
must be viewed as being ecological rather than egological in scope.  As such, the self or 
subject is the point-of-place in experience for the negotiations that occur in consequence 
of continuous transaction with the environment.  Any judgment one makes about or 
valuation one gives to one’s well-being must be in terms of the self-in-situation.  
Consequently, valuations or judgments we make about our well-being are understandable 
only in terms of situation-relativity, which I believe still preserves the intent of the 
subject-relativity requirement.  In conclusion, although this Chapter has argued that an 
account of human well-being must be based on “experience,” it also must have respect 
for experience because in so doing respect is also shown “for the possibilities in thought 
and knowledge as well as an enforced attention to joys and sorrows.  Intellectual piety 
toward experience is a precondition of the direction of life and of tolerant and generous 
cooperation among men.  Respect for the things of experience alone brings with it such a 
respect for others, the centers of experience, as is free from patronage, domination and 
the will to impose.”184 
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Inquiry, Creative Intelligence and Human  Well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The striving to make stability of meaning prevail 
over the instability of events is the main task of 
intelligent human effort. 
 
      John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 49  
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As Richard Bernstein observes, the existence of inquiry is not in doubt since in 
every area of life activity human beings examine, and investigate.  It is a mode of conduct 
that is accessible to objective study in which logic functions to discern the methods and 
patterns of inquiry thereby providing a guide for better and more successful inquiries.185  
There are three reasons Dewey’s theory inquiry has value for the account of human well-
being under development here: its sensitivity, its self-correcting nature and that it is 
problem driven.186  First, its sensitivity is derived from its being context-bound since it is 
a set of methods that are built up in and through the contexts in which they serve.  This is 
important since the purpose of inquiry is to understand, order, and control our 
experiences of and relations with the world—it is a primary tool by which we navigate 
our way through the world.  Second, it is self-correcting because it is designed to adjust 
itself in light of anticipated and unanticipated changes in the context or transactional field 
of organism-environment interaction.  Finally, it is problem driven in that what guides it 
are the problems of the inquirer, her interests and efforts, and when it is finished there is 
no longer the unsettled situation that gave rise to it in the first place.  Perhaps most 
importantly for human well-being, however, is the recognition that inquiry is 
transformative in that it involves discriminating, analyzing and relating.  In terms of the 
project undertaken here, his theory of inquiry offers the possibility of unifying the 
operation of discovery and creation in relation to human well-being. 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry avoids one-sidedly linguistic, cognitivistic, 
subjectivistic, or even biologistic reductions since it holds that observers are, at the same 
                                               
185 Bernstein, John Dewey, 102.   
186 In Deweyan Inquiry: From Educational Theory to Practice, James Johnston provides a general sketch of 
the familiar stages in Dewey’s theory of inquiry and relates it to educational practice. 
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time, agents and participants in cultural practices.  He strongly rejected such one-sided 
theories because they rest upon perhaps the most influential philosophical fallacy which 
he described as follows: 
The theory of knowing is modeled after what was supposed to take place 
in the act of vision. The object refracts light to the eye and is seen; it 
makes a difference to the eye and to the person having an optical 
apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The real object is the object so fixed 
in its regal aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind that may gaze 
upon it. A spectator theory of knowledge is the inevitable outcome. There 
have been theories which hold that mental activity intervenes, but they 
have retained the old premise. They have therefore concluded that it is 
impossible to know reality. Since mind intervenes, we know, according to 
them, only some modified semblance of the real object, some 
“appearance.” It would be hard to find a more thoroughgoing confirmation 
than this conclusion provides of the complete hold possessed by the belief 
that the object of knowledge is a reality fixed and complete in itself, in 
isolation from an act of inquiry which has in it any element of production 
of change.187 
What Dewey opposes here is not only the philosophical heritage of Platonist 
epistemology, but the purported correction offered by modern empiricism as well. 
In contrast, his conception of “observing” is much broader in that it involves not 
only seeing, but hearing, feeling, sensing, and imagining as well.  It includes not only 
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perceiving and thinking, but acting and participating as well.  It is a case of doing and 
undergoing in the Deweyan sense that comprises all the immediate, fuzzy and elusive 
qualities of primary experience.  Observing begins and ends in life-worldly contexts—in 
life-experience—with all its ambiguities, uncertainties, contradictions and myriad variety.  
Here we are always involved as agents who act in more or less consciously reflected 
ways on the basis of pre-established habits that largely determine the viability of our 
daily practices.  However, as agents we are always participants as well since it is only by 
communication and shared activities that acting becomes meaningful and informed by 
performative agency. 
Although knowledge may be defined as the “objective” of inquiry, what counts as 
knowledge is only what is justified by careful use of the norms and methods of inquiry, 
i.e., what meets the test of warranted assertibility.188  Knowledge, in the particular sense 
that Dewey intends, involves continuity in that, when gained in a specific inquiry, it 
becomes “funded” in our experience, thus serving as the background for further inquiry.  
But what forms the grounds for such an account of knowledge?  Johnston suggests that it 
is grounded in the following:189 
1. Knowledge of our individual immediate past.  Since we bring previous 
problem-solving habits to the situation this suggests that we need to 
distinguish between those that are good and bad 
2. The accumulated knowledge of the past that is transmitted through traditions, 
customs and knowledge of the past. 
                                               
188 When understood in this way, “knowledge” is simply an abstract term that relates to “inquiry” in the 
abstract. 
189 Johnston, Deweyan Inquiry, 9-10. 
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3. Experimental and reconstructive knowledge, i.e., that derived from the 
investigation of problem solving strategies of past peoples and from which we 
take such knowledge and use it in the context of the future. 
4. Knowledge of current technique, i.e., the ways and means of problem solving 
which differs depending on the nature of the problem that is being 
presented.190 
Clearly, then, the materials of inquiry depend upon context, e.g., those used to construct 
an experiment in the physical sciences are notably different from those used to acquire an 
understanding of a specific work of art or literature. 
Knowledge derived through inquiry has two additional characteristics that serve 
to give it projective force.  Not only is inquiry required to submit to a public test, but it 
also constitutes an ongoing self-corrective process in that 1) it has the capacity to adjust 
itself when its findings are not in accord with the anticipated results and 2) it has the 
capacity to adjust itself to the contexts in which it is in and used.  Although, with the 
exception of some general features, inquiry will look quite different in different contexts, 
what is common to all contexts is that a problem or potential problem exists.  Granted the 
context of a specific inquiry may require assuming some knowledge claims, norms, rules, 
and procedures as “fixed”, it is only in a temporary sense because they may be criticized, 
revised or abandoned in light of subsequent inquiry and experience.  Thus, knowledge is 
possible without invoking any absolute first truths that are given or knowable with 
certainty and it neither has nor requires such a foundation in order to be rational. 
                                               
190 Johnston describes these as an assemblage of built-up techniques, common to the various contexts, that 
are used to problem solve in those contexts.  Among the more common techniques are theories, 
mathematical methods, observational methods, interpretation strategies (e.g. empathy), textual analysis, 
logic, and communication patterns and strategies.  However, such techniques are only “tools” or means, not 
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Inquiry and its objective, “knowledge”, are rational because inquiry itself is self-
correcting since those who engage in the inquiry gradually become clearer about the 
epistemological status of both its starting points and its conclusions.  This is achievable 
because knowledge claims are continually subject to a public test in order to clarify, 
refine and justify them.191  This further suggests that a specific inquiry cannot be 
completely isolated from the context of other inquiries because procedures, methods, 
rules, and evidence required for the conduct of any inquiry derive from other successful 
inquiries that have achieved warranted conclusions.192  Irrespective of the specific content 
of human problems or the nature of problem situations, it constitutes a reflective 
evaluation of existing conditions.  It reflects both shortcomings and possibilities with 
respect to those operations that are intended to actualize certain potentialities of the 
situation so that what was once doubtful is now resolved.  The relevance of inquiry for 
human well-being is that its purpose is to create goods, satisfactions, solutions, and 
integration in what was initially a wanting, discordant, troubled and problematic 
situation.  In this respect, for Dewey, all intelligence is evaluative and there is no need to 
separate moral, scientific, practical or theoretical experience.  
                                               
191 A social or public context for inquiry serves as the medium for establishing the warranted conclusions, 
norms, rules, procedures, etc. for further inquiry.  Inquiry not only requires a community of inquirers but 
helps to further its development as well.  Dewey relates his idea of a community of inquirers to his view 
that an effective democracy requires the existence of a community of free, courageous and open-minded 
inquirers. 
192 By studying them, we can abstract norms, rules, evidence and procedures for directing further inquiry 
that are open to modification during the course of further inquiry. 
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Dewey’s Instrumental Logic and Theory of Inquiry 
Earlier in Chapter 1, I indicated that this chapter would offer an answer to the 
question of Dewey’s alternative to the traditional account of Reason.  His alternative is an 
account of reason that forces, through active experimentation, “the apparent facts of 
nature into forms different to those in which they familiarly present themselves; and thus 
makes them tell the truth about themselves, as torture may compel an unwilling witness 
to reveal what he has been concealing.”193  He further recognized that not only are there 
conditions under which reasoning occurs but that there are forms, or controlling 
operations, which are characteristic of thought in establishing future consequences as 
well.  Although the “guts of inquiry” depends on different contexts, there is a general 
operation of the logic of inquiry that is not context dependent.  However, this does not 
entail a system of formal logic because such formalization prevents one from seeing the 
contexts in which logic takes place and, even more importantly, that the point of logic is 
that it is something to be used to settle situations.  Thus, logic is never an intellectual end 
in itself, but only a means for solving problems.  The advantage to be gained from the 
logic of inquiry is that, in being descriptive, it is concerned with the ways in which 
human beings actually do inquire.  It is also prescriptive or normative in that its aim is to 
isolate, appraise and evaluate those norms and standards that are most successful for 
making warranted knowledge claims.194  However, such standards and norms are not “a 
priori forms”, nor are they externally imposed upon inquiry.  There is nothing that is 
sacrosanct about them because they only serve as “guiding principles” in order to engage 
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in inquiry that can be refined, altered or abandoned as a result of the self-corrective 
process of inquiry. 
Perhaps the germ of his conception of inquiry lies in his criticism of the reflex arc 
concept in psychology, especially his example of the child touching a candle flame.195  
Here he argued that what determines the nature of a particular phase (as stimulus or 
response) is its function in bringing into successful completion the intentional end 
established by the organism.  The demarcation of these functions in experience is by 
discriminating between a phase which represents the conditions required to start a 
reflexive activity (the stimulus) and a phase which represents the completion or meeting 
of the conditions introduced by the stimulus (the response).  It is not necessary here to go 
into the details of the context and argument, since the crucial point is that this simple 
example clearly demonstrates the purposeful and teleological nature of any human act.196  
In fact, understanding behavior as involving a “circuit” is what makes it possible to 
explain why, in the future, the child will normally avoid touching fire.  She will avoid it 
since, as a “circuit of behavior”, the response becomes part of the prior set of conditions 
that constitutes her particular situation.197  Consequently, her future responses will adjust 
to the same stimulus in a way that only her previous engagement with the environment 
and the organic retention of information (as habit) can provide.  The experience of the 
original relation, the child touching the candle flame, will therefore predictably transform 
itself in further acts, adding to its function a modified and holistic structure.  The 
modification of the experience of the original relation is that the response now retains the 
                                               
195 Dewey, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” in McDermott, Philosophy of John Dewey, 136-147. 
196 For a detailed discussion of Dewey’s functionalism and critique of the reflex-arc, see Tiles, “The 
Fortunes of Functionalism”, 39-61. 
197 Such “prior status” or “prior conditions” clearly emphasize the primacy of context in human behaviors 
or actions, as well as anticipates his later emphasis on contextualism. 
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stimulus.  Now, stimulus and response are only “functions” in the organic structure of 
human behavior.  The type of thinking exemplified here, what Dewey refers to as 
instrumental thought, serves as the basis for his theory of inquiry and forms the core of 
his version of instrumentalism.198 
In a more philosophical sense, however, instrumentalism is primarily associated 
with the theory and practice of scientific inquiry, although it applies equally to moral and 
social inquiry.199  Dewey describes it as “an attempt to constitute a precise logical theory 
of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily 
how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences….it 
attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving 
them from the reconstructive or mediative function ascribed to reason.  It aims to 
constitute a theory of the general forms of conception and reasoning.”200  Such broad 
application is possible because the methods and forms of thought that function in the 
experimental determination of future consequences differ only in type, not in kind.  What 
is common to thought and reflective behavior is that both use the same functional pattern 
wherein problematic situations become resolved through inquiry that yields warranted 
assertion as opposed to truth.  It is the settlement of the conditions of doubt, as produced 
and warranted by inquiry, that distinguishes the warranted assertion as a “working”, 
“satisfactory” or “verified” idea or hypothesis. 
It is also a “kind” in that all inquiry initiates in antecedent conditions of doubt or 
irritation (after Peirce) and terminates in the establishment of conditions in which doubt 
                                               
198 It is in this sense that, in Chapter 4, I develop the construct for a particular “mode” of human well-being 
that I refer to as instrumentalM well-being. 
199 Dewey’s instrumentalism differs from the traditional view of instrumentalism in morals and ethics, for a 
discussion of the latter, see Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, 1-23. 
200 Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, 26. 
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or irritation is felt no longer or no longer exists.  However, it is not the case that we label 
a particular bit of a situation as indeterminate.  Instead, it is the situation in its entirety 
that is indeterminate since “we are doubtful because the situation is inherently 
doubtful.”201  Further, the situation in which inquiry arises is indeterminate in terms of 
the issue which prompted it.  When the outcome of the situation cannot be anticipated, 
we usually refer to it as confused.  We might call it obscure when the course of its 
movement involves final consequences that are unclear.  We may refer to the situation as 
conflicting whenever it tends to evoke responses that are incompatible.  The point here is 
that inquiry arises in specific indeterminate situations which involve a complex of factors 
that are united by a pervasive quality.  Finally, the situation that gives rise to inquiry is 
uniquely qualified by its indeterminateness in that “[t]he peculiar quality of what 
pervades the given materials constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; 
it is a unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and only the situation it 
is.  It is this unique quality that not only evokes the particular inquiry engaged in but that 
exercises control over its special procedures.”202  As Bernstein notes, it is this last point 
that illustrates why Dewey placed so much emphasis on the function of the pervasive 
quality. 
Perhaps Dewey’s most definitive statement of the process of inquiry is that it 
consists in the “controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into 
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.”203  Here, again, his focus remains 
on the “pervasive unifying quality” of the experience or situation, as transformed through 
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the process of inquiry.  As a ‘kind’, all inquiry begins with antecedent conditions that 
consist of situations characterized by their indeterminate nature or internal conflict in 
which we, as the experiencer (inquirer), experience a felt difficulty.  Although 
indeterminacy certainly motivates us to look for a settlement, the mere existence of an 
indeterminate situation is not yet inquiry.  It is initiated when we anticipate existential 
consequences resulting from an examination of the conditions in our environment “with 
reference to their potentialities; and when responsive activities are selected and ordered 
with reference to actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a “final 
existential situation,” is inquiry begun.”204 
Although not every felt difficulty demands resolution in terms of inquiry, 
whenever the situation requires it, we tend to follow a general procedure.  The first step is 
to articulate the problem that needs solving, i.e., determining the problematic situation; 
however, this may require successive refinements during the progression of the inquiry.  
It is only when we have a “deliberate focus” that we can then say that there is a problem, 
therefore “problem finding” is always prior to “problem solving.”  Thus, an indeterminate 
situation is not a “problem” until a judgment is made that it is problematic.  The 
challenging task here is to make a judgment as to the “right” or “correct” problem, i.e., to 
label the existential situation properly.  Further, in order for the problem to be genuine 
(authentic) it must reflect the indeterminate situation out of which it develops.  The next 
step involves the anticipation of consequences through the formulation of suggestion or 
hypothesis in which various relevant hypotheses or suggestions for solving or resolving 
the problematic situation are formulated in imagination.  This involves thinking ahead 
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about what a particular solution or set of solutions will accomplish, e.g., manipulating our 
environment(s) to effect a potential improvement by contemplating what the actualization 
of such manipulation will accomplish.  In this case solutions to problems are existential 
in that they require finding the “definite constituents” of a situation which are those found 
in a “settled situation.”   
It is only settled, existential (real) traits that count because a solution produces 
some improvement in the situation that is notable through observed changes in these 
traits.  One way this may play out is either through a dramatic rehearsal in imagination 
or, if the situation necessitating the inquiry is complex enough, through hypothetical-
deductive reasoning which requires further refinement of the hypothesis, as well as 
ascertaining its logical consequences.  At this stage in inquiry, ideas consist of the 
anticipated consequences that will be carried out in practice and represent possibilities.  
While moving along the path of inquiry, some ideas are jettisoned while others are 
retained and strengthened; however, the test of a good idea lies in the “instrumental 
force” of the consequences it bears out.  At this stage, however, what counts as a 
consequence is not “existential” since what counts is only what is anticipated to have the 
preferred existential import.  Here, the criterion for success is how well the ideas hook 
into each other so as to construct a coherent framework or model that is context specific, 
even though these ideas may be more or less abstract.   
The observed facts and the entertained ideas represent the “functional divisions” 
in the work of inquiry and since both are operational there is a resulting transaction 
between them which also transforms the character of each.  The former are existential 
and operate in a variety of ways in that 
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[s]ome observed facts point to an ideal that stands for a possible solution.  
This idea evokes more observations.  Some of the newly observed facts 
link up with those previously observed and are such as to rule out other 
observed things with respect to their evidential function.  The new order of 
facts suggests a modified idea (or hypothesis) which occasions new 
observations whose result again determines a new order of facts, and so on 
until the existing order is both unified and complete.  In the course of this 
serial process, the ideas that represent possible solutions are tested and 
proved.205 
Although the ideational content of the latter is non-existential, nonetheless they serve to 
activate and direct further operations of observation because “they are proposals and 
plans for acting upon existing conditions to bring new facts to light and to organize all the 
selected facts into a coherent whole.”206  What counts as a fact is dependent on the 
specific mode of inquiry and, in order to advance the inquiry, the facts must be 
appropriately selected and used.  Not only do they play a role in the inquiry itself, but 
their role often changes throughout the development of the inquiry. It is generally the 
case that those facts and ideas which pan out tend to be those that are most often 
meaningfully related to each other. 
The final step in inquiry requires operationalization which tests out the solution in 
an existential situation, i.e., the one that we determine is a problem.   This involves 
experimental testing which either confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis or suggested 
solution.  At this stage in inquiry some ideas lead directly to existential change while 
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other ideas are operationalized when they lead to further operations that terminate in 
existential change.  Because ideas are meaningful relations (thought relations) that arise 
out of the circumstances of reflecting on anticipated consequences and the means to 
attain them, Dewey made a further distinction between two types of meaningful relations:  
conceptions and propositions.  Conceptions take the form of a rule that states “if such and 
such occurs, then this and that will follow” and are “universal”, i.e., they serve as a rule 
that claims something is the case, given certain specifying conditions.  It is under these 
rules that generic propositions, e.g., “humanity”, “dignity”, “well-being”, etc. operate and 
the reason they are able to function is that many different generic or existential 
propositions can comfortably fit under or work with them, which is what gives them the 
authority to operate.207  For example, Johnston suggests the cash value of the generic 
concept of “humanity” is that it has led to existential propositions that have a tangible 
effect on human conduct by providing ways to develop better living conditions for human 
beings. 
Some propositions consist in statements or sentences, e.g., “It is raining outside” 
that we believe to be the case and which can be tested existentially (concretely).  In 
inquiry, a proposition is an existential claim about what is in fact the case and are 
referred to as “generic” propositions.  Often, such statements are propositions of classes 
or kinds that we use to sort, order and classify existential traits, data, phenomena, etc.208  
However, they do not occur in a vacuum since the very authority for their formation 
comes from a conception.  Johnston observes that one trait both universal conceptions 
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and generic propositions share is their ability to self-correct.  In fact, a conception is only 
as good as the meaningful relation that it generates, i.e. being helpful.  Conceptions also 
have their operational nature bound up in the generic propositions that evolve from them.  
If the generic proposition doesn’t pan out or succeed, then either it or the conception that 
instantiates it is faulty.  The repeated failure of a generic proposition is what signals to 
the inquirer that the original conception is faulty.  Whenever the anticipated 
consequences don’t pan out, it becomes necessary to return to the problem in question in 
order to develop new conceptions and anticipated consequences.  Given this context, it is 
necessary to view inquiry, which begins and ends in situations, as being a loosely circular 
or spiral process. 
As we have seen, indeterminate situations and their later problematic situations 
mark the beginnings of an inquiry, while a “satisfactory” (settled) situation marks the end 
of an inquiry.  This means that an inquiry forms a whole with its beginnings and endings 
in a situation.  What is important here is that what occurs between the beginning and the 
end is an adjustment.  Specifically, inquiry forces adjustments to the following:  1) our 
judgment of what constitutes the problem, 2) our conceptions and generic propositions, 
and 3) the way we modify the environment, including the tools which we use to do so.209  
Ultimately, what counts as a successful inquiry is a satisfactory or settled situation and, 
until this is achieved, inquiry is continuously self-correcting.  What adjustment serves to 
accomplish is to return harmony and balance to an unsettled environment or state of 
affairs.  In this regard, Ralston notes that accommodation and adaptation are two types of 
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adjustment.210  The former involves acquiesce to the stubborn conditions of our 
environment by conforming to our physical and social surroundings.  The latter involves 
the active manipulation of the conditions of our environment in order to regain harmony 
and achieve our desires.  He suggests that “hope” could be the regulative principle 
operating here that “links the inquirer’s means (tools, instruments and even logical forms) 
to the end, goal or “end-in-view.”  It orders the instrumental relations between means and 
ends, not just in terms of an efficient relation, but as a desire, longing and aspiration that 
effectively spurs the inquirer on in the face of adversity.  It is thus a motivator for 
growth.”211 
Nor do we have to look far to find this general procedure since it can be found in 
common-sense thinking, practical reasoning and the most advanced forms of scientific 
reasoning; in fact, it is the basic form of all inquiry.212  They are the general features of 
both the method of knowing and the reflective situation.  It is not a uniform method, 
however, since the specific elements of an “individual’s method” result from her “native 
tendencies” and “acquired habits and interests.”  Therefore, any ‘individual method’ 
varies in the degree to which one’s “original instinctive capacities” and “past experiences 
and preferences” may vary.  Once inquiry has established a set of anticipated 
consequences and successfully shown that these are the fact of the matter for an inquirer 
or inquirers, it is tested by others.  Until this occurs, the anticipated consequences are 
merely hypotheses.  It is the frequent testing of inquiry over lengthy spans of time that 
tends to generate “common sense” facts of the matter.  Here, the existential import of the 
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inquiry is played up and the manner in which the inquiry is carried out is played down.  
Also, common-sense is oftentimes habituated in that we develop a stock of habits that we 
use in solving day-to-day problems and in our interactions with others.  In the end, the 
fact of the matter is that we have and use dispositions to treat certain situations in certain 
ways and, for the most part, when we are successful this contributes to our well-being. 
Creative Intelligence and Human Well-being 
The concept of creative intelligence did not arise with Dewey, but emerged out of 
the earlier classical position in American thought beginning with Emerson who said of 
the “method of nature” 
who could ever analyze it? That rushing stream will not stop to be 
observed.  We can never surprise nature in a corner; never find the end of 
a thread; never tell where to set the first stone.  The bird hastens to lay her 
egg; the egg hastens to be a bird.  The wholeness we admire in the order of 
the world is the result of infinite distribution.  Its smoothness is the 
smoothness of the pitch of the cataract.  Its permanence is a perpetual 
inchoation.  Every natural fact is an emanation, and that from which it 
emanates is an emanation also, and from every emanation is a new 
emanation.213 
Emerson’s understanding of nature viewed the original tension as the irreducible 
dialectic that arises between the imagination and the creative impulse of the human 
organism that occurs within the unpredictable giveness of Nature (read as the 
environment).  Further, this response is necessarily creative, individualistic, melioristic 
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and experimental, i.e., one in which the human organism is given as a creative force in 
the universe instead of merely a spectator in its unfolding.214 
Following Emerson, Pierce further pointed to the essential phenomenology of 
human thought.  As discussed in Chapter 2 he theorized that the process of thought, 
unlike the traditional understanding of reason, has only one function, i.e., to appease the 
irritation of doubt.  Pierce saw thought as operating according to two elements.  First, an 
individual’s established beliefs are challenged which results in a state of doubt or 
uncertainty.  This requires that the individual must adopt a new belief, which for Pierce is 
equivalent to adopting a new habit. Second, beliefs serve as rules for acting in a particular 
way given similar future situations.  The important point here is that the function of 
thought is always to resolve the inevitable tension that continually exists between 
organism and environment.  Where Emerson speaks of “creative imagination”, Pierce 
talks about the practical function of thoughts while living within a “universe of chance” 
and James speaks of the “will to believe” that is needed in order to overcome problematic 
situations.  Each sees beliefs and habits as derived from the continuous irreducible 
interaction between the organism and the environment.  Clearly, the concept of creative 
intelligence, in one form or another, is a long-standing and essential characteristic of 
American philosophical thought. 
 For Dewey, it offers the possibility of a naturalistic account of thought that serves 
as the driving force behind his melioristic-humanistic teleology.  He argued for the 
naturalization of the function of thought and boldly asserted “intelligence within nature 
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means liberation, as reason outside of nature means fixation and restriction.”215  Further, 
a naturalized conception of intelligence is preferable to the traditional dualistic 
conception of Reason because it has greater instrumental value. He described such 
intelligence as consisting in the “concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, 
developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed 
as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in 
accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice.  To such empirical suggestions used in 
constructive fashion for new ends the name intelligence is given.”216  The central point 
here is that intelligence is occurring within the very process of experience, which means 
that it is radical, transformative and constitutes the recognition that consequences and 
results matter. 
Adopting intelligence instead of the traditional conception of Reason has 
significant implications for philosophy in that the “recognition of the place of active and 
planning thought within the very process of experience radically alters the traditional 
status of the technical problems of particular and universal, sense and reason, perceptual 
and conceptual.  But the alteration is of much more than technical significance.  For 
reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, and used in the 
creation of social arts; it has something to do.”217  Nor is Reason (as statically conceived) 
capable of satisfying the immediate practical needs of the human organism.  What serves 
to make an intelligent human being is not “having reason which grasps first and 
indemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason deductively from them to 
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the particulars which they govern, but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities 
of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate.  In the large sense of the term, 
intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical.” 218  In fact, this is the function of 
intelligence—overcoming the gap between the organism and the environment.  In this 
context, intelligence involves the judgment or ability to select and arrange the means to 
achieve those consequences that lead us towards what we have chosen as the end-in-
view, which constitutes a potential consummatory experience. 
In applying “creative” to the concept of “intelligence” Dewey sought to illustrate 
the way in which intelligence is reconstructive in that it serves as the purposeful re-shaper 
of experience: 
Essential philosophic reconstruction represents an attempt to state these 
causes and results in a way freed from incompatible inherited factors.  It 
will regard intelligence not as the original shaper and final cause of things, 
but as the purposeful energetic re-shaper of those phases of nature and life 
that obstruct social wellbeing.  It esteems the individual not as an 
exaggeratedly self-sufficient Ego which by some magic creates the world, 
but as the agent who is responsible through initiative, inventiveness and 
intelligently directed labor for recreating the world, transforming it into an 
instrument and possession of intelligence.219 
One consequence of his conceptualization of creative intelligence is that his critique of 
the traditional conception of “Reason” led him to reject the traditional conception of the 
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“person” as well.220  As a naturalistic account of reason, creative intelligence implies a set 
of relations and habits that extend well beyond an individual’s self-encapsulated ego.  
Furthermore, given that creative intelligence leads to social well-being, it is 
fundamentally a social-communal conception since it can be directed at the resolution of 
an original tension that is manifested socially, e.g., as an organism-environment 
problematic at the community level.  This resolution must be achieved not only in as 
liberating a way as possible, but also must maintain such open possibilities for others. 
Deliberation and the Dramatic Rehearsal in Imagination 
Earlier, in Chapter 2, it was noted that habit is one of three factors that figure into 
activity, the others being impulse (instinctive activity) and intelligence. As a natural 
activity, the action of habit carries within it natural information that “pre-reflectively” 
influences not only our overt behavior, but any reflective or introspective cognitive 
activity as well.  At times, however, the organism-environment interaction becomes so 
problematic that our habits no longer work effectively and efficiently to overcome the 
problematic situation.221  In such instances, it becomes necessary to engage in the process 
of deliberation since it “has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice 
of a course of action which straightens it out.”222  Such problematic situations move us 
from a pre-reflective field of beliefs (as habit) to a reflective level of beliefs (as 
intelligence) as we seek to maintain or retain a sense of transactional equilibrium.  Since 
natural needs constantly motivate reflective activity, both in terms of establishing 
immediate lines of activity or general ideas for conduct, dramatic rehearsal in 
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imagination offers the best paradigm for negotiating with the actualities of decision-
making.223 
  Because the origination of inquiry lies in the felt need to overcome problematic 
situations—it is felt existentially and physically instead of merely as a mental or cognitive 
state—it is necessary to understand deliberation as “dramatic and active, not 
mathematical and impersonal; and hence it has the intuitive, the direct factor in it.”224  It 
begins whenever prior habits and newly released impulses conflict, thereby blocking 
efficient overt action.  The basis for such a view of deliberation is a conceptual system in 
which practical, not intellectual, activity is the central concern.225  The process of 
deliberation lies in our capacity for operating in a reflective mode of experience.  Such an 
account of reflective activity describes the local and present individual as situated within 
a radically relational universe, not existing outside of it.  As a dramatic rehearsal in 
imagination, deliberation is an experiment in trying out various competing lines of 
possible action in which “[t]hought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby 
avoids having to wait the instruction of actual failure and disaster.”226  It is 
“experimental” in that it involves trying out “each habit, each impulse, involved in the 
temporary suspense of overt action…finding out what the various lines of possible action 
are really like…[by] making various combinations of selected habits and impulses, to see 
                                               
223 In fact, Dewey viewed ethics as the “general activity of problem solving”, i.e., of resolving conflicts 
between organism and environment. 
224 Dewey, Ethics, MW 5, 292. 
225 He observed, “[w]e, indeed, estimate the import or significance of any present desire or impulse by 
forecasting what it would come or amount to if carried out; literally its consequences define its 
consequences, its meaning and importance.  But if these consequences were conceived merely as remote, if 
their picturing did not at once arouse a present sense of peace, of fulfillment, or of dissatisfaction, of 
incompletion and irritation, the process of thinking out consequences would remain purely intellectual.” 
Dewey, MW 5, 292. 
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what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon.  But the trial is in 
imagination, not in overt fact.”227  Although deliberation occurs in imagination, it ceases 
when the decision or choice is made.  What distinguishes deliberation, as dramatic 
rehearsal in imagination, from mere calculation is that it attempts to create new values 
continuously, while calculation attempts to establish fixed values. 
Furthermore deliberation, as a dramatic rehearsal in imagination, “is not 
irrevocably tied to the delight and disappointment of the past as a calculus must be…the 
calculative model offers no real standard for making decisions, just the injunction to 
accumulate more of what has seemed enjoyable before.” 228  This has significant 
implications for how we are to understand the relationship between the “self” and human 
well-being.  The self in calculation is one that considers pluses and minuses 
in isolation from one another.  Like profit and loss entries in a ledger, they 
cannot be related to one another—only added or subtracted.  This is 
because the conception of self which underlies calculation is inferior to 
that which grounds dramatic rehearsal…The method of calculation treats 
human beings as repositories of disconnected states.  Figuring out the 
psychic costs and benefits of each action deals with the individual as a 
place for credits and debits to be recorded…Implied in calculating 
outcomes…is a conception of the self as a collection of unrelated states or 
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moments.  No enduring structure of the self enters into the calculative way 
of decision-making.229   
In contrast, deliberation as dramatic rehearsal in imagination leads to conceiving the 
“self” as the more or less successful organization of habits and interests that, ultimately, 
determines a way of living (well-being).  Simply put, the act of rehearsing our options in 
imagination provides a procedure for discovering and not simply rehashing sources of 
value.   
The importance that dramatic rehearsal in imagination has for our own well-being 
is that it not only focuses our attention on the nature of our activities and their impact on 
us, it also projects the satisfaction or frustration of our interests through it.  It gives us 
something concrete with which to work and revise, thus providing us a way to discover 
the possibilities in action.  In doing so, it “can suggest new possibilities of action, beyond 
those entertained at the outset of the decision-making.”230  The most powerful feature of 
deliberation (as dramatic rehearsal in imagination) is that it involves a choice that gives 
decisive direction to action.  Not only does it release energy, it leads to the emergence of 
a unified preference out of competing preferences, as the pervasive quality of the 
situation.  All deliberation is a search for acquiring new beliefs and continuous 
transformation—it is a way to act, not a search for a final terminus since its aim is to 
facilitate stimulation.231  Since there are no fixed-ends or final-states, the only possibility 
is to conceive deliberation as being a circular process in which there is no beginning and 
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no end.  There are only “aims” or “ends-in-view” and the aims of deliberation serve as 
“redirecting pivots in action” and as the “turning points in activity.”232 
 The process by which aims are formed clearly has significant importance for the 
account of human well-being under development.  It generally begins with a wish (as an 
emotional reaction against the present situation) along with a hope for something better, 
in which 
 [a]ction fails to connect satisfactorily with the surrounding conditions.  
Thrown back upon itself, it projects itself in an imagination of a scene 
which if it were present would afford satisfaction.  This picture is often 
called an aim, more often an ideal.  But in itself it is a fancy which may be 
only a phantasy, a dream, a castle in the air.  In itself it is a romantic 
embellishment of the present; at its best it is material for poetry or a 
novel…It becomes an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of 
concrete conditions available for its realization, that is, in terms of a 
“means.”233 
However, aims are not all we use to guide our deliberation, since our judgments must 
also conform to some principles and criteria.  It is creative intelligence that is concerned 
with principles, criteria and judgments because it involves foreseeing the future so that 
our actions have order and direction.  In this regard the “diffused or wide applicability of 
habits is reflected in the general character of principles: a principle is intellectually what 
a habit is for direct action.  As habits set in, grooves dominate activity and swerve it from 
conditions instead of increasing its adaptability, so principles treated as fixed rules 
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instead of helpful methods take men away from experience….situations into which 
change and the unexpected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create new 
principles.”234  Finally, since creative intelligence operates not only at the individual 
level, but at the social level as well, it has broad relevance for human well-being. 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 Obviously, there are those who question the plausibility of Dewey’s theory of 
inquiry.235  Some critics have suggested that it leaves little room for emotion and 
imagination—it is just a theory about experimentation.236  However, the fallacy here is in 
claiming that his view of experimentation has nothing (or very little) to do with emotion, 
imagination and creativity.  Such criticism ignores that Dewey consistently and strongly 
accentuated the aesthetic and qualitative nature of inquiry within the context(s) of art by 
emphasizing the satisfaction of the experience rather than the particular techniques and 
methods involved.  Consequently, the “unified whole” is what all inquiry aims for and 
what is given priority in his account.  Further, claiming that inquiry has little to do with 
emotion, imagination and creativity seemingly disregards the very contexts within which 
they occur.  The very function of inquiry is to order and control responses thereby 
increasing the possibility for richer and more deeply felt emotions to rise to the surface. 
Another feature such critics apparently overlook is the importance Dewey gives to 
deliberative or dramatic rehearsal since this involves imagining anticipated consequences 
to the tentative solutions at hand.237  Imagination, especially in dramatic rehearsal, is at 
the core of inquiry because “our capacity for having a conceptually coherent world stable 
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enough to allow some measure of intelligent, deliberate mediation is imaginative through 
and through.  Imagination is at the very foreground of meaning.”238  Imagination’s most 
important function results from our capacity, while situated in the present, to take in the 
full scope of a situation and establish continuity between the actual consequences of past 
conduct and the prospective consequences of future conduct.  In dramatic rehearsal 
imagination serves as “the only gateway though which these meanings [derived from 
prior experiences] can find their way into a present interaction; or rather…the conscious 
adjustment of the new and the old is imagination.”239  In this context imagination 
involves “the capacity to understand the actual in light of the possible…it constitutes a 
phase of activity…in which possible activities are envisioned in relation to our own 
situations, thereby amplifying the meaning of the present and creating the context from 
which present values may be criticized, thus liberating the course of action itself.”240 
 A related criticism is that Dewey’s theory of inquiry denigrates or downplays 
abstract thinking.241  This criticism is dealt with easily once it is made clear that 
conceptions are required in order for the various existential propositions to function at all.  
Perhaps the real concern here has less to do with “abstract thought” and more to do with 
the tentative nature that Dewey gives to conceptions and propositions.  The problem here 
is that the abstract thoughts that Dewey endorses are tentative because they depend on 
their operational status instead of being the “timeless truths” or metaphysical states of 
affairs that his critics have in mind.  As shown in Chapter 1 and 2, as well as in the 
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present chapter, since these critics endorse a realm of “fixed ideas or notions” that Dewey 
denies, they will never find his theory satisfactory. 
 Another criticism is that the “self-correcting” nature of inquiry is too lenient on 
what counts as hard facts and truths, and that the “facts of the matter” have more force 
and depth than Dewey’s theory gives credit.  Although this may be correct, the problem 
here is that what counts as truth has little to do with the “correspondence theory of truth” 
of the traditional empiricists.  Instead, as noted earlier in this chapter, Dewey preferred 
the term “warranted assertibility” which emphasizes that the “settled results of inquiry” 
are always potentially subject to modifications or outright dismissal.  His point here is 
that the putative “facts of the matter” are potentially subject to change under varied 
conditions, and these conditions are occasioned by the problems that we face. 
 One final criticism that is particularly relevant to this inquiry is whether our own 
best results can be assured by the success of our inquiries.  Although this may appear 
circular, it depends upon how we define “success” in this case.  For Dewey, the definition 
of success is the satisfaction that results in consummatory experience, i.e., the situation as 
a unified whole.  This response is not merely emotional, but includes cognitive, 
behavioral and affective elements as well.  On this view, “success” leads to “future 
success” because there is now a method that can be applied in different contexts.  Of 
course, this method may require “adjustments” or be developed as a “habit of inquiry” 
that becomes a routine feature of our general dispositions.242  Thus, a successful inquirer 
not only understands that different contexts require different techniques, materials and 
tools, but also recognizes the importance of possessing attitudes that are congenial to 
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different contexts.  For Dewey, among the most important dispositions necessary for 
inquiry are directness (confidence), open-mindedness (willingness to entertain other 
ideas), single-mindedness (whole-heartedness) and responsibility (seeing a thing 
through).243 
 One advantage of Dewey’s account of creative intelligence is it recognizes that 
the success of any inquiry involves not only the context-relative processes and materials 
of inquiry, but the dispositions of the inquirer as well.  Perhaps the latter suggests that 
character, albeit of a Deweyan type, is a necessary ingredient of inquiry.  Although 
valuable information and techniques can be gained through practice there is, however, a 
limit to which they are transposable to other contexts.  Ultimately, there is no substitute 
for information and exercise that is internal to the context of inquiry.  Recently, Code has 
advanced a non-transcendent view of knowledge referred to as “ecological thinking” 
which is a picture of: 
an epistemic subjectivity and agency social-culturally learned and 
practiced, for which community, ecologically conceived, is a condition 
sine qua non for the production, circulation and acknowledgement of 
claims to know.  Its articulation in the language of ecology…is intended to 
unsettle assumptions about isolated, abstract, formal knowledge claims 
advanced and evaluated in isolation from their circumstances of their 
making and the concrete conditions of their possibility and from their 
consequent situational effects…[they] can be articulated, heard and  
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enacted only by knowers inculcated into a form of life…where conditions 
for their articulation and acknowledgment are already in place.244 
Lang notes that although ecological thinking does not reduce to a set of rules or methods 
and may play out differently from situation to situation, it is sufficiently coherent to be 
interpreted and enacted across widely diverse situations.  Some contexts involve the use 
of metaphors, images and symbols that operate to shape and govern possibilities of being, 
thinking, feeling and doing.  In making no assumptions about separation between a 
context and the elements that are contained by it, ecological thinking holds that 
knowledge is something that is made, negotiated and circulated because “the nature and 
conditions of the particular “ground” the situations and circumstances of specific 
knowers, their interdependence and their negotiations have claims to specific epistemic 
scrutiny equivalent to those of allegedly isolated, discrete propositional knowledge 
claims.”245  As such, ecological thinking contexts come to be understood as interactive, 
interdependent, transactional epistemic ecosystems in the sense that “epistemic” is taken 
to involve the construction and enactment of embodied or situated knowing. 
 Although there are many contexts for inquiry among the most common found in 
human experience are science, aesthetics, interpersonal, public, and bodily-kinesthetic.246  
The scientific context involves experimentation under and in laboratory conditions where 
the concern frequently is with quantification and the purpose is related to the precision 
and accuracy necessary for measured findings.  Aesthetic contexts, in contrast, involve 
the making, doing and reflection involved in art, music and literature where the concern 
is with a certain sort or quality of experience, i.e., a highly satisfactory experience.  The 
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interpersonal context involves relationships with other individuals, e.g. family, friends, 
colleagues, and authority figures.  In this context inquiry focuses on communication 
skills, dialogue, and developing a shared and sympathetic set of sentiments towards 
others.  One reason group projects are often undertaken, whether scientific, athletic or 
artistic, is for the creative, imaginative and critical resources that others bring to the 
group.  The public context involves relationships with fellow citizens, the larger 
community and beyond.  Finally, the bodily-kinesthetic context is concerned with body 
awareness and psychomotor control.  However, Johnston notes that one cannot simply 
transpose the techniques and methods from one context onto another and expect 
appropriate consequences to follow. 
 In conclusion, although all inquiry is context dependent, the common features of 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry can be summarized as follows: 
1. Inquiry always has the same beginning point and final product.  It begins in doubt, 
uncertainty and puzzlement that are more that “subjective” states because it is the 
situation itself that is problematic or questionable.  It ends with the transformation 
of problematic situations into understandable and manageable ones.  When we 
inquire, we develop distinctions and relations out of the situation that allows us to 
“see through” the problem. 
2. Inquiry is inclusive of common sense and science; it has a variety of techniques 
although there is a common structure or pattern to inquiry and its procedures are 
anti-reductionistic.  It also involves a “somatic intelligence” in operation, i.e., 
manipulation, as some form of doing by the inquirer, is involved. 
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3. Past inquiries form, in part, the context for further inquiries since we use what we 
have already learned in present as well as future problem-solving. 
4. Because inquiry can help solve the problems of ordinary people (including social 
problems) responsibility is a human accompaniment of inquiry. 
There are two additional features of Dewey’s theory of inquiry related to “growth” that 
serve to underscore its value for human well-being: its sensitivity to context and its 
ability to self-correct.247  Although the ability of inquiry to induce growth and educate 
have been neglected by educators, Johnston observes that “[i]nquiry must presuppose 
experience and growth, as the increase in the fund of meaningful, as well as satisfying 
experiences.”248  However, it is important to be cautious when equating educational 
growth with engaging in successful inquiries, since by definition the inquirer doesn’t 
know in advance where the inquiry is headed or what the outcome will be. 
 Finally, since inquiry and growth are open-ended evolutionary processes guided 
by human intelligence, the experienced inquirer learns to recognize the features of 
successful inquiry through her repeated involvement in problem-solving activities.  This, 
in itself, is an ability that signals an unfolding process of growth because “[t]he formation 
of a self, new in some respect or some degree is…involved in every genuine act of 
inquiry.”249  For example, although the difference here is only one of emphasis, the “self” 
in the “cognitive situation” resolves the situation by means of a change produced in the 
environmental conditions, while the “self” in the “moral situation” reconstructs itself as 
the distinctly demanded means.  The “self” engaged in inquiry undergoes reconstruction 
“according to conditions set by the need of following subject-matter where it leads, 
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requires willingness to surrender a theory dear to the heart of an inquirer and willingness 
to forego reaching the conclusion he would have preferred to reach.”250  But even more is 
required of inquiry if the aim is to solve the problem of reconstructing the self since it 
must also take into account reconstruction of the existing conditions.  Scientific inquiry is 
uniquely suited for this role because of its success in “effecting an outcome satisfying the 
needs of the situation.”251
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Ethics, Value and the Instrumental Mode in Human Well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If instrumental efficiencies need to be emphasized, it is not 
for the sake of instruments, but for the sake of that full and 
more sure distribution of values which is impossible with-
out instrumentalities. 
 
     John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 308 
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For Dewey, value holds a central place within the existential matrix of human 
experience and is inextricably tied to human well-being because “[o]ur constant and 
unescapable concern is with prosperity and adversity, success and failure, achievement 
and frustration, good and bad.  Since we are all creatures with lives to live, and find 
ourselves within an uncertain environment, we are constructed to note and judge in terms 
of bearing upon weal and woe—upon value.”252  Although the traits of nature (e.g., the 
precarious, the stable, quality, ends and histories) are implied by moral experience, some 
form of acknowledgment of these traits is necessary in order to make the actual 
experience of moral life possible.  For Dewey, it is possible to explicate them only by 
special reference to their occurrence in moral experience so that what distinguishes value, 
from merely liking or approving of something, is the consummatory phase of intentional 
conduct.  
As a consequence, philosophy’s place is within this matrix of weal and woe.  Both 
the inquiry into and the associated reflection about value are necessary not only at the 
level of individual well-being, but at the social level as well.  In this context, moral 
reflection is not about producing imperatives for conduct or prescriptions for duty, but 
about inquiring into all the conditions that are relevant to the formation of what actually 
functions as human well-being in experience.  Since all propositions which fulfill the 
“functions” of moral deliberation are cognitive in that they neither prescribe obligations 
nor prove that certain actions possess inherent moral properties, their function is to 
enlighten the formation of values.  As a philosophical term, however, “value” is heavily 
loaded and used in different ways, so it seems especially important to be as clear as 
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possible as to its meaning.253  What is clear, at least in terms of the current inquiry, is that 
Dewey viewed the discrimination of whatever it is that has “value” as being a function of 
the inclusive relation of human beings and the natural environment.254 
The Relevance of Dewey’s Ethical Meliorism for Human Well-being 
Chapter 2 examined the importance of habits in Dewey’s theory of experience.  
The principle of habit also enters into ethics not only because habits are social in nature, 
but because moral considerations enter at every point in the process of natural and social 
inquiry as well.255  Since the meaning of “moral” covers all human action, social 
phenomena such as habit, custom, and scientific methods of inquiry are simultaneously 
moral and natural.  In fact, morality is implicit in the very existence of customs or 
socially established ways of acting because such institutionalized habits are normative by 
their very nature in that 
all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the 
environment, natural and social…progress proceeds in two ways, 
and…freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an 
environment in which human desire and choice count for something.  
There are in truth forces in man…infinitely frail in comparison with 
exterior forces, yet they may have the support of a foreseeing and 
contriving intelligence.  When we look at the problem as one of an 
                                               
253 As important as value is as a philosophical term, it is ambiguous since we often use it in different ways.  
Sometimes we use it as a verb, e.g., “to value” or “give value to” something or that something is “to be 
valued.”  At other times we use it as a noun that designates something as “a value.” 
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adjustment to be intelligently attained, the issue shifts from within 
personality to an engineering issue, the establishment of the arts of 
education and social guidance.256  
Furthermore, morality is also implied by the fact that human action is oriented to natural 
goods, i.e., to the things that will satisfy human needs. 
 Moral considerations are intrinsic to the process of deliberation as well since it is 
through reflection and choice that we seek the best from among the alternative courses of 
action projected in the dramatic rehearsal in imagination.  However, moral deliberation is 
never immediate in that, as with the general method of inquiry, it begins with an effort to 
determine the nature of the problematic situation and discover what the options really are 
or involve before making a rational selection from among them.  It is “a process of active, 
suppressed rehearsal; of imaginative dramatic performance of various deeds carrying to 
their appropriate issues the various tendencies which we feel stirring within us.  When we 
see in imagination this or that change brought about, there is a direct sense of the amount 
and kind of worth which attaches to it, as real and direct, if not as strong, as if the act 
were really performed and its consequences really brought home to us.”257  By imagining 
ourselves acting out the various courses of action open to us, we discover whether and 
how particular dispositions are expressed in such courses of action.  In fact, there is a 
direct sense of worth here which comes in the form of a sense of relief or frustration, 
pleasure or pain, which serve as a “subjective signal” that the course of action anticipated 
will express one of our active dispositions.  It is only, “[w]hen many tendencies are 
brought into play, there is clearly much greater probability that the capacity of self which 
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is really needed and appropriate will be brought into action, and thus a truly reasonable 
happiness results.”258 
However, at the conclusion of such a dramatic rehearsal a decision about what 
goods to pursue still must be made.  Thus, dramatic rehearsal is a method for gaining 
information that is necessary for a moral judgment and, consequently, such judgment is 
not immediate.  As such, morality refers to the control of future action since, after all the 
consequences of the proposed alternative hypotheses are considered, some projected 
courses of action promise more in the way of good than do others.   Morality also enters 
into the way that others respond to our choices of action in terms of the social 
consequences of our actions.  Although Dewey viewed such evaluative behavior on the 
part of human beings as a “natural, though emergent, fact that remains mysterious” it is, 
nonetheless, simply an empirical fact that evaluation is a form of human behavior—
people do think and act in terms of goods, and they approve or disapprove of certain 
thoughts or acts.  Given that some persons will approve or praise certain actions while 
others will disapprove or condemn them, the very act of choice must take those 
consequences into account as well, if they are to be considered rational. 
Another fact is that moral responsibility arises from a liability in that others in the 
group first hold us responsible for our actions so that we then learn to hold ourselves 
responsible in consequence of their responses.  Thus, the point in praising or condemning 
past actions is that it leads to the control of future actions.  Furthermore, moral 
responsibility is a necessity that exists both for the group with respect to its members and 
for the members with respect to itself as the group.  As a consequence, all human action 
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becomes “conduct” that it is morally appraised, controlled and guided from within the 
natural world.  Not only did Dewey describe the process by which conduct is formed and 
preserved, he used this description to correct and refine the process itself.  In viewing 
conduct as a continuous stream of behavior, from the cradle to the grave, it is possible to 
cut into the stream in many ways.  It can be divided into component sequences as we like 
and we can view the last act of the sequence as the end for which the preceding acts are 
the means.  Photographically fixing a distinction that is, at most, relative to ever-changing 
interests represents only one particular way of dividing what is actually a continuum.  
Here again, as with his theory of inquiry, such a distinction is context or situation 
dependent in that it is purely functional and relative to the specific point of view we hold 
at the moment. 
In viewing human beings as fundamentally “energetic creatures” whose action 
must be directed and controlled, it was necessary for Dewey to redefine motive in its 
moral sense.259  It is not merely something that impels a specific action, but also serves to 
channel a human being’s natural activity in such a way that it will have specific 
consequences.  To say that a given act has a specific “motive” (e.g., greed) is not to state 
the pre-existing cause of the act; instead, it simply distinguishes a particular element 
within the act as having the tendency to produce certain consequences, along with 
rendering a judgment about the act in light of the desirability of the consequences.  
Therefore, attributing motives to an agent is simply part of the moral appraisal of the act, 
the purpose of which is to control the agent’s future action.260  One consequence of 
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Dewey’s view is that the whole question of motivation is inextricably involved with 
moral judgment and with teaching individuals to conform their future action to socially 
approved standards which are subject to on-going reconstruction as well.   
As noted in Chapter 1, Plato’s account of human well-being rested heavily on the 
concept of virtue.  Dewey provides an account of virtue in which his reconstruction of 
habit and motive provide the grounds for understanding it in naturalistic terms.  Virtues 
are not separate from habits and motives, but refer to “moral properties” that exist as 
components of the self.  Certain habits are referred to as being “virtuous” because they 
tend to produce consequences that are believed to be good, but “apart from such tendency 
a ‘virtuous’ disposition is either hypocrisy or self-deceit.”261  His use of “tendency” here 
is critical given his opposition to any theory that locates virtue exclusively in either inner 
intention or a particular set of overt consequences.  Virtues, then, are motives in the sense 
that they “are ends because they are such important means.  To be honest, courageous, 
kindly is to be in the way of producing natural goods or satisfactory fulfillments.”262  
However, such goods and fulfillments are not always possible through either inner 
intentions or objectives since luck, accident, and contingency also play a part.263  
Welchman sums up Dewey’s view on virtue as being “the expression of any particular 
disposition to action is desirable (thus virtuous) if it enhances an individual’s freedom to 
construct harmonious, flexible, stable life projects that further enhance the individual’s 
                                                                                                                                            
attributed to her.  If the disapproval of the group is successful, she is induced to channel her behavior 
voluntarily along those lines that the group approves, and so to want to do what she must do anyway. 
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263 Dewey, MW 14, 36. 
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capacity to participate in her community’s life.  Dispositions to action are undesirable 
(vicious) if they tend to promote the reverse.”264 
Moral deliberation is not simply a matter of following an absolute rule or fixed 
method of calculation, rather it is a moral inquiry that involves making a decision about 
which habit (as a Deweyan motive) will lead to desirable results.   Those with the highest 
probability of doing so are determined by observing the consequences as produced over 
an adequate number of successive trials.  It is in this probabilistic sense that Dewey uses 
the word tendency.  Certain habits or motives are referred to as being a “virtue” because 
they are especially conducive to producing particular consequences, i.e., because of their 
tendency to do so.  Dewey saw virtue , when understood as a dynamic structure of habits 
and motives, as applying to the transactional or situated self —a self has a virtuous 
character if its habits and motives are virtuous, a vicious character if its habits and 
motives are vicious.  One’s choice of the kind of self that one is to be is always a moral 
choice—it involves choosing those habits and motives having the tendencies to produce 
certain types of consequences. 
In understanding moral deliberation as moral inquiry, Dewey held that it is the 
degree to which the process of deliberation is open to evaluation and improvement that 
further enhances the effectiveness of the process of reconstruction of the problematic 
situation, including its moral context.  Chapter 3 noted that inquiry involves the 
formation of specific reflective habits, i.e., problem identification, dramatic rehearsal in 
imagination, elaboration of consequences, and evaluation of the consequences of our 
projected behavior.  As did Peirce and James, Dewey saw the success of the principles of 
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the scientific method as proof that our principles of inquiry must themselves be held as 
hypothetical and constantly tested against new experiences, new problems, and new 
verifications.  His reconstruction of deliberation as inquiry also led him to a re-analysis of 
the ends-means distinction and the role of future ends in deliberation.265 
The problem of ends is crucial for the process of moral deliberation because, since 
action is purposive, we are always involved in seeking means to the attainment of relative 
ends.  However, rational knowledge is possible only if based upon “tendencies” for a 
course of action to realize an end-in-view, i.e., the known probability, based on prior 
experience, that such a course of action will have such consequences.266  Thus, it is 
through the projected consequences of present conduct that we are able to assign meaning 
to present action.  The significance of a present act lies in the difference that it will make 
in the future (as now conceived)—in all the anticipated consequences (both good and 
bad) that our present action may be expected to have.  This is precisely what gives our 
moments of present choice significance; they can make the world other than it is or 
would have been had we acted otherwise.  Such present moments of choice can make a 
real difference because moral choice serves as an effective agent in the world and for 
Dewey this fact is what gives meaning and zest to life. 
It is such a view of ethics that underlies his call to the heroic life and belief in the 
possibility of genuine social reform.  He recognized clearly that the evils of and in life, 
whether natural or artificial, cannot be avoided.  This led him to reject both optimism and 
pessimism.  In their place he offered meliorism which is “the belief that the specific 
                                               
265 There is no such thing as an “end-in-itself.”  Instead, the only goods sought are those which are always 
themselves means to further goods; and means which, only while we seek them, are also ends. 
266 For Dewey, there is nothing else upon which to base the possibility of rational knowledge since there are 
no more certain guarantees of future outcomes upon which to base conduct. 
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conditions which exist at one moment be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, 
in any event, may be bettered.  It encourages intelligence to study positive means of good 
and the obstructions to their realization, and to put forth the endeavor for the 
improvement of conditions.  It arouses confidence and a reasonable hopefulness that 
optimism does not.”267  As noted previously, his view of moral deliberation and moral 
choice also offers the possibility for human beings to experience genuine freedom.  
However, such freedom can be achieved if and only if the following three conditions are 
met: 1) one possesses the ability to carry out plans, 2) one possesses the capacity to vary 
and experiment with these plans and, 3) it must really be the case that our desires and 
choices are effective causes in the world. 
The first condition separates well-conceived plans, which can be carried out in 
action, from those that are merely the dream of a possible world.  The second condition 
makes deliberation and rational choice possible; otherwise the “ruts of custom” are worn 
ever deeper and future thought or action is helplessly blocked by unresolvable conflict.  
However, Dewey placed the most stress on the third condition since its fulfillment 
depends upon our ability to forecast accurately what will be the consequences of present 
conduct.268  But what is the means by which such effective freedom can be achieved?  He 
viewed education as being the key instrument here since it involves the way in which 
habits are formed and culture is transferred from one generation to another.  It is through 
education that the habits of deliberation, critical inquiry, dramatic rehearsal, and 
empirical verification can be created, thus shaping the “cake of custom” before it 
                                               
267 Dewey, MW 12, 181-182. 
268 This requires a solidly grounded empirical social science through which we can accurately estimate the 
probability that a given course of conduct or choice will have the desired consequences.  For Dewey, social 
science becomes a condition of freedom and of the effectiveness of moral choice in the world. 
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hardens.  Because education can affect the child before traditional habits are fully 
ingrained, capitalizing upon the remaining plasticity, it offers a route to the reconstruction 
of the world—either as a force for freedom and growth or for bondage and stagnation, 
depending on how we use it. 
Dewey’s theory of ethics also has implications for how the person or self is to be 
understood, i.e., not as property of human beings, like their natural endowments.  Instead, 
it refers to a complex set of functions that these natural endowments may be used to 
perform since “[o]ne becomes a person as one learns to perform the functions constitutive 
of personality, in accordance with the social rules for their performance.”269  It is only 
through participating in already established systems of conduct that one can come to 
“apprehend his own powers, appreciate their worth and realize their possibilities, and 
achieve for himself a controlled and orderly body of physical and mental habits.  He finds 
the value and the principles of his life, his satisfaction and his norms of authority, in 
being a member of associated groups of persons and in playing his part in their 
maintenance and expansion.”270   
This suggests that social interaction is a necessary condition of moral agency 
since, “[a]part from the social medium the individual would never know himself, he 
would never be acquainted with his own needs and capacities.”271  It is also the case that 
social conditions not only “evoke what is latent, and bring to conscious attention what is 
blind, but they select, encourage and confirm certain tendencies at the expense of others.  
They enable the individual to discriminate the better and worse among his tendencies and 
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achievements.”272  Not only is participation in social institutions a necessary condition for 
one being a self-conscious and rational agent, it is also a necessary condition for being a 
moral agent because being a self-conscious and rational agent is a necessary condition 
for moral agency.  The important conclusion here is that “it turns out that Dewey’s claim 
that social dispositions and their satisfactions are qualitatively superior to their nonsocial 
counterparts is not after all fallaciously derived from a set of merely factual statements 
about human sociability.”273 
Finally, although Dewey argues that there is no universal a priori meaning or end 
to human life or action, this doesn’t mean that we should lack the motivation to carry on 
living and struggling to improve our lives.  For some the very conception of a fixed 
antecedent standard may offer a degree of contentment, however, it is but “another 
manifestation of the desire to escape the strain of the actual moral situation, its genuine 
uncertainty of possibilities and consequences.  We are confronted with another case of 
the all too human love of certainty, a case of the wish for an intellectual patent issued by 
authority.  The issue after all is one of fact.  The critic is not entitled to enforce against 
the facts his private wish for a ready-made standard which will relieve him from the 
burden of examination, observation and continuing generalization and test.”274  Just 
because life has no intrinsic value from a pragmatic perspective doesn’t entail that it is 
valueless—it is just that it has no value until it is valued.  Nor does it entail that life is 
meaningless, it just says that it meaning still has to be constructed.  Consequently, our 
lives and the meaning they have for us grow continually deeper and more complex.  In 
holding the belief that the meaning and value of our lives is up to us, Dewey saw no 
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reason for general despair about life or morality.  The problem is that that philosophers 
constructed “a strange dream world when they have supposed that without a fixed ideal 
of a remote good to inspire them, they would have no inducement to get relief from 
present troubles, no desires for liberation from what oppresses and for clearing-up what 
confuses present action [and]…[s]ufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.” 275  Dewey 
was cautiously optimistic, however, that such “evil” will be sufficient to “stimulate us to 
remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony…and limitation into 
expansion.  The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable and attainable by 
man.”276 
Valuation Statements, Observational Contexts and Human Well-being 
If we look to our ordinary language, we often say that we “value” something or 
that something has “value” or even that something is a “value”.  However, this isn’t the 
same as saying that something is “valuable”.  Dewey clearly recognized the inherent 
linguistic difficulties in using value and value-expressions as both nouns and verbs, and 
attempted to avoid these difficulties by reconstructing it as valuation.277  He identified 
three distinct types of valuation expressions: 1) exclamatory, 2) prizing (esteem), and 3) 
appraising (estimate).  Valuation-statements containing the first type of expressions serve 
to influence the conduct of others by evoking certain responses from them.  Those 
containing the second type of expressions emphasize something that has a definite 
personal reference and emotional quality.  Finally, those containing the last type of 
                                               
275 Dewey, MW 14, 195. 
276 Dewey, MW 14, 195. 
277 When used as a noun, “value” designates an object or its intrinsic quality, e.g., “Mary is a good 
woman”.  However, when used as a verb it is often designates either prizing (holding precious and dear) or 
appraising (assigning value to). 
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expressions designate an activity of comparative rating and are primarily concerned with 
a relational property of objects.278 
Exclamatory valuation expressions are clearly problematic because they are 
difficult to verify since they merely express one’s feelings about the conduct of others.  
Their primary use is to influence the conduct of others by evoking certain responses from 
them.  However, from an empirical standpoint, claiming that a report of a value-
expression is a “feeling” is meaningless since, “the interpretation is couched in terms of 
something not open to public inspection and verification.”279  Perhaps, since they involve 
inter-personal behavioral relations, they function as “signs.”  As signs, however, do they 
truly constitute value expressions or are they merely “indicators of feelings” about 
situations involving inter-personal behavior?  Dewey makes the case that they constitute 
legitimate value-expressions since, in order to function as such, they must refer to 
valuation phenomena that are “social or interpersonal phenomena” of some kind.  What 
they do, however, is provide material for propositions about observable events that are 
subject to empirical testing and subsequent verification or refutation. 
If Dewey’s analysis is correct, and I believe it is, then all statements containing 
exclamatory value-expressions are analyzable in terms of their observable context.  In 
order for exclamatory value-expressions to be legitimate value statements, it is necessary 
to make their existential context clear.  An example of such a context would be an 
existent situation that will have unpleasant consequences that the person uttering the 
                                               
278 Such expressions designate an activity of rating that involves comparison and “…is primarily concerned 
with a relational property of objects so that an intellectual aspect is uppermost of the same general sort that 
is found in ‘estimate’ as distinguished from the personal-emotional word ‘esteem’.”  Dewey, MW 13, 19. 
279 Dewey, MW 13, 199. 
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exclamation is unable to cope with, but who anticipates an improved situation if 
assistance is received from others.  The main point here is that when we take contexts 
into account “what emerges are propositions assigning a relatively negative value to 
existing conditions; a comparatively positive value to a prospective set of conditions; and 
an intermediate proposition (which may or may not contain a value-expression) intended 
to evoke activities that will bring about a transformation from one state of affairs to 
another.”280  The observable context in which one makes such value-expressions provides 
the grounds for assigning a relatively positive or negative value to propositions about 
existing conditions or about a set of prospective conditions.281  In such cases, the 
observable context involves both an aversion to an existent situation and attraction 
towards a prospective possible situation, along with a specifiable and testable relationship 
between the latter, as an end, and certain activities as means for accomplishing it. 
With regard to prizing valuation expressions, the “emphasis falls upon something 
having a definite personal reference, which, like all activities of distinctly personal 
reference, has an aspectual quality called emotional.”282  Such expressions clearly 
demarcate what they designate from what the word “enjoy” designates since some things 
are prized that are not necessarily enjoyed.283  Certainly, enjoying is more problematic 
conceptually and less desirable as a value expression because it is more ambiguous than 
                                               
280 Dewey, MW 13, 202. 
281 There may as well be intermediate propositions (which may or may not contain a value-expression) the 
intent of which is to evoke activities that will bring about a transformation from one state of affairs to 
another. 
282 Dewey, MW 13, 195. 
283 There are many variants of prizing, e.g., “tending for”, “caring for” and “liking” that can be expressed in 
a behavioral (affective-motor) sense because they are used to designate particular activities that take place 
in order to maintain or bring about certain conditions.  They are empirically verifiable in that they involve 
both the relation of active or behavioral (affective-motor) attitudes, e.g. liking and disliking, and the 
relation of valuation to things as means-end.  The distinction made here is similar to that between 
“affective” and “effective” thought. 
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prizing.  This ambiguity led Dewey to conclude that any effort to assign signification to 
words in isolation from objects “as designata” is a futile undertaking and it is generally a 
good thing, at least philosophically, to keep ambiguity at a minimum.  The source of the 
ambiguity here lies in the two different ways in which “enjoying” can be used.  In some 
cases it means receiving gratification from something already in existence, thereby 
requiring no affective-motor action as a condition of its production.  In other cases it can 
be used to signify “taking delight” in an effort in order to perpetuate the existence of 
conditions that are the source of the gratification. 
Here again, Dewey directs our attention to the importance of the observable 
context in regards to prizing valuation expressions since all of them are subject to the 
“evocation of specifiable existential conditions and to observation of what takes place in 
them…we are directed to observe whether energy is put forth to call into existence or to 
maintain in existence certain conditions; in ordinary language, to note whether effort is 
evoked, whether pains are taken to bring about the existence of certain conditions rather 
than others, the need for the expenditure of energy shows that there are conditions 
adverse to what is wanted.”284  This suggests that value description and assignment is 
possible only through the observation of behavior which may need to extend over 
considerable space-time.  In fact, this enables us to use qualifying adjectives such as 
“great” or “slight” as prefixes to valuation expressions, e.g. “Happiness is the greatest 
good”.  Perhaps the most significant point here is that the most solid ground for making 
the distinction between “positive” and “negative” valuation lies in observing the direction 
which the energy takes. 
                                               
284 Dewey, MW 13, 203. 
 
 
 
  139 
Desires, Interests and the Existential Context of Well-being 
 Another feature of prizing valuation expressions is that they possess an existential 
element since they occur only to bring something missing into existence or to sustain the 
existence of something when threatened by external conditions.  The existential context 
involves desiring (as opposed to mere wishing) and requires treating any desire in terms 
of how it arises and functions in that specific context.285  As such, desires count only 
when they arise within and function with reference to certain existential contexts, i.e., 
they serve either to satisfy existing wants or to sustain the current situation.286  In such 
cases, it becomes both possible and necessary to state the relation between desire and 
valuation in terms of empirically verifiable propositions.287  Also, instead of being a post-
facto state of desire, effort becomes the “essential tension” that is involved in desire.  
Although such expressions are empirical, they are “situation dependent” and adequate 
only to the extent they adapt to the needs and demands imposed by the situation.  They 
are empirical because, within the context of the situation, they are “open to observation, 
and since the consequences of the effort-behavior as observed determine the adaptation, 
the adequacy of the given desire can be stated in propositions…capable of empirical test 
                                               
285 It is interesting to note that Dewey’s objection against any account based on desire is similar to that 
offered by Sumner.  Dewey observed that in defining ‘valuation’ in terms of desire, “…as something initial 
and complete in itself, there is nothing by which to discriminate one desire from another and hence no way 
in which to measure the worth of different valuations in comparison with one another.  Desires are desires, 
and that is all that can be said.  Furthermore, desire is then conceived as merely personal and hence as not 
capable of being stated in terms of other objects and events.” Dewey, MW 13, 204-205. 
286 The connection between “valuation as prizing” and “desire” is through existential situations and differs 
in terms of the particular differences in existential contexts. 
287 This is possible because the content and object of desires “depend upon the particular context in which 
they arise, that in turn depends upon the antecedent state of both personal activity and of surrounding 
conditions.”  Dewey, MW 13, 205. 
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because the connection exists between a given desire and the conditions with reference to 
which it functions are ascertained by means of these observations.”288 
However, desires are not the only motivation for making prizing valuation 
expressions.  At times, interest is involved in making such expressions since it “suggests 
in a forcible way the active connection between personal activity and the conditions that 
must be taken into account in the theory of valuation”.289  Having an interest in 
something means that we have a stake in both the course of events as well as their end-in-
view.  It leads us to act in a certain way in order to bring a particular result, rather than 
some other result, into existence.  Since interests occur in definite existential contexts that 
are situations within the life-activity of a person or a group, they “are so linked with one 
another that the valuation-capacity of any one is a function of the set to which it belongs.  
The notion that a value is equally an object of interest can be maintained only upon a 
view that completely isolates them from one another—a view that is so removed from 
readily observed facts.”290  Because desires and interests are activities that take place and 
have effect in the world, they are indirectly observable in terms of both themselves and 
their observed effects.  Consequently, statements about desires or interests are 
propositions about matters of fact. 
In order to delimit the problem as to the existence of valuation statements in a 
distinctive sense (as appraisal), valuation expressions arising from desires and interests 
must be stated in terms of the conditions and consequences that they serve.  Such 
statements take the general form ‘Desiring X is good’ or ‘Desire X is better than desire 
Y’ or ‘Desire X is more desirable than desire Y’.  The question here is whether it is 
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possible to appraise propositions about existent valuations themselves and whether such 
appraisal, once made, enters into the constitution of further values.  The existence of 
value statements, in a distinctive sense, means that “the final outcome is to show that 
some kinds of acts of prizing are better than others, valuation-acts are themselves 
evaluated, and the evaluation may modify further direct acts of prizing.”291  Thus, it is 
only when this condition is met that propositions about valuations that actually take place 
become the subject matter of valuations in a distinctive sense, i.e., as marked off from 
propositions of physics and from historical propositions about what human beings have in 
fact done. 
In particular, appraising value expressions refer to the future since propositions 
containing such expressions consist in a rule(s) for determining the performance of an act 
and an observable regulative condition, i.e., something that shall or should happen.  Such 
propositions are normative in that they specify the condition(s) to which definite forms of 
future action must conform.  It is in this sense that they serve as criteria or norms for 
judging the value of proposed modes of behavior.  The key question here, however, is 
whether such normative statements are merely expressions of convention, tradition, and 
custom, or whether they are capable of stating relations between things as means and 
other things as consequences, when such relations are themselves grounded in 
“empirically ascertained and tested” existential relations (e.g., cause and effect).  Further, 
if the goal is to achieve a fully empirical account of valuation, can such statements meet 
the first requirement of scientific procedure—full publicity as to materials and processes?   
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Dewey’s answer is that appraisals of courses of actions as “better or worse” or 
“more or less serviceable” are as experimentally justifiable as non-valuative propositions 
because they are about “things as they sustain to each other the relation of means to ends 
or consequences.”292  The appraisal of a rule as to a “better or needed” action only 
happens within the context of an end-in-view—it is a valuation of the action’s 
serviceability or need/desire/interest-meeting ability.  Of course, while there are 
situations where action is based on sheer instinct or complete trial-and-error, appraisal 
generally involves the observation of actual materials and an estimate of their potential 
force in producing a particular event.   Most often this involves comparing and 
contrasting some observation of the “outcome attained” with the “outcome intended.”  
This is what sheds light upon the actual fitness of things employed as means, making 
possible a better judgment in the future as to their “fitness” and “usefulness”.  For 
example, if observations about modes of conduct result in a judgment made as to their 
being “silly, imprudent, or unwise, or the contrary”, such discrimination rests on the 
validity of the estimates reached about the general relation of things as means to the end 
or consequence actually achieved.   
One possible objection to this view is that it applies only to things as means and 
propositions about genuine valuations apply only to things as ends.293  However, this 
objection fails to recognize that when something is under consideration as a means, but 
requires too much time or energy for attainment or, if achieved, would lead to 
inconveniences or likely future troubles, the end is open to re-appraisal and ultimately to 
rejection as a “bad” end.  Nor is it the case that valuation propositions are just about 
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293 Dewey responds that this objection misses the mark since “ends are appraised in the same evaluations in 
which things as means are weighed.”  Dewey, MW 13, 212. 
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valuations that have actually occurred since some are used to describe and define certain 
things as “good”, “fit”, or “proper” in a definite existential relation (means-ends or 
means-consequences) and serve as generalizations that stipulate the proper use of 
materials.294  Another possible objection is that this view fails to distinguish between 
things that are good and right in and  of themselves (i.e., intrinsically or immediately so) 
and things that are simply good for something else.  In raising the question of the relation 
between the categories of means and end, this objection also explicitly raises the question 
of the relation between prizing and appraising in valuation.  This distinction is so crucial 
for Dewey’s theory of valuation and values that the failure to make it destroys the 
validity of his conclusions. The claim here is that appraising applies only to means 
(where the evaluation is secondary and derivative) while prizing applies to things that are 
ends (as the full sense of valuation).  A further question arises as to whether the relation 
between appraising things as means and prizing things as ends implies that interests or 
desires (likings) that directly affect an institution of ends-values are independent of the 
appraisal of things as means or whether such appraisal intimately influences them.  
Dewey argues this is not the case.295  Indeed, we only need to look at what takes place in 
any deliberative activity since “deliberation is the weighing of various alternative desires 
(ends-values) in terms of the conditions that are the means of their execution, which, as 
means determine the consequences actually arrived at.”296 
                                               
294 In their general form, such valuation propositions can rest upon scientifically warranted empirical 
propositions that are testable by observation of the actually attained results compared to the intended 
results. 
295 Consider an instance in which a person P finds that desire X requires too much effort to achieve its 
realization.  Does this fact react to modify P’s original desire X to some extent and, by definition, P’s 
valuation?  For example, if P cannot achieve X in a particular circumstance, is X’s value in P’s hierarchy of 
values, diminished? 
296 Dewey, MW 13, 213. 
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The only control over the operation of “foreseeing consequences”, for Dewey, is 
in terms of the causal conditions operating to secure their attainment.  In particular, the 
degree to which a proposition, in which an object as an end-in-view is able to be stated or 
is explicitly stated, meets the test of warranted assertibility depends on the extent to 
which the existing conditions have been examined and appraised in terms of their 
capacity as means.297  When we consider experiences in which ends-in view are formed, 
and in which earlier impulsive tendencies are shaped through deliberation into a chosen 
desire, we see that the object finally valued as an end to be reached is determined in its 
concrete make-up by appraisal of existing conditions of means.  Consequently, it is 
neither possible to separate ends from means by assuming, for example, a separation 
between “useful/helpful” and “intrinsically good”, nor does it follow that there is any 
separation between propositions stating what is “expedient, prudent or advisable” and 
what is “inherently desirable”.298 
The essential difference between “impulse” and “desire” is that an end-in-view is 
present in desire as an object of foreseeable consequences.  What accounts for the 
possibility of distinctive value propositions (appraisals) is that “foresight” is dependable 
only to the degree it consists in an examination (inquiry) into the conditions that, in fact, 
will decide the outcome.  Furthermore, those propositions warranted by evidence and 
subject to experimental test can enter into the evaluation of things that are means.  
                                               
297 If this is not the case then it follows that no deliberation occurs, no formation of ends-in-view is possible 
and people act directly upon whatever impulse or acquired habit presents itself. 
298 Words such as “inherent”, “intrinsic” and “immediate” are often used ambiguously.  Nor is any self-
evident truth being stated, since such a separation is “foolishly” irrational given that words like prudent, 
sensible and expedient so readily merge into the word “wise”.  Although some desires and interests are 
shortsighted while others are enlightened or farsighted, both shortsightedness and farsightedness are 
determinable based on whether the object of a given desire is viewed as a “conditioning means” of further 
consequences. 
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Furthermore, if these propositions enter into the formation of the interests and desires that 
are themselves valuations of ends, then such interests and desires constitute the subject 
matter of authentic empirical affirmations and desires.  What is most important here, in 
terms of human well-being, is that any end-in-view also consists in affective-ideational 
motor activity that is involved in the union of the acts of prizing and appraising.299  By 
using Dewey’s theory of value it possible not only to determine the conditions under 
which desires and interests (hence valuations) are “matured and tested” but also to 
explain how it is possible for desires and interests to change by means of learning the 
consequences of acting on them. 
Another distinction that is important to consider is that which arises is between 
what is “desired”, what is “desirable” or what “should be desired”.  We often use these 
terms when speaking about human well-being in both prudential ways and ethical ways.  
Earlier we saw that a number of modern philosophical theories of well-being have 
clustered around desire theory.  The particular issue of interest here is what such a 
distinction demarcates in experience.  Dewey viewed it as marking the contrast between 
the “object of desire” at its first appearance in impulse or acquired habit and the “object 
of desire” that emerges from its subsequent revision(s) as contextualized by critical 
judgment about the conditions that will decide the actual result.300  Since social 
conditions and pressure are part of the conditions that affect the execution of desires, it is 
also necessary to account for them in framing ends in terms of available means.  
Furthermore, desires and interests are themselves causal conditions of results and, as 
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difference from, the ends anticipated or held in view. 
300 Since the “desirable” emerges only after prior experience shows that “hasty action upon desire not 
subjected to criticism leads to defeat or catastrophe”, there is no a priori distinction. 
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potential means, require appraisal as such.  What is critical here, in terms of human well-
being, is being able to discriminate between simply having an end-in-view for which any 
desire suffices and inquiring to make certain the resultant consequences are such that they 
will be actually prized and valued when they occur. 
Theories that relate value to desire and interest generally make a sharp division 
between “prizing and appraisal” and between “ends and means”, although they fail to 
investigate empirically the actual conditions under which desires and interests arise and 
function, and in which end-objects and ends-in-view acquire their actual content.301  
Desires arise only when there is “something the matter”, i.e., when a lack or want in the 
existent situation produces some form of conflict within its elements.  Desires do not 
arise when “things are going smoothly” since there is no need to project ends-in-view—
effort and struggle are not required so that things are allowed to take their natural course.  
Here, there is no need for the projection of an end-object or end-view because it is not 
necessary to investigate or examine what would be better to have happen in the future.  
However, at times “vital impulses and acquired habits” can operate without the 
intervention of an end-in-view or purpose.302  When desire and an end-in-view intervene 
between the occurrence of a vital impulse or acquired habit and the execution of an 
activity, it usually results in the modification and, to some degree, the transformation of 
the original impulse or tendency.303  This proves that valuation takes place only when 
                                               
301 Such an analysis would focus the following three elements: 1) the actual emergence of desire, 2) its 
object and 3) the value-property ascribed to the object. 
302 When someone steps on your foot, your reaction is usually to get out from under the other person’s foot.  
You really do not give any thought to forming a “definite desire” and setting up an “end” to reach.  Since 
such behaviors are so direct no desires and ends intervene and no valuations take place. 
303 This is purely a tautological statement since the occurrence of a desire related to an end-in-view is a 
transformation of a prior impulse or routine habit. 
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there is “something that matters” and, whenever there is valuation, there is also present an 
“intellectual factor”—a factor of inquiry.304 
How is it possible to account for the fact that there are differences in different 
desires and their correlative ends-in-view?  The answer here is that such differences 
depend upon the adequacy of the inquiry into two conditions.  The first involves an 
examination of the “lacks and conflicts” of the existing situation and the second requires 
assessing the likelihood that a particular established end-in-view will, if acted upon, 
actually fill the existing need or satisfy the requirements of what is needed.  It is only 
through eliminating conflict by directing activity that a unified state of affairs can be 
achieved.  Furthermore, there are only two possible alternatives since an action can take 
place either with or without an end-in-view.  When actions occur without an end-in-view, 
there is overt action with no intermediate valuation as when a “vital impulse” or “settled 
habit” reacts directly to some immediate sensory stimulation.  Whenever actions occur 
with an end-in-view it means not only that a particular end-in-view exists, but also that it 
is valued or exists in relation to a desire or interest.  It is the anticipation of consequences 
(as a foreseen or foreseeable end) that “tautologically mediates” the subsequent motor-
activity and thereby enters into the constitution of the desire or interest.  This means that 
things can be anticipated (foreseen as ends or outcomes) only in terms of the conditions 
which bring them into existence.  Furthermore, it is impossible for one to have an end-in-
view or to anticipate the consequences of an action without considering the means for 
bringing it into existence.  In fact, this is the essence of genuine human desire since 
anything else is only an idle fantasy or a futile wish, both of which can be the result of 
                                               
304 It is the formation and projection of the end-in-view as that which, if acted upon, fulfills the existing 
need or lack and resolves the existing conflict. 
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vital impulses and acquired habits.305  Consequently, there is no separation between 
means and ends in experience since the “propositions in which things (acts and materials) 
are appraised as means enter necessarily into desires and interests that determine end 
values.”306 
The Existential Nature of Qualitative Thought 
We live in a qualitative world that forms the field of characteristic modes of 
thinking because thought is definitely regulated by qualitative considerations.  Although 
this fact has influenced metaphysics and epistemology, it has had significantly less 
influence in logical theory or science.  The question of concern here is “What is the 
relation or lack of relation between propositions which refer to objects of physical 
science and those that refer to qualitative objects?”  Dewey criticized the “property” 
notion of propositional content, i.e., that propositions such as “the stone is metallic” 
consist of an object (stone) and a property (metallic) proclaiming that “...logical theory 
has nothing to do with the forms of thought characteristic of qualitative objects.”307   
In contrast he claimed that the only thing unqualifiedly given in experience is the 
total pervasive quality, not a dualistic combination of the object and its properties.  
Dewey drew the distinction between situation and object in holding that any logical force 
existing between objects and their relations is inexplicable without “the selective 
determination and relation of objects in thought as controlled by reference to a 
situation.”308   The point he is making here is that in failing to acknowledge such 
underlying and pervasive qualitative determinations, a distinct logical formulation is 
                                               
305 The content of fantasies and wishes are not ends-in-view precisely because they are not formed in terms 
of the actual conditions that serve as the means for their actualization. 
306 Dewey, MW 13, 222. 
307 Dewey, “Qualitative Thought”, 196. 
308 Dewey, “Qualitative Thought”, 197. 
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problematic in two ways.  One is that it denies thought to the subject matter in question 
by attributing “intuition”, “genius”, “impulse” or “personality” as ultimate and 
unanalyzable entities.  The other, perhaps worse, is that it reduces intellectual analysis to 
a mechanical enumeration of isolated terms or “properties”.   
Instead, for Dewey, what regulates the pertinence, relevancy or force of every 
distinction and relation within the situation is the underlying unity of qualitativeness.  
This is what guides the selection, rejection, and the very manner of the utilization of all 
explicit terms in the proposition.  It is precisely this quality that allows us to keep 
thinking about one problem without our having to constantly stop to ask ourselves what it 
is that we are thinking about.  He talks at length about “subject-predicate” form of 
propositions and why they are a problem 309  The chief problem is that such a view sees 
the subject as “given”—ultimately apart from thinking—and then thought adds to what is 
given a further determination or else assigns it to a ready class of things. 
Dewey’s formulation of the notion of the “situation” emphasizes the fact that the 
subject-matter ultimately referred to in existential propositions (the ”stone” is “metallic”) 
is a “complex existence that is held together in spite of its internal complexity by the fact 
that it is dominated and characterized throughout by a single quality.”310  It is this larger 
and inclusive subject-matter to which the term “situation” refers.  However, it is not and 
cannot be stated or made explicit because “[i]t is taken for granted, “understood”, or 
implicit in all propositional symbolization.  It forms the universe of discourse of whatever 
is expressly stated or of what appears to be a term in a proposition.  The situation cannot 
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310 Dewey, “Qualitative Thought”, 197. 
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represent itself as an element in a proposition any more than a universe of discourse can 
appear as a member of discourse within the universe.”311   
The situation also controls the “terms of thought” in that they are its distinctions 
and their applicability to it is the ultimate test of their validity.  Thinking as an existential 
process takes place through association; existentially it is association as far as the latter is 
controlled.  The mechanics of thinking cannot be totally irrelevant to its logical structure 
and function.  For Dewey, “ideas” signify objects, not psychical entities, thus they are 
meanings to which reference is made since 
the gist of the matter is that the immediate existence of quality, and of 
dominant and pervasive quality, is the background, the point of departure, 
and the regulative principle of all thinking.  Thought which denies the 
existential reality of qualitative things is therefore bound to end in self-
contradiction and in denying itself.  “Scientific” thinking, that expressed in 
physical science, never gets away from qualitative existence.  Directly, it 
always has its own qualitative background; indirectly, it has that of the 
world in which the ordinary experience of the common man is lived.  
Failure to recognize this fact is the source of a large part of the artificial 
problems that infect our theory of knowledge and our metaphysics, or 
theories of existence.312 
Dewey notes that the significance of dominant qualitativeness in suggestion and 
connection shows why thinking, as an existential process, is all one with controlled 
association.  Controlled association refers to the connection of objects or their elements in 
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the total situation having a qualitative unity.  But, association is more than mere 
contiguity because both ideas are relevant to a situation defined by a unity of quality 
since there must be a coherence of some sort.  
The Function and Operation of Value in Instrumental Well-being 
Dewey’s theory of value clearly represents a challenge to the traditional 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that underlie most, if not all, theories of 
value.313  Since well-being itself is a value that is valued as well as held to have value, 
and may well be valuable, his theory has significant implications for the account of 
human well-being under development here.  Consider the use of exclamatory valuation 
expressions such as “You lied!”  Not only do they clearly signify something of value 
(“Lying is wrong or bad”), they are also open to empirical analysis and description, e.g., 
by showing remorse, not lying in future situations, etc.  In some contexts, they can 
signify either approval or disapproval, thus they can have either positive or negative 
import. 
Certainly, someone subjected to constant negative exclamatory value-expressions 
who constantly utters them as well, is unlikely to value positively his own well-being or 
that of others.  Similarly, for someone consistently subjected to positive exclamatory 
value-expressions, and who consistently utters them, it is highly likely she would 
positively value her own well-being.  Not only do exclamatory valuation expressions 
influence our well-being, they also serve to assign empirically established value-content 
to it.  However, human well-being certainly includes more value-content than what is 
                                               
313 Ontologically, it is grounded in his radical empiricism that leads him to reject the existence of fixed 
categories of values, e.g., the good, the right, etc. as being determinative of the meaning of values.  Instead, 
any meaning given to ‘good’, ‘right’ is derivable only from actual world contexts.  Epistemologically, the 
distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is no longer relevant since all valuation propositions are 
analyzable empirically. 
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provided by the exclamatory valuation expressions that occur in one’s life.  Otherwise, 
the positive assignment of value to well-being would consist of little more than a series of 
signifying grunts. 
Prizing valuation expressions relate to human well-being more substantively 
given the immediate naturalistic fact that we like some things and dislike other things.  
This is precisely what leads to an experience that is either enjoyable or unpleasant.  
Obviously, many things that we like or dislike are simply the result of impulse or habit.  
However, our likes and dislikes can become, depending on context, more robust; in 
which case we demarcate them in experience as desires and interests.  They are more 
robust because they inherently contain the elements of deliberation and personal activity.  
In this form, they constitute the basis for valuation as prizing and what is prized is some 
end based on a desire or an interest.  However, since there are no fixed or final-ends 
separate from the means used to achieve them, there are only ends-in-view which, 
depending on the context, can serve as both means and end.  Consequently, since there is 
no “final end” what carries forward in experience is only a connected series of temporary 
stopping points (ends-in-view). 
By using dramatic rehearsal in imagination, we are able to foresee an end-in view 
or anticipated consequence as the intended outcome (the prize).  After selecting a 
temporary end-in-view and achieving it through successful means, we come to enjoy a 
sense of unity of experience (consummation).  The relationship between the foreseen 
consequence and the actual consequence is also subject to empirical analysis and 
description.  Although what we enjoy contributes to our sense of well-being, 
unfortunately, it often results from capricious impulse and habit.  Clearly, a robust 
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account of human well-being requires more than this.  Perhaps what one prizes has 
greater importance in one’s assessment of one’s well-being than what one enjoys.  It 
seems likely that if one succeeds in achieving one’s desires and interests, one would be 
positive in her assessment of her well-being.  As with exclamatory valuation expressions, 
prizing valuation expressions are also context dependent.  Since desires and interests are 
activities that are both observable and have observable effects in the world, this means 
that they have empirically established value-content.  However, when speaking about our 
well-being it seems that we refer to more than what we prize. 
We clearly distinguish certain “prizings” as being better than others.  Appraisal 
valuation expressions are not only comparative.  Because they are the result of the 
evaluation of different valuation acts, they also serve to modify further direct acts of 
prizing.  They are also regulative in that they serve as rules for determining whether to 
perform an act or not.  Since such expressions constitute generalized appraisals of things 
in terms of whether or not they actually do what they need to do, they constitute 
empirical propositions that are testable by the comparative observation of the results 
actually attained to those intended.  Given that means and ends are inseparable as ends-
in-view, any proposition stating an end-in-view is warranted only in the degree to which 
existing conditions have been examined and appraised in their capacity as means.  It is 
through the shaping of prior impulses and acquired habits into a chosen desire that the 
object, which finally comes to be valued as an end to be reached through appraisal of the 
existing conditions in terms of means, is determined in its concrete make-up. 
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Analysis and Conclusion 
Dewey’s instrumentalism and meliorism are fundamental to the development of a 
theory of instrumental well-being in which the pervasive quality (satisfaction) of the life-
situation is taken to be the pervasive quality that is the criterion for human well-being.  
However, it is not all that clear as to what we mean when we say someone makes a 
judgment about one’s “satisfaction” or “fulfillment” in regard to one’s life.  Although the 
appraisal one makes about one’s satisfaction is one’s own since it involves one’s life and, 
therefore, one’s personal satisfaction, such appraisal does not occur in total isolation.  
Instead, one’s appraisal of what constitutes one’s satisfaction occurs within the context of 
the social community of which one is a member.  In this sense, one’s appraisal of one’s 
satisfaction has larger social meaning within the given context of one’s community.314   If 
this is the case, it seems that in acting to bring about satisfactory activity for oneself, one 
is necessarily called to act for the public or social good.  It is through the realization of 
one’s personal well-being that one contributes to the well-being of other members of 
one’s community.  This view of individuality recognizes that while we are individuated, 
we are not isolated, since each of us is a social individual. 
In Chapter 1 questions were raised about accounts of human well-being that 
involve reason, especially those claiming that one’s judgment about one’s well-being is 
either absolutely or formally true or false.  This is not to deny that some of our judgments 
about our well-being have a rational basis—well-being certainly involves more than mere 
caprice.  But, I want to push this point a little further by suggesting that judgments about 
well-being involve more than rationality, and that not all judgments about well-being 
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must necessarily have a purely rational basis. This is because instrumentalism emphasizes 
the importance of one’s knowing, doing and feeling, while meliorism emphasizes the 
importance of one’s making things better as a consequence of one’s knowing, doing and 
feeling.  Most importantly, this requires a radical shift from understanding the person as a 
subject to conceiving her as field state in which her knowing, doing and feeling, as 
inquiry and experimentation, is situated in the context of her environmental transactions.  
Consequently, judgments or valuation-statements about human well-being are derived 
from experience—one’s embodied knowing, doing and feeling that are situated in 
experience and do not occur apart from it. 
This requires a reconstructed understanding of the person as a transactionally 
situated self, for whom inquiry is an instrument, and who functions as an agent in the 
instrumental mode in human well-being.  But, there is more to human well-being than 
what the instrumental mode affords and this point is reflected in the distinction Dewey 
made between his theory of instrumentalism (which leads to truth) and his theory of 
aesthetics (which leads to meaning).  As we will see in Chapter Five, this distinction is 
particularly important when it comes to developing the aesthetic mode of a Deweyan 
account of human well-being and the function of judgments one makes about one’s well-
being.  In rejecting the claim to any formal or absolute truth, a ‘meaning-based’ theory of 
human well-being would count valuations that have expressed or felt meaning (embodied 
knowledge) as judgments about one’s well-being.  But, as Dewey would caution, making 
such a distinction between meaning and truth does not imply that there is a hard 
separation between them.  So, it really isn’t a question about which is the best theory for 
judgments about one’s well-being, but about the nature of the inter-relationship between 
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the two ideas in making such judgments.  Once again, to push it just a little further, the 
least partial type of judgment about one’s well-being involves the unification of reason 
(as creative intelligence), meliorism (as ethics) and meaning (as aesthetics). 
Although some Dewey scholars see little value in pragmatism as an approach to 
illuminating the nature of subjectivity or selfhood, others suggest that the prospect may 
not be quite so bleak.315  One possible advantage that a Deweyan approach to human 
subjectivity offers is that it places human agency at the center since we are human agents 
who are active and undergo transformations as a consequence of our activities.  
Colapietro describes Dewey’s conception of human subjectivity as beginning with “an 
incessantly active organism in transformative interchange with a historically charged 
environment…recognizes that—culturally as well as personally, the dynamic present 
through which we are moving embodies (primarily in our habits and artifacts) the 
presence of a largely irrevocable past, but nonetheless, the possibility of a truly novel 
future.”316  He views each of us as “a singular organism, an organism that has been 
subjected to acculturation, and is aware of itself as a subject and social agent.”317  So, it 
seems appropriate to describe his position as agent-relative which has significant 
implications for how we look at human well-being. 
In contrast to Sumner’s view of subject-relativity as an expressly individual affair, 
Dewey’s view of the individual as a social individual requires that any one person’s well-
being is necessarily related to the well-being of other community members.  Colapietro 
notes that a Deweyan approach to human subjectivity “is the robust affirmation of human 
                                               
315 See Bernstein, John Dewey, 1967; Smith, The Spirit of American Philosophy, 1978; Stuhr, Pragmatism, 
Postmodernism and the Future of Philosophy, 2003; and Lubling, The Person Vanishes, 2011. 
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agency: we are first and foremost agents, beings not so much goaded into activity by 
external stimuli as always active by our own inherent constitution.  The role of stimuli in 
guiding and, indeed, redirecting conduct is enormous; however, their function is not to 
provoke an inert being into action, but to assist a dynamic being in more finely and fully 
reorienting itself toward the scene of some engagement.”318  On this interpretation, well-
being is viewed as an aim or end-in-view that can be achieved or pursued in both an 
individual and collective sense.  If such interdependency is correct, this has a significant 
implication when it comes to making an appraisal about one’s satisfaction with one’s life.  
For Dewey, the primary way in which one learns to be a satisfied person, or how to be a 
person at all, is through the example of and interaction with other persons. Thus, in 
achieving a satisfactory life-situation for oneself (well-being) one is bringing about the 
conditions that are necessary for other community members to do the same. 
Perhaps Dewey’s notion of “an individual life of satisfactory self-conscious 
activity that is unique to ourselves” can be helpful to our understanding of life 
satisfaction.319  But what does it mean for one to make an appraisal of one’s life 
satisfaction or that one’s life is satisfactory—what do we mean by satisfaction?  Dewey 
asks us to consider the difference between satisfying and satisfactory.  When we say that 
we are satisfied we “make a statement about a fact, something already in existence; it is 
not to judge the value of that fact…It is just correct or incorrect and that is the end of the 
matter…everyday experience informs us that finding satisfaction in a thing may be a 
warning, a summons to be on the lookout for consequences.”320  To say that something is 
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satisfying is the “content of a proposition of fact.”321  However, when we say that 
something is a value we assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain conditions because “[t]o 
say that something satisfies is to report something as an isolated finality.”322  But, when 
we assert that something is satisfactory we “define it in its connections and interactions.  
The fact that it pleases or is immediately congenial poses a problem to judgment.  How 
shall the satisfaction be rated?  Is it a value or is it not?  Is it something to be prized and 
cherished, to be enjoyed….To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets 
specifiable conditions.  It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing will do.  It asserts a 
consequence the thing will continue to serve; it will do.  That it is…satisfactory is a 
judgment, an estimate, an appraisal.  It denotes an attitude to be taken, that of striving to 
perpetuate and to make secure.”323  Although the distinction Dewey made between an 
appraisal of something as satisfying and an appraisal of something as satisfactory is 
interesting, it merits further explication.  Chapter 2 examined the operation of habits in 
pre-reflective experience and reflective experience which has relevance for a Deweyan 
understanding of preferences.  Because our preferences are based on our experiences 
which are governed by the principles of continuity and interaction, the quality of our 
experience is mediated by these two principles.  This means that our preferences consist 
in the habitual relationships that exist between the organism and some activity or thing.  
It is the pervasive quality inherent in our life-situation, as experienced in this relationship, 
which is at the center of instrumental well-being. 
Dewey’s theory of valuation is especially relevant in regards to the account of 
human well-being under development in this inquiry.  It provides the basis for an 
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empirical account of human well-being whether assessing it immediately, retrospectively 
or prospectively.  By contextualizing valuation in terms of inquiry, it becomes obvious 
that finding human well-being in some final outcome or in the achievement of some 
fixed-state is at best an impossibility, and at worst a pathology.  Instead, we can find 
human well-being in the pervasive quality of the situational context (immediate, 
retrospective or prospective) that is the consequence of the continuity of successive ends-
in-view.  At the immediate phase of experience, the instrumentalM mode of human well-
being derives from the union of the affective-ideational elements of motor activity 
(consummation) associated with the successful attainment of one’s ends-in-view.  The 
result of inquiry and its subsequent affective-ideational motor activity is that they 
successfully put a doubtful or irritating situation to rest, at least temporarily. 
This is, arguably, the most significant aspect since our judgments about our well-
being are more than a consequence of our cognitive-motor activity since we feel 
something as well.324  Dewey spoke of the need for our response to experience to be felt 
“in the muscle.”  His pragmatism is well-suited to the task of developing an account of 
the affective conditions necessary for a theory of well-being because it accounts for the 
experience of disruption and how it contributes to well-being.  This is possible because 
unsettledness (e.g., doubt, irritation, discomfort, etc.) constitutes a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for reflective activity.  It is not sufficient because, in some unsettled 
situations, non-reflective habits do an adequate job and reflectivity is not needed.   The 
experience of unsettledness, resulting from the disruption of settled habit, leads to efforts 
to reduce doubt or irritation by restoring settled experience.  These efforts are successful 
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to the extent that other habits (non-reflective or reflective) are brought forward in 
experience and operate to achieve a restoration or, if the unsettled situation remains, other 
efforts are made which involve bringing forward other habits.  It is only when non-
reflective habits fail to achieve a restoration of settled experience that reflective habits are 
brought forward in experience. 
Prospectively, the instrumentalM mode of human well-being involves the use of 
dramatic rehearsal to imagine possible ends-in-view, identify foreseeable consequences 
of one’s actions and assess their valuation-content.  Although the situation is not yet 
settled, inquiry leads to the identification of possible affective-ideational motor activities 
than can serve to return the situation to a more settled state.  Thus, human well-being 
when conceived retrospectively consists not in an epistemic judgment about the 
summative effects of such consummations, but in reflecting on the pervasive quality of 
the situation and what it further moves into, i.e., the act of reflection about one’s well-
being is, itself, consummatory.  However, as we will see in the next chapter, perhaps one 
of Dewey’s greatest contributions to value inquiry was to investigate the continuity 
between aesthetic experience and everyday life.325
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That the aesthetic and moral experience reveal traits of real 
things as truly as does intellectual experience, that poetry 
may have a metaphysical import as well as science, is 
rarely affirmed… 
 
 John Dewey, Theory of Value, 7  
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The term “aesthetics” was invented by Baumgarten to ground a formal 
philosophical system comprised of a general theory of sensory knowledge that, when 
combined with logic, resulted in a comprehensive theory of knowledge.326  He argued 
that the cognitive value of sensory perception not only has potential for better thinking, 
but for better living as well.327  The primary problem with such an understanding of 
aesthetics, for Dewey, is that it isolates those art products that have attained a “classic 
status” from the conditions of their origin and operation in experience.  It is their isolation 
from the human conditions under which they came into existence and the human 
consequences they generate in actual life experience that renders them opaque as to their 
general significance in terms of aesthetic theory.  Consequently, in isolating and 
separating art, it becomes “cut off from that association with the materials and aims of 
every other form of human effort, undergoing and achievement.”328 
Dewey worked diligently to dispel the traditional view of art products as being 
separated from experience.  This is the result of the historical separation of theory from 
practice in many domains beginning with the ancient Greeks, in their distinction between 
theoria and praxis that has been carried forward since.  This basic dualism has led to 
aesthetic theories that separate artistic objects from both the conditions of their origin and 
their operation in experience.  He also distinguished between the “enjoyment of” and the 
“understanding of” art and, ultimately, within the context of the aesthetic.  Understanding 
an art product, for example, requires that we forget them for a period of time and examine 
the ordinary forces and conditions of experience that are not usually regarded as 
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aesthetic.  In order to understand the aesthetic, however, it is necessary to begin with the 
“raw” events and scenes that hold our attention, stimulate our interest, and provide us 
enjoyment. 
At this point it is clear that the function of inquiry is to assist in changing an 
unsettled situation into a settled one.  In terms of both capacities and contexts it is means 
by which to change both situations and experiences; it functions as a tool we have and 
use to bring about satisfactory experiences individually as well as collectively.  When we 
“have an experience” we note its immediate qualities, which are neither abstracted nor 
deduced and immediate qualities that are “satisfactory” that help us to discriminate 
among events.329  Obviously, we tend to prefer events that have such “satisfying” 
qualities.  Since the business of inquiry is to select, order, and control these qualities such 
that they occur in other existential situations, this suggests that certain experiences, at 
least in terms of their qualities, are better than others.  Because these are activities and not 
objects, Dewey often refers to them as arts and he considered inquiry, as an activity, to be 
an art as well. 
Although he saw no metaphysical separation between the “arts of doing and 
making” and the “arts of knowledge (knowing)”, this is not to say that art and science are 
coextensive since “if modern tendencies are justified in putting art and creation first, then 
the implications of this position should be avowed and carried through.  It would then be 
seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that they only distinction worth 
drawing is not between theory and practice, but between those modes of practice that are 
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not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of 
enjoyed meanings.”330  It is aesthetic experiences that constitute the highest sorts of 
experience or consummatory experience, that is, a complete experience in which all of 
the traits of existence are at their maximum.  However, in many cases it is not possible 
for one to have such an experience unless one’s making, doing, observing, investigating 
and reflecting are operating at their maximum.  Clearly, although these have different 
functions and can be distinguished from each other, their beginnings and endings are 
found in existential situations and not in some form of logical determination.  To put it 
rather simply, an experience “is always what it is because of a transaction taking place 
between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment.”331  The 
naturalized, transactional sense of the aesthetic occurs only when the “live creature”, 
through its participation in the ordered relations of its environment, secures the stability 
essential to living.  This is possible because experience involves continuity, i.e., when 
different situations succeed one another something carries over from the earlier one to the 
later one. 
Recognizing the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience 
Dewey’s critique begins with the recognition that traditional theories of art and 
aesthetics “start from a ready-made compartmentalization or from a conception of art that 
“spiritualizes” it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience.”332  As a 
result, art products that have attained a “classic” status become isolated from the 
conditions of their origin and operation in experience, i.e., their “indigenous” status.  A 
number of cultural-historical reasons account for the rise of the compartmentalized 
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conception of fine art and more recently, as a result of the international scope of 
capitalism and the changes it has brought about, modern industry and commerce 
(economic cosmopolitanism) have further destroyed the connection between works of art 
and the “genus loci of which they were once the natural expression.” 333  The result is that 
they have achieved a newly acquired status as merely specimens of fine art which serve 
as the “insignia of taste and certificates of special culture.”334  
The resultant isolation of works of art from the conditions that gave rise to them 
illustrates the loss of their validity and significance in terms of the place they once held in 
the life of a community.  As a result artists, too, are now isolated from the “mainstream of 
active interest” because the very nature of their work is incompatible with industrialism 
since they “cannot work mechanically for mass production.”335  Consequently, 
contemporary artists are “less integrated” in the normal flow of social life than in the 
past, which leads to a “peculiar aesthetic individualism” wherein the artist’s commitment 
to her work is only as an isolated means of achieving independence through esoteric or 
eccentric self-expression.  The consequence of the conjunction of all these forces 
produces a separation between ordinary and aesthetic experience, giving rise to the 
conditions that constitute the gulf that exists between the producer and the consumer in 
modern society. 
In order to overcome this defect art and aesthetics must reveal the way in which 
works of art idealize the qualities that are found in common or ordinary experience.  For 
a correct philosophy of art to contribute to the cultivation of “aesthetic appreciation” (as a 
branch of the general theory of criticism) it must disclose what to look for and what to 
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find in concrete aesthetic objects.  A philosophy of art is “sterilized, fragmented and 
alienated” unless it makes “us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of 
experience…indicates why this function is so inadequately realized and…suggests the 
conditions under which the office would be successfully performed.”336  A correct theory 
of art must restore the “continuity between refined and intensified forms of experience 
that are works of art and the everyday events, doings and sufferings that are universally 
recognized to constitute experience.”337  One advantage such a theory offers is that 
although its primary concern is with understanding and insight, it still recognizes the 
value of exclamations of admiration or emotional appreciation.338  An understanding of  
what the “aesthetic” means, in terms of its human application, must begin “in the raw”, 
that is, in the common events and scenes that ”hold the attentive eye and ear of 
man…arousing his interest and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens.”339  The 
key to recovering the continuity of aesthetic experience with the normal processes of 
living is through discovering the aesthetic qualities involved in the experience of 
common “run of the mill” things.340  In this context, the aesthetic can be found in the 
rhythmic groans of the railroad locomotive straining to gain speed as it leaves the city, 
the intense fury of a fire engine rushing by, in the noisy hustle and bustle of inner-city 
traffic or in the seemingly death-defying choreography of high-steel workers throwing 
and catching rivets.  Artistic engagement can be found in what is usually considered to be 
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experience” for a human being.  Consider the Parthenon, one’s experience may be simply as personal 
enjoyment or it may involve seeking to understand what the thought and life of the people whose lives it 
entered had in common as creators as well as those who were satisfied with it. 
339 Dewey, LW 10, 10. 
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ordinary or non-aesthetic, as in the work done by “the intelligent mechanic engaged in his 
job—interested in doing well and finding satisfaction in his efforts—caring for his tools 
and materials with genuine affection.”341   
Dewey was quick to point out that most people would likely object if told they 
enjoy their casual relations, even in part, because of their aesthetic quality.  This shows 
the extensive and subtle pervasiveness of the very ideas which are responsible for 
isolating art to its place upon a “remote pedestal.”  One advantage that beginning with a 
conception of “fine art” which is connected to the discovered qualities of ordinary 
experience has is that it “will be able to indicate the factors and forces that favor the 
normal development of common human activities into matters of artistic 
value…[including] those conditions that arrest its normal growth.”342  Further, since the 
most vital forms of contemporary art, for average people, are things not usually 
considered as “art”, e.g., television, popular music and sensationalistic journalism, the 
very remoteness of objects acknowledged as “fine arts” makes them “anemic” to the 
mass of people so that their “esthetic hunger is likely to seek the cheap and vulgar.”343 
This has not always been the case since there are and have been cultures in which 
“everything that intensifies the sense of immediate living is an object of intense 
admiration.”344  Today it is most common to find the art products of such cultures 
displayed in museums, although in their own time and place they played an intimate part 
in the significant life of an organized community.345  Their significance in community life 
                                               
341 Dewey, LW 10, 11. 
342 Dewey, LW 10, 17. 
343 Dewey, LW 10, 12. 
344 Dewey, LW 10, 12. 
345 In museums, we observe the common products of “primitive people” with a sense of awe, admiration 
and respect.  We are moved by the delicately flaked and fluted hunting points, amazing innovations in the 
 
 
 
  167 
was that they enhanced the process of everyday living because “[i]nstead of being 
elevated to a niche apart, they belonged to displays of prowess, the manifestation of 
group and clan membership, worship of gods, feasting and fasting, fighting, hunting, and 
all the rhythmic crises that punctuate the stream of living… [as]intimate parts of the 
rights and ceremonies in which the meaning of group life were consummated…a vital 
reenactment of the legends and history of group life”.346  Dewey also recognized that 
comparing the emergence of works of art out of ordinary experience to the refinement of 
raw materials into valuable objects will strike some as being unworthy of the term 
“aesthetic” and, perhaps, even reduces such objects to the status of commercially 
manufactured objects. 
Part of the problem here may involve distinguishing between enjoying and 
understanding.  For example, one can “enjoy” flowers without any having any 
knowledge of the interactions of light, soil, air, moisture and seeds in their growth.  But, 
in order to have an “understanding” of flowers it is necessary to take into account such 
interactions, and this is where theory comes into play.  Theory, in this sense, is a “matter 
of understanding” which, in the context of art, is particularly “concerned with discovering 
the nature of the production of works of art and of their enjoyment and perception.”347  
Consequently, just as it is not possible to direct the growth and flowering of plants 
without understanding their causal conditions, so too, aesthetic understanding must “start 
                                                                                                                                            
design and decoration of pottery, and the intensity and power of the elaborate designs on garments and 
clothing, to name just a few.  We, just as the creators and users of the items, appreciate the great care 
involved in their making, but we go a step farther in that we accord them a place of honor.   
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with the soil, air and light out of which things esthetically arise.  And these conditions are 
the conditions and factors that make an ordinary experience complete.”348 
The Essential Conditions of Life and the Live Creature 
Although Dewey’s critique led him to the position that artistic and aesthetic 
quality is implicit in every normal experience, most people tend to view art as being an 
alien experience and consider aesthetics to be a synonym for artificial.  Making the 
relationship explicit, however, requires not only a clear and coherent idea of what normal 
experience means, but also the recognition that the nature of experience is determined by 
the essential conditions of life.  The first consideration here is that, “life goes on in an 
environment, not merely because of it, through interaction with it.”349  Thus, for each of 
us our “career and destiny” as a human being are intimately bound up with our 
transactions with the environment.  Throughout the greater part of human history, 
however, all art products and forms of aesthetic experience were contextualized in that 
they were part of the significant life of an organized community in which the meaning of 
group life was consummated.  Over time, along with the rise of nationalism, imperialism, 
and capitalism, the former sense of aesthetic meaning was lost thus giving rise to a 
separated and compartmentalized conception of fine art. 
As the original status of works of art was lost, their new status as specimens that 
function in isolation from the conditions of their origin resulted in placing art and its 
appreciation in a realm of their own.  They are isolated because, in failing to understand 
that they arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions, theories of art and aesthetics 
disconnect them “from other modes of experiencing [that] are not inherent in the subject-
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matter…Embedded as they are in institutions and in habits of life, these conditions 
operate effectively because they work so unconsciously.  Then the theorist assumes they 
are embedded in the nature of things.”350  Again, the problem here can be traced to the 
philosophical fallacy which, in this case, involves the failure on the part of most theories 
of art and aesthetics to recognize that 
[l]ife itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with 
the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either 
through effort or some happy chance.  And in a growing life, the recovery 
is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of 
disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed…Life 
grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive 
balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under 
which it lives.351 
Although this seems to be a biologically commonplace condition, for Dewey the balance 
of such energies reaches to the roots of aesthetic experience. 
Indeed, the world itself may well be indifferent and hostile since the very 
processes that serve to maintain life often “throw it out of gear” with its environment 
which can even be fatal.  However, whenever “ life continues and if in continuing it 
expands, there is an overcoming of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a 
transformation of them into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more 
significant life…Here in germ are balance and harmony attained through rhythm.  
Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of, 
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tension.”352  Form arises and order emerges from the achievement of a stable, but ever 
changing, equilibrium resulting from the relations of harmonious interactions such 
tensional energies bear upon one another.  In this sense, form is not only active but 
develops itself and includes, within its “balanced movement”, a greater variety of 
changes that interlock and sustain each other.  One result of such coherence is 
“endurance” and, by incorporating such order into ourselves, we experience harmonious 
feelings whenever we find ourselves in such congruous order. 
It is only through sharing in the “ordered relations of the environment” that we are 
able to achieve the stability necessary for living, which occurs usually after a phase of 
disruption and conflict.  The artist, for example, “cares in a peculiar way for the phase of 
experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and 
tension.  He rather cultivates them not for their own sake but because of their 
potentialities, bringing into living consciousness an experience that is unified and 
total.”353  The difference between the artist and the scientific inquirer is “one of the place 
where emphasis falls in the constant rhythm that marks the interaction of the live creature 
with his surroundings.  The ultimate matter of both emphases in experience is the same, 
as is also their general form.”354  Seeing art and science as separate is “the result of 
converting a difference of tempo and emphasis into a difference in kind.”355  For the 
scientific inquirer the “aesthetic moment” occurs when her ideas cease to be mere ideas 
and become incorporated in the meanings of objects.  However, scientific inquiry is more 
remote than aesthetic inquiry in that the inquirer operates with words, symbols and 
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mathematical signs.  For the artist, however, who “has his problems and thinks as he 
works…his thought is more immediately embodied in the object…[he] does his thinking 
in the very qualitative media he works in, and the terms lie so close to the object that he is 
producing that they merge directly into it.”356  In the final analysis, for Dewey, it is 
“aesthetic satisfaction [that] takes privilege over science, which plays the role of a 
“handmaiden” since it merely provides the conditions for achieving such satisfactions 
more frequently, stably and fully.”357 
 In contrast to the scientific inquirer and the artist, in nature the “live creature” 
does not have to project its emotions into the objects experienced but merely 
discriminates things as being favorable or unfavorable.  However, this is also the point at 
which direct experience comes in to play through the interaction of nature and human 
being wherein human energy is gathered, released, pent up, frustrated, or successfully 
controlled.  Here experience consists in the “rhythmic beats of want and fulfillment, 
pulses of doing, and being withheld from doing” since “[a]ll interactions that effect 
stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms….Contrast of lack and 
fullness, of struggle and achievement, of adjustment consummated after irregularity, form 
the drama in which action, feeling and meaning are as one.  The outcome is balance and 
counter balance.  These are not static and mechanical.  They express power that is intense 
because measured through overcoming resistance.  Environing objects avail and counter-
avail.”358  Thus, it is impossible for “aesthetic experience” to occur in either a world of 
“mere flux” or a world that is “finished or ended” since such experience is possible only 
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because of the “actual world” in which we live.359  Only in our world, in which there is a 
combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions, is it possible for the 
experience of a living creature to possess aesthetic quality.  This is because the live 
creature experiences the recurrent loss and reestablishment of equilibrium with its 
surroundings.  It is the moment of passage from disturbance into harmony that is, for 
Dewey, the most intense in life. 
 For the most part, in our world our experience is punctuated by moments of 
fulfillment that tend to occur at rhythmically enjoyed intervals.  These moments of “inner 
harmony”, in an objective sense, come into being only when our negotiations with the 
environment are successful although 
[f]ortunately, for variety in experience, terms are made in many ways—
ways ultimately decided by selective interest.  Pleasures may come about 
through chance contact and stimulation; such pleasures are not to be 
despised in a world full of pain.  But happiness and delight are a different 
sort of thing.  They come to be through fulfillment that reaches to the 
depth of our being—one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the 
conditions of existence.  In the process of living, attainment of a period of 
equilibrium is at the same time the initiation of a new relation to the 
environment, one that brings with it potency of new adjustments to be 
made through struggle.  The time of consummation is also one of 
beginning anew.360 
                                               
359 In the world of mere flux, since change is never cumulative, nothing would ever move towards a close.  
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Although most of us consciously discriminate between our present living, our past and 
our future, the “live creature” adopts its prior achievements and success, using them to 
inform the present instead of trying to live upon their status as past achievements.361  In 
fact, it is alive only because it is in direct contact with a world of moving, rhythmic 
energies in which genuine hazard, contingency, and irregularity is just as much a part of 
it as is consummation, determinateness, and order.  The matrix in which experience 
develops is a temporal process of events that start and stop.  The future, then, is not 
experienced as ominous and foreboding, but as “a promise of possibilities” that are felt as 
a possession of what is now and here.  Such a life, Dewey claimed, is “truly life” in that 
everything overlaps and merges (interpenetrates). 
Unlike the “live creature”, though, because most of us are apprehensive about 
what the future may bring, we experience a division within ourselves in that we fail to 
enjoy the present because we subordinate it to that which is absent.362  One consequence 
such routine abandonment of the present to the past and future has is that the “happy 
periods of an experience that is now complete because it absorbs itself into the memories 
of the past and anticipations of the future, come to constitute an esthetic ideal.  Only 
when the past ceases to be trouble and anticipations of the future are not perturbing is a 
being wholly united with his environment and therefore fully alive.”363  This is aesthetic 
experience because it is what art celebrates, with particular intensity, i.e., those moments 
in which the past reinforces the present and in which the future is a “quickening” of what 
now is. 
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 Grasping the sources of aesthetic experience, for Dewey, begins by observing 
non-human animal life since activities at this level “may at least stand as reminders and 
symbols of that unity of experience which we so fractionalize when work is labor, and 
thought withdraws us from the world.  The live animal is fully present, all there, in all its 
actions…All senses are equally on the qui vive.”364   In contrast to most of us, what the 
“live creature” retains from the past and expects from the future operate as directions in 
the present and, when the past is fully absorbed into the present, it continues to press 
forward into future experience.  Consequently, connecting art and aesthetics with 
experience does not lower their significance and dignity since 
[e]xperience in the degree to which it is experience is heightened 
vitality…it signifies active and alert commerce with the world; at its 
height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and world of objects 
and events…it affords our sole demonstration of a stability that is not 
stagnation but is rhythmic and developing.  Because experience is 
fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of 
things, it is art in germ.  Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the 
promise of that delightful perception which is aesthetic experience.365 
Part of the problem here may have to do with our understanding of our “senses” 
since we usually understand them to be mechanical stimuli or irritated 
stimulations.  It is only on rare occasions that our senses are “fraught with the 
deep realization of intrinsic meaning”; nor is it the case for most of our experience 
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that our senses “unite to tell a common and enlarged story.”366  Dewey observed 
that it is under such conditions as these that sense and flesh have gotten such a 
bad reputation. 
The Naturalization of Aesthetic Sense 
Sense can be understood in a number of different contexts, i.e., as in the sensory 
(sensations), the sensational, the sensitive, the sentimental, as well as the sensuous.367  
Indeed, for Dewey, it encompasses 
almost everything from bare physical and emotional shock to sense 
itself—that is, the meaning of things present in immediate experience.  
Each term refers to some real phase and aspect of the life of an organic 
creature as life occurs through sense organs.  But sense, as meaning so 
directly embodied in experience as to be its own illuminated meaning, is 
the only signification that expresses the function of sense organs when 
they are carried to their full realization.  The senses are the organs through 
which the live creature participates directly in the ongoings of the world 
about him.  In this participation the varied wonder and splendor of this 
world are made actual for him in the qualities he experiences.368 
The material of the senses oppose neither “will”, the means by which such participation 
is carried on and directed, nor “intellect”, the means by which participation “is rendered 
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fruitful in sense and by which meanings and values are extracted, retained and put to 
further service in the intercourse of the live creature with his surroundings.”369 
In such context, experience is “the result, sign and reward” of organism-
environment interaction through which it is transformed, by means of the senses and 
connected motor activities, into participation and communication.  Conceiving 
experience in terms of dualistic oppositions e.g., mind-body, spirit-flesh is false because 
they only signify marks of contraction and withdrawal that “have their origin, 
fundamentally, in fear of what life may bring forth.”370  For Dewey, recognition of the 
continuity of our “organs, needs and basic impulses” with that of other forms of animal 
life does not reduce us to the level of sub-human.  Instead, it “makes possible the drawing 
of a “ground plan” for human experience upon which is erected the superstructure of 
man’s marvelous and distinguishing experience.”371  What serves to make humans 
distinct from other forms of animal life is their ability “to carry to unprecedented heights 
that unity of sense and impulse, of brain and eye and ear, that is exemplified in animal 
life, saturating it with the conscious meanings derived from communication and 
deliberate expression.”372 
 The fact that humans excel at making complex and minute differentiations in 
experience accounts for the necessity in having many more comprehensive relationships 
among the constituents of our being.  Although these distinctions and relations are 
important, what is most significant is that there is also created “more opportunities for 
resistance and tension, more drafts of experimentation and invention, and therefore more 
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novelty in action, greater range and depth of insight and increase in poignancy in 
feeling.”373  As the organism’s transactions with the environment increase in complexity, 
“the rhythms of struggle and consummation in its relations to its environment are varied 
and prolonged, and they come to include within themselves an endless variety of sub-
rhythms.  The designs of living are widened and enriched.  Fulfillment is more massive 
and slightly more shaded.”374   
 This has implications for our experience of space and time as well.  Space is no 
longer a “void” in which to roam around, avoiding dangerous things and seeking things 
that satisfy the appetite, but “becomes a comprehensive and enclosed scene within which 
are ordered the multiplicity of doings and undergoings in which man engages.”375  
Neither is time an endless and uniform flow or succession of instantaneous points, but 
instead “is the organized and ongoing medium of the rhythmic ebb and flow of expectant 
impulse, forward and retracted movement, resistance and suspense, with fulfillment and 
consummation.”376  Time is understood as an “ordering of growth and maturations” and, 
when conceived as organization in change, it is growth because “it signifies that a varied 
series of change enters upon intervals of pause and rest; of completions that become the 
initial points of new processes of development.”377  However, such recognition of change 
is not itself merely a point in time, but “the focal culmination of long, slow processes of 
maturation, i.e. as manifestation of the continuity of an ordered temporal experience in a 
sudden discrete instant of climax.”378  These two basic discriminations in experience also 
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have implications for Dewey’s understanding “form” in the context of fine arts as “the art 
of making clear what is involved in the organization of space and time prefigured in 
every course of a developing experience.”379 
 Despite physical limitations and narrow localization, moments and places are also 
charged with accumulations of long-gathering energy, e.g. returning to a significant 
childhood scene with the resultant release of pent up memories and emotions.  However, 
mere recognition only occurs when something else, other than what we recognize, 
occupies us, e.g. either an interruption or intent to use what we recognize as a means to 
something else.  In contrast, to “perceive or see” involves more than simple recognition 
since it does not identify something present in terms of a past disconnected from it and, 
as such, the past carries into the present thereby expanding and deepening the content of 
the latter.  Dewey described the process as follows:  “Perception is therefore at its lowest 
and its most obscure in the degree that only instinctive need operates.  Instinct is in too 
much haste to be solicitous about its environing relations….[p]rimitive need is the source 
of attachment to objects.  Perception is born when solicitude for objects and their 
qualities brings the organic demand for attachment to consciousness….Perception that 
occurs for its own sake is the full realization of all the elements of our psychological 
being.”380  Jackson notes that Dewey viewed perception as “a developmental affair.  It 
emerges in answer to our bodily needs as we go about seeking their fulfillment.  That is 
the condtion under which we begin to see the world in meaningful terms.”381   
Jackson also discusses Dewey’s view of the place of perception in an art-centered 
experience.  It involves “the translation of bare continuity of external time into the vital 
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order and organization of experience.  Identification nods and passes on.  Or it defines a 
passing moment in isolation, it marks a dead spot in experience that is merely filled in.  
The extent to which the process of living in any day or hour is reduced to labeling 
situations, events, and objects as “so-and-so” in mere succession marks the cessation of a 
life that is a conscious experience.  Continuities, realized in an individual, discrete, form 
are the essence of the latter.”382  This suggests that art is “prefigured” in the very process 
of living in which internal organic pressures cooperate with external materials in the 
environment in such a way that the former are fulfilled and the latter transformed in a 
satisfying culmination.  Again, although some may hesitate to call this “art” since it 
seems to lack directive intent, Dewey observed that “all deliberation, all conscious 
content, grows out of things once performed organically through the interplay of natural 
energies.”383  What distinguishes the contribution of humans is that they are conscious of 
the relations found in nature.  Such consciousness enables them to convert “the relations 
of cause and effect that are found in nature into the relations of means and 
consequences…[and] itself is the inception of such transformation…mere shock becomes 
an invitation; resistance becomes something to be used in changing existing arrangements 
of matter; smooth facilities become agencies for executing an idea.”384  It is through these 
operations that “an organic stimulation becomes the bearer of meanings, and motor 
responses are changed into instruments of expression and communication; no longer are 
they mere means of locomotion and direct reaction.”385 
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Even here, such “organic substratum” constitutes the “quickening and deep 
foundation” since conception and invention cannot exist apart from the relations of cause 
and effect in nature.  Likewise, without the processes of rhythmic conflict and fulfillment, 
design and pattern would be absent from experience.  Finally, without our “organs 
inherited from animal ancestry” our ideas and purposes would lack a mechanism of 
realization.  The existence of art serves as concrete proof that man uses 
 the materials and energies of nature with intent to his own life, and that he 
does so in accord with the structure of his organism—brains, sense organs, 
and muscular system.  Art is the living and concrete proof that man is 
capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the 
union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live creature.  
The intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power of selection, and 
redisposition.  Thus it varies the arts without end.  But its intervention also 
leads in time to the idea that art is a conscious idea—the greatest 
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity.386 
The experience of art, whether as doing or undergoing, lends itself to enriched 
experiences when the qualities of such experience are at their maximum.  Here, 
making, doing, acting, and thinking are integrally fused.  It is precisely this fusion 
that is characteristic of all art that is intelligently carried out. 
The Function of Emotion and Expression in Dewey’s Aesthetics  
Given the preceding role and function of art, Dewey recognized that emotion and 
imagination play a central role.  In Chapters 3 and 4, it was noted that emotion and 
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imagination are inseparable from the very process of inquiry. Our consciousness of the 
conditions of the rhythm of loss of integration with the environment, and the subsequent 
recovery of union, are what provides the material from which we form purposes.  It 
begins when emotion, as the conscious sign of an actual or impending break, serves as 
the occasion that induces reflection.  The resulting desire to restore union serves to 
convert “emotion” into “interest in objects” (as conditions for the realization of harmony) 
and further incorporates the material of such reflection into objects as their meaning.   For 
Dewey emotion, 
belongs of certainty to the self.  But it belongs to the self that is concerned 
in the movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked.  We 
jump instantaneously when we are scared, as we blush on the instant that 
we are ashamed.  But fright and shamed modesty are not in this case 
emotional states.  Of themselves they are but automatic reflexes.  In order 
to become emotional they must become parts of an inclusive and enduring 
situation that involves concern for objects and other issues.387 
Emotion arises in an inclusive or existential situation in which someone desires 
something and involves a complex process of reflex and desire or repulsion.  Although 
we sometimes substitute “feeling” for emotion, feelings are never unaccompanied states 
since they always exist in the context of a desire or repulsion, i.e., as part of an existential 
situation. 
 Art serves to harness the emotions of artists when producing works of art.  For 
those of us who undergo a work of art, it invigorates our emotions so that we may then 
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get control of them.  Whenever our emotions are aroused, in doing or making art as well 
as in our reactions to an expressive object, it is because we are producing satisfactory or 
having complete experiences.  In such instances our generic traits of existence are at their 
maximum.  Emotions themselves, though, do not confer the status of satisfactory or 
completeness on our experiences; instead they are the outgrowth of the quality of an 
experience.  By understanding which emotions are aroused by certain practices or in 
certain contexts, it is possible to improve or manipulate them by producing objects that 
serve to stimulate them.  It is in this way that emotions can be harnessed for the good of 
an experience and, if Dewey is correct, the function of art is that it provides benefits for 
the control and channeling of the “vital forces” in experience. Further, because every 
complete experience begins as an impulsion, as the outward and forward movement of 
the whole organism in its entirety, the whole self is called into play. 
Impulsions arise from a need that can be met only when the organism originates 
and establishes definite relations with the environment.  It is the need/environment 
interaction that produces the tension that results in an impulsion.  With the subsequent 
release of energy, as modulated by past experience, impulsion is transformed through the 
process of re-creation into thoughtful action.  It is this “double change” involving both 
impulsion and re-creation that converts an “activity” into an act of expression.  
Consequently, those things which are in the environment become means or media, while 
those things retained from past experience become “coefficients in the re-creation” 
thereby taking on new or renewed meaning.  However, merely giving way to an 
impulsion does not constitute expression because it also requires an “urge from within 
outwards” in which values are brought forward from prior experience.  Although 
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emotional discharge is a necessary condition for expression, it is not a sufficient 
condition for expression.  Expression in art is possible only where material is employed 
as medium, i.e., employed in view of its place and role (in its relations) in an inclusive 
situation. 
The expression of aesthetic emotion, then, is a complex process that is derived 
from organism/environment relations that involve environing objects, resisting objects, 
internal emotions and impulsion.  This led Dewey to conclude that  “[t]he real work of art 
is the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and 
environmental conditions and energies...The thing expressed is wrung from the producer 
by the pressure exercised by objective things on the natural impulses and tendencies.”388  
In particular, the act of expression that constitutes a work of art is a construction in time, 
not an instantaneous emission.  In this context the expression of the self, in and through a 
medium, is a prolonged interaction that emanates from the self.  The result of this 
interaction forms the objective conditions in a process through which both the work of art 
itself and the producer acquire a form and order they did not possess previously.  Artistic 
expression, for Dewey, is the carrying forward to completion of an inspiration by means 
of the objective material of perception and imagery.  The difference between the two is 
that perception is immediate and individual, marks concrete experience, and comes from 
the present occasion while imagery is derived from meaning, substance and content that 
is embedded in the self from the past. 
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Imagination, Dramatic Rehearsal and the Aesthetics of Self-Activity 
Imagination enters aesthetic experience through inquiry, in which deliberation is 
understood as an imaginative rehearsal in which the anticipated consequences of acting in 
a certain manner on the medium are thought out before they are attempted in the 
concrete.    Dewey described the central role that imagination plays as follows: 
[i]t is not so generally recognized that a similar transformation takes place 
on the side of ‘inner’ materials, images, observations, memories, and 
emotions.  They are progressively re-formed; they, too, must be 
administered.  This modification is the building up of a truly expressive 
act.  The impulsion that seethes as a commotion demanding utterance must 
undergo as much and as careful management in order to receive eloquent 
manifestation as marble or pigment, as colors and sounds.  Nor are there in 
fact two operations, one performed on the outer material and the other 
upon the inner and mental stuff.389 
The dialectic at play here is that imagination, in artistic or aesthetic experience, serves to 
develop the actual performance as well as leading to further imaginative inquiry.  In such 
cases, imagination and actualization are, reciprocally, each the ends and means to the 
other.  Whatever the medium from which art arises, whether the artist 
works out his original emotional idea in terms of auditory and visual 
imagery or in the actual medium as he works is of relatively minor 
importance.  For the imagery is of the objective medium undergoing 
development.  The physical media may be ordered in imagination or in 
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concrete material.  In any case, the physical process develops the 
imagination, while imagination is conceived in terms of concrete material.  
Only by progressive organization of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ material in organic 
connection with each other can anything be produced that is not a learned 
document or an illustration of something familiar.390 
Thus, artistic inquiry occurs whenever a conscious attempt at experimenting with media 
is made for the purpose of enacting a favorable, satisfactory and settled result.391  The 
artist also possesses a repertoire of techniques and skills (as habits) for use in solving the 
problems at hand.  Those that are successful lead to an aesthetically pleasing or satisfying 
result, while those that do not are jettisoned. 
It is also possible to interpret deliberation, as dramatic rehearsal in imagination, as 
having a story structure, at least in the sense that it has a beginning, middle and end.392  
Its beginning is constituted by an active phase of stable, established habits and 
characterized by equilibrium, adaptation, and harmony.  In the middle we find a troubled 
situation characterized by disrupted habit, disharmony, imbalance, loss of adaptation to 
surroundings, and competition or disunity among habits and desires.  However, as we are 
provoked into a reflective phase of deliberation, as the active phase of imagination, the 
troubled situation becomes increasingly organized.  The end or conclusion consists in a 
consummatory phase of recovered action and stability that is characterized by 
reconstructed equilibrium and re-unification of desires.  Consequently, Dewey believed 
that working to discover an integrative value among competing values represents an ideal 
that one should strive to achieve. 
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Analysis and Conclusion 
Alexander observes that “[t]he great tragedy in isolating art and aesthetic 
experience from the range of experience has been that we fail to treat life artistically.”393  
In Art as Experience, Dewey again took up the issue of experience by showing that there 
is both a rhythm to and an interpenetration of the instrumental and consummatory phases 
of experience.  His theory of inquiry has shown that scientific knowing is a form of 
activity or practice, i.e., as an art that represents an attempt to specify the ways in which 
knowing is an art.394  As a result, he showed that it is no longer possible to maintain the 
traditional distinction between theory or knowledge as contemplation and practice or art 
as being limited to lesser forms of doing and making.  Goodman reflects a similar view of 
the aesthetic experience, which he describes as 
 dynamic rather than static.  It involves making delicate discriminations 
and discerning subtle relationships, identifying symbol systems and 
characters within these systems and what these characters denote and 
exemplify, interpreting works and reorganizing the world in terms of 
works and works in terms of the world.  Much of our experience and many 
of our skills are brought to bear and may be transformed by the encounter.  
The aesthetic “attitude” is restless, searching, testing—is less attitude than 
action: creation and recreation.395   
Therefore, consummations and the direct enjoyment of aesthetic quality are not 
expressions of some transcendent reality, since they can only be understood in terms of 
the rhythm of experience.  The rhythm here consists in a movement from situations 
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characterized by the conflicts and problems that emerge from the ongoing process of 
experience towards fulfillments (consummations) of these experiences.  They are natural 
endings or consummations in experience, not endings that are fixed in some determinate 
hierarchy but realized through the directed transformation of experience. 
Achieving success in meeting these ends is experienced as “consummations” 
which, themselves, are funded by the results of inquiry.  Such consummations are marked 
by their harmony, integrity and completeness, as well as pervaded by a heightened 
aesthetic quality that marks them off from other experiences.    However, it is not just the 
ending of an experience (cessation) that makes it complete since any “completed 
transaction” is related organically and dynamically to the circumstances that precede 
it.”396  Consummation is also characterized by a rhythm within our experience, which 
involves passing from direct, immediate enjoyment to critical appraisal and from critical 
appraisal to consummatory experience.  Bernstein observes that “[n]ot only can all 
inquiry and all life be understood as art—a controlled activity—but esthetic quality is not 
limited to a specific type of experience: it can pervade all experiences…Every integral 
experience, everything which is distinctively an experience, moves towards a close, an 
ending, a fulfillment.”397  Consequently, since any activity that is simultaneously 
productive and aesthetic, as well as instrumental and consummatory is art, this means that 
art, itself, is a natural event and can be understood as the completion of nature. 
For Dewey, there is no metaphysical separation between the arts of doing and 
making and the arts of knowledge.398  Although they may have different functions and we 
can distinguish one from the other, their beginnings and endings are found in an 
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existential situation, not in a logical determination.   However, there are three differences 
about inquiry in the context of art and aesthetic experiences that must be recognized.399  
First, is the focus on the constructive and experiential aspects of inquiry; more so than in 
other contexts and particularly, the presence and use of imagination and emotion in 
inquiry.  Second, that task of inquiry can only be understood in the context of doing and 
making, i.e., the manipulation of materials.  Third, the different techniques and methods 
as used in the context of art, specifically the use of experimentation to produce an art 
object.  Thus, “art” consists of doing and making so that when we do it, we construct 
something.  Whatever it is that we construct, such activity is context specific, at least in 
the following way. 
In its most traditional context “doing art” involves drawing, painting, sculpture, 
music, poetry and literature.  But, for Dewey, art can also be found in more ordinary 
contexts, such as in the “manual arts” of building, sawing, welding, erecting, repairing 
and manipulating.  In the context of intellectual activity, however, it is found in the 
process of inquiry (as creative intelligence) which involves doings such as thinking, 
imagining, reflecting, relating and communicating.  Not only are the variables of the 
artistic enterprise numerous and complex, there are also no formulas to employ that 
guarantees a rightness of fit.  What is necessary for doing art is an immersed engagement 
that demands all of one’s attention and intelligence.  Eisner observes that the 
development of such intelligence “requires the ability to deal effectively with multiple 
demands simultaneously.  And, it is by learning to engage in that process that perception 
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is refined, imagination stimulated, judgment fostered and technical skills developed.”400  
Consequently, in light of the complexities of these demands, he finds it ironic that the arts 
are widely regarded as cognitive.  The relevant point here, with respect to the aesthetic 
mode in human well-being, is that all of these activities and abilities are art because of its 
unique goal, i.e., to deepen, enlarge and enrich human experience. 
Inquiry in art and aesthetics is holistic in its emphasis on making and doing as 
well as thinking and reflecting.401  As a result, it offers the best opportunity to develop 
complete and consummatory experiences.  When it is successful, inquiry leads to 
satisfactory experiences which are what form the standards of genuine growth—the 
development of better and richer experiences.  It also facilitates growth by developing 
meanings that lead to better and richer experiences which, in turn, lead to better and more 
fully developed meanings.402  It is in this way that a loose circle of meanings and 
experiences are formed.  Furthermore, meanings multiply as to know more about an 
object and, by discovering more about its connections with other things in the world, its 
meaning becomes more enriched.403  Jackson notes that this increased richness applies 
not only to its explicit usefulness (instrumental meaning) but also to those aspects of 
meaning that are reflectively attained through inquiry (expressive meaning) that are 
gradually absorbed by the object itself.  Thereafter, it is altered in its qualitative 
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immediacy and we perceive it as possessing those meanings that become added on in 
experience. 
In terms of the account of human well-being under development, one of the most 
important features of inquiry is that it is an affair of both the mind and the body.  This is 
not surprising given his insistence that it is organisms and not an abstract mind or 
intellect that responds to existential situations.  Through constant biological and 
psychological adjustment as a response to solving problems, the organism also adapts to 
its environment by changing.  This is because dramatic rehearsal in imagination, which is 
a function of our habits, makes it possible to mark off a range of viable courses of action.  
It is also the case that possessing more habits serves to widen the field of possible 
observation and forecasting that is open to us.  Further, the more flexible our habits are, 
the more refined our perception is in terms of its ability to discriminate, making whatever 
is presented in and evoked by imagination more subtle and delicate.  However, dramatic 
rehearsal in imagination is not merely an individualistic cognitive activity since “[o]ur 
mostly unconscious horizon of social habits tethers our dramatic rehearsals, both 
disclosing and concealing potential alternatives for conduct.  Social habits are shared and 
stable interpretative structure (e.g., symbol systems, imaginative structures, values, 
gestures, prejudices) that we inherit as we form personal habits.  They enable us to 
communicate so that we can anticipate and compose the future together.”404  The 
relevance that Dewey’s account of deliberation and dramatic rehearsal in imagination 
holds for human well-being is that it recognizes that “vying prospects for harmonizing 
values are intelligible only in the context of the larger narratives of our lives—lives 
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enacted on the same stage as other lives.  To deliberate is to co-author (with environing 
conditions) a dramatic story.  It is not merely application of universal rules to particular 
instances, nor is it a pseudo-mathematical calculation of means to already coagulated 
ends.”405    
 Dewey’s theory of art and aesthetics provides a corrective to Baumgarten’s 
exclusion or neglect of the cultivation of the body.  Recently, there has been a renewed 
interest in this aspect of Dewey’s work on the part of Shusterman who extends Dewey’s 
theory of aesthetics.  He introduced the term somaesthetics to describe “an enlarged, 
somatically centered field…that can contribute significantly to many crucial 
philosophical concerns, thus enabling philosophy to more successfully redeem its original 
role as an art of living.”406  It constitutes the “critical, meliorative study of the experience 
and use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and creative 
self-fashioning…[and is also] devoted to the knowledge, discourses, practices, and bodily 
disciplines that structure such somatic care or can improve it.”407 The idea and 
importance of somatic care has ancient philosophical roots, e.g. Socrates declared the 
body is valuable for all human activity and should be as fit as possible.  However, given 
that most philosophies have tended to neglect this aspect, perhaps philosophy as a whole 
should pay greater “attention to the variety of somatic practices through which we can 
pursue our quest for self-knowledge and self-creation, for beauty, potency and pleasure, 
for the reconstruction of immediate experience into improved living.”408 
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The conception of somaesthetics has particular value, in several ways, for the 
account of well-being under development here.  Since our senses belong to and are 
conditioned by our body, a somaesthetic way of knowing complements knowledge 
derived from sensory experience that is then subjected to discursive reason in that it seeks 
to enhance the actual performance of our senses through improved direction of our 
bodies.409  In contrast to Plato, for example, our knowledge of the world can be improved 
by perfecting, not denying our bodily senses.  Second, if the primary cognitive aim of 
philosophy is more than just knowledge of worldly facts, i.e., self-knowledge, then 
knowledge of one’s bodily dimension cannot be ignored.  As a result, it is important that 
philosophy become, “[c]oncerned not simply with the body’s external form or 
representation but also with its lived experience, somaesthetics works at improving 
awareness of our bodily states and feelings, thus providing greater insight into both our 
passing moods and lasting attitudes.  It can, therefore, reveal and improve somatic 
malfunctions that normally go undetected even though they impair our well-being and 
performance.”410  Third, if virtue and right action require knowledge, self-knowledge and 
effective will (which in particular, depends upon somatic efficiency) then somaesthetics 
can achieve a better mastery of the will’s concrete application in behavior since 
“[k]nowing and desiring the right action will not avail if we cannot will our bodies to 
perform it; and our surprising inability to perform the most simple bodily tasks is 
matched only be our astounding blindness to this inability, the failure resulting from 
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inadequate somaesthetic awareness.”411  Finally, if the pursuit of virtue and self-mastery 
is traditionally integrated into ethic’s quest for better living, especially as happiness, then 
somaesthetics’ concern with the body as the locus and medium of our pleasures suggests 
that it deserves additional attention. 
For Dewey it is the pre-epistemological person that constitutes the most basic 
interaction of the organism with the environment.  As a consequence of such interaction 
“[w]hat the live creature retains from the past and what it expects from the future operate 
as directions in the present…The past absorbed into the present carries on; it presses 
forward.”412  This leads Kestenbaum to suggest that Dewey located the source of the 
aesthetic in the “live creature” (animal life below the human scale) because “the unity 
and integration of the live animal itself, and the unity and integration of the live animal 
and environment, exemplify the conditions which aesthetic experience develops and 
intensifies…the savage embodied in pure form, if not sophisticated and complex form, 
the qualities and conditions of dramatic life, life which is ‘fully alive’.…the savage, in his 
interaction with the environment, is “whole” in the sense that action, feeling, and 
meaning are unified and integrated…in the sense that the present is or organically 
continuous with past and future.”413 
In conclusion, Dewey’s theory of art and aesthetics sought to recover the 
continuity of the aesthetic experience with the normal processes of living.  By providing 
a naturalized aesthetics, he emphasized such important concepts as continuity, 
interaction, equilibrium, resistance, growth, rhythm and consummation.  This naturalized 
sense of the aesthetic is possible only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of 
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its environment, securing the stability essential to living.  Alexander notes that Dewey 
also includes unifying qualities of experiences that are negative “[a]lthough terms such as 
unity, integration, and resolution tend to have us think of positive experiences, Dewey is 
concerned to show that there may be deep aesthetic aspects of life that are not particularly 
happy.  Art seeks to express the meaning of experience, and not all life is cheerful…there 
may be times when we are seriously out of step with our environment.  The sense of that 
loss may have significance and be used in works of art…these works evoke deep 
responses from us because they use qualities from our lives that give them shape and 
meaning.”414 
  In experience, the “social world” (e.g., human relations, institutions and 
traditions) is as much a part of the natural world in and by which we live as is the 
“physical world.”  In this sense “nature”, as we experience it, “is not “outside.”  It is in us 
and we are in and of it.  But there are a multitude of ways of participating in it…Works of 
art are means by which we enter…into other forms of relationship and participation other 
than our own.”415  When such participation comes after a phase of disruption and conflict 
it is indeed the case that, as Dewey claimed, it becomes a consummation like the 
aesthetic.  Art, then, is continuous with nature and provides a way of enhancing, varying 
and enlarging our experience of it.  Indeed, art is basically there in nature—in human life 
and its setting.  It cuts through the traditional distinctions between the instrumental and 
the consummatory, the practical and the theoretical, the mechanical and the immediate by 
relocating them so that they can now be seen to be distinction between those experiences 
which are full of enjoyed meanings and those which are not.  For Dewey, this provides 
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the only grounds for differentiating between what is authentic and inauthentic in 
experience, as well as in human well-being.  Perhaps here is a place for criticism to enter 
as well, since the work of artists “is not to validate or replicate the status quo but to 
transform the world and educate us to perceive it afresh which can be done only by 
considering things differently and through new perspectives.  In this sense, Dewey would 
agree that art is criticism of life—for the sake of life itself.”416
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The examination and analysis of Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism in this inquiry 
reveals that it has three essential characteristics.417  The first is its grounding in a 
profound respect for the richness, depth, and complexity of human experience and 
cognition.  Second, it offers an evolutionary perspective that appreciates the role of 
dynamic change in all development (as opposed to fixity and finality).418  The third is that 
it recognizes that human cognition and creativity arise in response to problematic 
situations that involve values, interests, and social interaction.  His philosophical 
reconstruction of experience, especially as exemplified in his theories of inquiry, ethics, 
value and aesthetics, offers the possibility for a natural and more robust account of 
human well-being than those offered by Plato and Sumner.  Such an account is natural 
and more robust due to his reconstructing the traditional understanding of experience 
from an epistemic or cognitive state to an existential understanding of experience as the 
field of geographic transactions.  This enlargement of “experience” (experienceG) makes 
it possible to provide an account of human well-being grounded in the existential matrix 
in which ordinary human beings live, enjoy, and suffer in consequence of their 
negotiations with the environment.  The implication this has for the account of human 
well-being offered here is that it requires understanding it in terms of our response to the 
continuous barrage of existential challenges that present themselves and which we are 
forced to face.  
It is this context, in conjunction with the implications that experienceG has for 
reconstructing our understanding of knowledge, ethics, value and art, that it is now 
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possible to articulate the following specific elements which are central to a Deweyan 
account of human well-being:  
1. It begins with the recognition that the fundamental natural feature of 
experience consists in the balance between the precarious and stable in 
existence. 
2. It recognizes that, within the context of the natural world, human well-being is 
a consequence of chance, choice and change. 
3. It recognizes human well-being involves both discovery and creativity (as 
inquiry) as qualitatively expressed in its instrumental and aesthetic modes. 
4. It recognizes that the “pervasive quality of the situation” is the only legitimate 
criterion for “authenticity” in terms of human well-being. 
5. It recognizes the “person” or “self” as an ecological field of transaction, not as 
an individualistic “subject”, “spectator”, or “proprietor”.  
These elements provide the basic organizational structure for the conclusion to this 
inquiry.  However, the fact that we are at a point of conclusion means only that we have 
arrived at an “end-in-view” for this particular inquiry since the possibility for continued 
inquiry remains.419 
Achieving Balance between the Precarious and the Stable in Existence 
   Dewey emphasized that experienceG begins in nature and involves the 
alternation between periods of precariousness and periods of stability during which the 
organism achieves a state of temporary balance in terms of its transactions with the 
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environment.  One has only to glance at the news reports on television or in the 
newspaper to find constant reminders of how precarious human existence truly is.  With 
today’s 24/7 news cycle, we are continuously exposed to a seemingly endless list of 
accidents, natural disasters, man-made disasters and epidemic illnesses.  In virtually 
every place we can be connected and choose to be, we are bombarded with constant 
reminders that human existence is precarious.420  However, saying that our existence is 
precarious is not meant to suggest that we live constantly at the crumbling edge of a 
dangerous precipice, although some of us may find ourselves in such a situation, either by 
choice or by chance. Most of us brush up against the precariousness in existence often 
enough so that we should not take it as only referring to the occurrence of exceptional 
types of situations in one’s life.  Many of us have experienced, at some point in our lives, 
a physical health situation during which we moved out of experiencing our situation as 
being relatively stable and moved into experiencing our situation as being more 
precarious.  What begins as an observation that “something’s not quite right” with our 
body most often serves to initiate an inquiry into what is going on with it.  Perhaps the 
initial inquiry resolves the problematic situation quickly, i.e., “take two aspirins and call 
me in the morning.”  Alternatively, it may lead to uncovering an underlying health 
condition that is more serious, which requires further testing and more waiting. 
Although the situation above may be somewhat exceptional, the naturalistic 
tension between instability and stability also plays out in extremely mundane ways as 
well. Many of us have experienced driving along a familiar route only to find ourselves 
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confronting unanticipated road construction that produces in us a brief moment of 
instability.  We often are able to make a simple or easy adjustment to our planned route in 
order to restore our stability.  However, when the environmental conditions are different, 
for example when driving in large urban area that is unfamiliar to us, the instability we 
experience even though the situation may be similar, is likely to be greater, resulting in a 
sense of uneasiness or discomfort as we try to navigate our way around the road 
construction.  If our response to the situation is not successful in relatively short measure 
(e.g., our vehicle is not equipped with a GPS device) we can end up “lost”, resulting in 
our feeling even greater instability, perhaps akin to precariousness.  Examples such as 
these serve to illustrate that what begins with the demarcation of insecurity and instability 
in existence later becomes discriminated in experience as a felt tension (e.g., anxiety, 
irritation, or uneasiness) from which we seek relief, perhaps even desperately, depending 
on the conditions under which the environmental transactions occur.421 
Although Dewey recognized that precariousness is part of our existence, at other 
times he emphasized that we also experience it as relatively stable.  Ultimately, in the 
particular way he conceived what constitutes our “own” experience, it is always the 
consequence of this inherent natural tension between the precarious and the stable in 
existence.  We continuously and repeatedly move back and forth from periods of relative 
stability to periods of lesser or greater instability throughout the course of our existence, 
second by second, minute by minute, and so on.  For the most part, we go along in the 
flow of experience with our pre-reflective habits (as beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, 
                                               
421 Recent, first-hand experience with such a situation allows me to attest fully to the consequences 
associated with the movement from the relatively stable to the precarious in existence.  Fortunately, the 
underlying health condition was not particularly serious and it took very little to restore homeostasis. 
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desires, etc.) operating intact; and we are usually successful in negotiating any existential 
challenges that arise.  When such challenges arise, though, there are only four possible 
responses to the now existent problematic or tensional situation:  1) we push back against 
the environment and it gives, 2) the environment pushes back against us and we give, 3) 
the environment pushes back against us and we push back against it, or 4) we give and 
the environment gives. 
Perhaps the brute existential fact that life consists in the tensional alteration 
between the stable and the precarious is what lies at the source of our need or desire for 
something that can serve as a secure anchor—something to which we can remain firmly 
tethered or upon which we can always rely.  As we saw earlier, Plato clearly recognized 
the desire for order and security during times of instability and his theory of justice, in 
particular, was motivated in great part by the political instability, civic strife and external 
warfare that consumed Athens during his lifetime.422  Interpreted within the context of 
pragmatic naturalism, his philosophy was clearly a direct reaction to his own doubt, 
discomfort and irritation as the historical and cultural factors of his time played out.423  
His mistake in working to resolve what was, in essence, a problematic situation in 
experience (e.g., how it is possible to achieve good governance) was to pursue a non-
naturalistic path that separated the world of ideas from the world of nature, i.e., his “two 
worlds” theory.  
                                               
422 See: Raven, Plato’s Thought in the Making, 27-41; Robinson and Denniston, “Plato”, 3-9. 
423 In his introduction to The Quest for Certainty, Stephen Toulmin observes that Dewey viewed the 
Platonist demand for certainty and necessity as having its own emotional origins:  it was an “escape from 
peril.”  Although these origins were partly cultural, being the product of superstitions that went back 
ultimately to the astro-theology of the Ancient Empires, they were also partly personal—an expression of 
an urge for a psychological security which the world of practical life simply does not provide.  Dewey, LW 
4, 15-18. 
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Western religion, too, has influenced not only our beliefs about the precarious 
nature of human existence, but our response to it as well.  The continuous tension of 
disputes about influence of the realm of Nature and the realm of God in human existence 
resulted in a cleavage between the two realms.  Human well-being came to involve the 
will of god(s)—one prospered when they were appeased and one suffered when they 
were not.  The most sacred text of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious tradition begins 
with the story of Genesis which contains evidence of the first disruption of and 
falsification in human experience, and to which we continue to devote a substantial 
amount of thought and argument.424  Even now, many people continue to believe that 
faith can safeguard one against the precariousness of one’s existence, at least in some 
measure, as well as offer a route to the transcendent world of fixed forms and final-ends.  
It is unclear, at least to me, how one finds security and stability in tethering one’s 
thoughts or beliefs to an immaterial world or form.  If they are by definition without 
substance, how is it possible for them to serve as a firm anchor to secure one against the 
force of the hazards encountered in human existence? 
The problem with religious conceptions of human well-being is that they are 
univocal and homogenous.  As such, they have no relevance in terms of this inquiry. 
They are also incompatible with the tenets of pragmatic naturalism in that all concepts, 
assertions, and propositions about God are devoid of cognitive significance because they 
are incapable of either confirmation or disconfirmation.  The point of the discussion here, 
however, is that religion has been very effective in deeply embedding and continuously 
reinforcing, within the context of the Western historico-cultural tradition, the belief in 
                                               
424 The disruption is as follows: soon after creation of the natural world and human existence, an angry God 
casts Adam and Eve, the first humans, out of the Garden of Eden (as the stable and perfect in experience) 
and into the world of Nature (as the precarious and imperfect in experience).   
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fixed forms and final-ends.  Usually, when disputes among various philosophical and 
religious traditions arise, they tend to be disagreements about the particulars involved in 
specifying something as a fixed form or final-end.  Rarely is discussion given to the 
nature of the grounds for holding the belief in fixed forms or final-ends within these 
traditions.  Given this context, it is quite easy to understand why such an immense 
number of individuals continue to retain such beliefs even today. 
However, to pursue the other choice, that of anchoring ourselves in the world of 
lived experience, requires a very different understanding of the nature of our existence as 
human beings.  Specifically, it requires a shift in our understanding of human existence 
from what has been essentially non-relational to a relational conception.  The former 
conceives human existence in terms of material objects that are collections of properties 
or bundles of sensations that are part of the “furniture” of the world.  The latter conceives 
human existence in terms of a relational conception in which the process of human-
environment interaction creates a transactional field within Nature.  It is precisely 
through such relations (transactions) that we engage in a continuous struggle to reduce 
tension (precariousness) and to maintain homeostasis (relative stability) which is 
necessary for the continuance of life.  This fact of nature is the reason why the element 
currently under discussion serves as the beginning point for a Deweyan account of human 
well-being—it is at its roots an existential, not a conceptual account as provided by Plato 
and Sumner. 
This also has implications in that it offers a way to avoid the difficulties presented 
by the typical distinction between subjective and objective theories of human well-being 
as noted earlier in Chapter 2.  A Deweyan account holds that our experience of our own 
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well-being is “subjective” only in the following sense.  For most organisms, it is often the 
case that any disturbance in the transactional field will manifest itself as a felt disturbance 
in the essential constancy of inner tissue or psychological balance.  As human beings, we 
usually experience such disturbance as tension or anxiety that, whether it is the result of 
internal or external stimuli, serves to motivate us to overcome such stimuli disturbances.  
In shifting from a standard subjectivist account to a situated transactional-field account, 
human well-being no longer involves being the individual bearer, possessor or owner of 
certain properties or states, e.g., a virtuous character, fulfilled preferences, authentic 
happiness, or things on some objective list.  Instead, it recognizes that human well-being 
involves much more than this because it is concerned about the qualitative nature of the 
ongoing relationships that exist within the field of environmental transaction.  This is 
what gives to any situation its pervasive quality which, itself, is a consequence of the 
organism’s success in overcoming disturbance or reducing tension and, therefore, in 
maintaining a dynamic homeostatic tension balance. 
Certainly, there is little to disagree with in observing that ours is a world in which 
our interactions with the environment, at times and perhaps more often than we realize, 
involve risk, uncertainty and instability.  Even though the precariousness of our existence 
is a given for us, this is not a reason to live our lives in constant fear.  Living constantly 
in a highly precarious environment would be exhausting at the very least and, if unabated, 
will likely result in death.  Fear is first marked by “contractions, withdrawals, evasions, 
concealments” and later by “organic shrinkage, gestures of hesitation and retreat.”425  
Aside from being a horrible state of existence, living one’s life in fear does not seem to 
                                               
425 Dewey, MW 14, 107-108. 
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offer much in terms of material for a theory of human well-being other than sheer 
fatalism.426  However, this is not to suggest that fear does not have an important part to 
play in human well-being.  Dewey suggested that fear, as an emotion, “need not be an 
undesirable factor in experience.”427  If Dewey is correct then certain “desirable traits” 
such as caution, circumspection, prudence and the desire to foresee future events to 
prevent some possible harm are all products traceable to the impulse of fear.  What is 
noteworthy here is that he referred to “prudence” as a “desirable trait”, but not as a value. 
This has implications in terms of the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 about the 
value status of human well-being, in particular Sumner’s claim that it is a prudential 
value in that it raises a question as to whether being prudential in fact rises to the level of 
being a value.  Clearly, although human well-being is something that is valuable to have, 
saying that something is “valuable to have” is not the same as saying that acting in a way 
that is prudential is something that should be prized or held in high regard by oneself or 
others.  However, it is possible that acting prudentially has relevance when it comes to 
the appraisals given to a particular action that occurs in a particular situation or context 
by either oneself or others.  A more significant problem here is that the initial motivation 
for “prudential value” lies not in “doing what is in one’s own interest” but in the “impulse 
of fear.”  If this is the case, then “acting in one’s best interest” becomes a second-order 
concept derived from fear, which is a problem for Sumner’s claim that there is a rational 
basis for a welfarist theory of human well-being. 
                                               
426 Dewey claims that, at least for humans, it seems that fear stops engagement and, therefore, growth. 
Impulses of fight, flight or paralysis become habituated which leaves little hope for human well-being since 
there is no possibility for engagement and growth. 
427 Dewey, MW 9, 89-90. 
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What we can conclude from our discussion at this point is that human well-being 
involves the discrimination of the pervasive quality of the natural tension (as the mode 
and tempo of interaction) in our experience.  Chapter 2 specifically argued that such 
natural tension results from the combination of the relatively isolated consequences of the 
fundamental traits in experience, unhappily or happily as these may be.  This provides 
sufficient evidence that, for Dewey, wisdom is vitally important to human well-being 
because it is the means by which we are able to arrive at the “choice and administration 
of the proportioned union of the mode and tempo of interaction.”428  In this regard, the 
modern American poet Robert Creeley makes the following comparison: “Truth is a 
small stream one steps over, wisdom an insistent preoccupation.”429   If this is the case, 
then the wisdom that is required for human well-being involves an insistent 
preoccupation with using a naturalistic process for making choices and for achieving their 
administration in proportioned union, despite living in world of chance and change.  The 
detailed examination of the process of Deweyan inquiry provided in Chapter 3 showed 
not only the means by which we come to acquire these naturalistic tendencies (as habits), 
but also how we are able to achieve attainment of the “proportioned union” of the 
fundamental traits in experience upon which our well-being depends. 
Human Well-being in a World of Chance, Choice, and Change 
Given the precariousness of our existence, perhaps C. S. Peirce was correct in 
observing that we live in a universe of chance and answering the question as to whether 
there are any “eternally fixed and final” values with a resounding no.  If correct, even 
though there are different ideas about values, it is impossible to claim that any one such 
                                               
428 Dewey, LW 1, 67. 
429 Robert Creeley, “Wisdom” no page number in text, in his A Day Book. New York: Scribner and Sons, 
1972. 
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idea itself can be a fixed state or final-end.  Let us take a moment to think about how 
chance might play out in terms of human well-being.  I am working at home writing my 
dissertation, which is something that I am doing in order to satisfy a preference and 
achieve what I believe to necessary for achieving a final-end, i.e., obtaining a Ph.D. 
which will enable me to live a “good life.”  After a while the phone rings and it is a friend 
who suggests that I go with him to either an art show or a poetry reading.  I respond that 
my preference is to continue writing but my friend insists, noting that I really have not 
taken much time out from writing for some time. 
Although my stated preference is to continue writing and I have a fixed-end that I 
desire to achieve, perhaps my will is weak and I reluctantly agree to go.  I also express to 
my friend that I am completely ambivalent when it comes to going to either the art show 
or the poetry reading.  Thus in spite of my desired fixed-end, stated preference and good 
reasons for my preference, I demur and allow my friend to make the decision.  However, 
the choice to go with my friend, even though it does not constitute a “preference” on my 
part, can affect future situations that may arise.  My friend decides that we should to go to 
the poetry reading, during which I have a deeply moving experience.  Afterwards, I seek 
out the poet to have a conversation and the encounter turns out to have important 
relevance to the dissertation on which I am working.  The point here is this chance event, 
clearly not a matter of preference or choice on my part, has a moving consequence in 
terms of my well-being and it contributes to what is the preference for which I seek 
fulfillment. 
Situations such as this strongly suggest the importance that both chance and 
choice play in an account of human well-being.  One obvious consequence of living in a 
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universe of chance is that choice becomes an important demarcation point in human 
experience, although chance does not always present us with a choice.  Choice clearly 
plays a large part in how we understand human well-being both as a practical matter and 
as a philosophical theory.  As we saw in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, Dewey argued that it is not 
through mere reflective contemplation that we are able to manage the natural traits in 
experience, but through intelligence and purposive art, because 
[i]nterest, thinking, planning, striving, consummation and frustration are a 
drama enacted by these forces and conditions.  A particular choice may be 
arbitrary; this is only to say that it does not approve itself to reflection.  
But choice is not arbitrary, not in a universe like this one, a world which is 
not finished and which has not consistently made up its mind where it is 
going and what it is going to do.  Or, if we call it arbitrary, the 
arbitrariness is not ours but of existence itself.430 
However, as a practical matter most of us believe, at least to some extent and generally 
with good reason, that in many respects our well-being is contingent upon the choices 
that we make, at least as far as we are able to demarcate such events in experience, i.e., as 
pre-reflective or reflective experience.   Further, choice differs from chance since, in 
many situations, choice is not a fifty-fifty proposition and we can often specify the 
conditions to meet in order to improve vastly the odds of making the “right” choice.  
How, then, is it possible to increase the likelihood that one will in fact choose 
what is right or good or in one’s best interests in a universe of  chance and change?431  If 
                                               
430 Dewey, LW 1, 67. 
431 It is difficult, at times, to see where the demarcation point in experience clearly lies between these terms.  
Regardless, we use these terms to discriminate certain qualities in experience from others and it is possible 
that the discrimination of all three could be part of the reflective experience involved in a situation.  Neither 
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we follow the course of pragmatic naturalism, since choice involves only what is “given” 
in nature and human experience, it has as much to do with the world of nature as chance.  
Further, although we discriminate between choice and chance in experience, neither has a 
privileged or exalted position in it.  Because we demarcate choice as a factor in our 
experience, however, it does have importance for the way in which human well-being is 
conceptualized.  One of the points emphasized in Chapter 2 was that the accounts of 
human well-being offered by both Plato and Sumner give considerable prominence to the 
centrality of choice.  Because choice plays such an active role in human well-being, the 
advantage of a Deweyan account is that it views choice in a way that is consistent with 
nature and human experience.  In so doing, it not only explains how we make choices, 
but also how we are to understand their consequences.  Nonetheless, the often brute and 
always naturalistic fact of chance intervening in existence has significant consequences 
for human well-being, and this is not something to dismiss lightly. 
 Whether it occurs by chance or choice we also demarcate our experience in terms 
of “change” which, itself, constitutes another fundamental or basic trait of nature, e.g. 
seasonal changes.  Since the ancient Greeks, a major philosophical problem has been to 
explain stability in a natural world that is in a constant state of flux.  However, most 
philosophies of flux deify change by seeking to make it universal, regular and certain.432 
Since most of us recognize that nothing in the natural world is ever “absolutely” stable or 
instable, perhaps science offers the only way to ever understand change.  This is because 
the process of scientific inquiry, when applied to the natural world, involves the 
                                                                                                                                            
is it likely that human well-being can be equated with just one of these terms, i.e. doing what is right, good 
or in one’s best interests, since each begins from a different perspective and, at times, there can be conflict 
among them. 
432 Dewey, MW 1, 49. 
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measure, relation, ratio, knowledge of comparative tempos of change.  In 
mathematics, some variables are constants in some problems, so it is in 
nature and life.  The rate of change of some things is so slow, or is so 
rhythmic, that these changes have all the advantages of stability in dealing 
with more transitory and irregular happenings—if we know enough.  
Indeed, if any one thing that concerns us is subject to change, it is 
fortunate that all other things change…To designate the slower and the 
regular rhythmic events structure, and more rapid and irregular ones 
process, is sound practical sense.  It expresses the function of one in 
respect to the other.433 
Dewey’s commitment to pragmatic naturalism also yields a bi-directional analysis of 
change, in which it is possible to cash out the meaning of change in terms of its 
consequences, regardless of whether it is the result of chance or choice.  His analysis 
recognizes that we experience change not just as moving in the direction of how the 
environment changes, but since our transactions with the environment are simultaneously 
moving in another direction, we also experience a change in ourselves as a result of our 
transaction with the environment.  Finally, it is living in a world in which chance, choice 
and change are in constant operation that enables us to discriminate and then engage in 
the vital activities of discovery and creation that are so central in human experience and, 
consequently, to human well-being. 
 
 
                                               
433 Dewey, LW 1, 64. 
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Discovery, Creativity and Human Well-being 
Since the time of Plato, one of the more fundamental philosophical demarcations 
we have made in human experience is between discovery and creation.  Perhaps William 
James’ distinction between a closed universe and a melioristic universe will helpful here.  
Since discovery (finding) always occurs in a closed universe, the same applies to any 
theories derived through it, i.e., they, too, are closed in that they only seek to describe 
existing reality by “discovering” something that already exists.  In contrast, a melioristic 
universe, in recognizing that we cannot recapture existing reality, holds that the existing 
human universe can be changed and improved.434  For the most part, philosophical 
theories have come down on the side that human well-being is something which is wholly 
discoverable.  The problem is that the understanding of discovery involved here interprets 
the world of nature as being “ready-made” and merely awaiting discovery, like 
something we might find unexpectedly in our dresser drawer.  An unfortunate 
consequence of understanding discovery in this way is that the creative elements 
necessary for human well-being get lost in the very process of discovery.  However, it 
may be possible to avoid this unhappy consequence by reconstructing the function and 
operation of discovery and creativity, in relation to human well-being, from within the 
context of pragmatic naturalism.435  Since pragmatic naturalism rejects either/or thinking, 
neither discovery nor creation alone can be taken to have exclusivity; hence human well-
being becomes a matter of both discovery and creation.  However, this requires adopting 
                                               
434 See James, “What Pragmatism Means”, 179-192; “Pragmatism’s Conception of the Truth”, 193-206; 
and Some Problems of Philosophy, 228-231. 
435 Pragmatic naturalism views discovery and creation as organic human functions related to an 
environmental field that includes objects and goals.  They constitute discriminations in experience of the 
ways of feeling, thinking and doing by which human beings navigate within and through their environing 
field.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 re-cast this distinction in terms of the operation of the instrumental mode and the 
aesthetic mode of well-being. 
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a different understanding of “discovery” since, in the context of human experience, its 
importance lies in it having consequences in the world of nature.  In this way it becomes 
a moving force through which our experience of the world of nature becomes different in 
some fundamental way. 
Most theories of human well-being, whether ancient, modern or contemporary, 
give inadequate attention to creativity in that they either fail to recognize the significance 
of creativity at all or offer only an incomplete account of its function and operation.  This 
at least raises the question, for me, as to whether a solely or even dominantly discovery-
oriented theory can capture what is necessary for a full and complete understanding of 
human well-being.  Pragmatic naturalism offers an alternative to the traditional 
understanding of discovery and creation in terms of their instrumental value, as 
consequences, in both nature and human experience.436  It does so by first directing our 
attention to the importance of language since it is the primary way by which we 
communicate our experience.  However, there is more to language than merely 
communication because our use of language, itself, in reflecting the generic traits of 
experience and their consequences, functions as a “tool” which we use in activities 
relating to both the discovery and creation of human well-being.437   
Perhaps, by moving outside the typical philosophical way of demarcating 
experience, I can push this point about language, as being the “tool of tools”, a little 
further.  Certainly, poets have a highly refined understanding of the instrumental value of 
                                               
436 The fact we make such a distinction in our experience presumes it has some degree of instrumental 
value otherwise there would be no reason for us to make it in the first place. 
437 In this sense, language is a bio-psychological function because it serves as a sign by means of which 
individuals are able to draw inferences.  Ideas (expressed as beliefs) are implicit dispositional tendencies 
and plans of action that serve as vehicles by which humans can interact within a natural and social 
environment.  In this sense, language is a tool with jobs to perform. 
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language, even if they are not always masterful in their use of it.  Consequently, poets 
very well may have something to offer in terms of the new understanding of discovery 
and creation that is now required.  The modern American poet Charles Olson made the 
following observation about the “discoverability” of the human universe: 
There are laws, that is to say, the human universe is as discoverable as that 
other.  And as definable.  The trouble has been, that man stays so 
astonished he can triumph over his own incoherence, he settles for that, 
crows over it, and goes at a day again happy he makes a little sense.  Or, if 
he says anything to another, he thinks it is enough—the struggle does 
involve such labor and some terror—to wrap it in a little mystery: ah, the 
way is hard but this is what you find if you go for it.  The need now is a 
cooler one, a discrimination, and then a shout.438 
It goes without question that discovering the “human universe” involves discrimination, 
in particular the discrimination of “root categories” or the generic traits of nature and of 
human transactions.  However, Olson pushes our understanding of discovery further in 
holding that it involves more than merely the discrimination of experience (which 
remains important)—it also involves a shout.  By understanding discovery in this sense, 
one recognizes it has a certain characteristic projective force as well.  The idea of this 
projective force in discovery is also found in the epic poem Patterson by William Carlos 
Williams, a contemporary of Olson’s, where he warns us that, “knowledge, undispersed, 
is its own undoing.”439  One might quibble over exactly what Williams’ means by 
“undispersed”, but since it is a poet speaking it is likely he understands that dispersing 
                                               
438 Olson, Human Universe and Other Essays, 3. 
439 Williams, Patterson, 12. 
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knowledge includes taking into account its consequences as well.  Although perhaps in 
different ways, it seems both Olson and Williams echo Dewey’s dictum that the only 
power ideas have is when they become moving ideas, which means to cash them out 
experientially in terms of their consequences. 
Part of the difficulty in discovery, Olson reminds us, is that “definition is as much 
a part of the act as is sensation itself, in this sense, that life is preoccupation with itself, 
that conjecture about it is as much of it as is its coming at us, its going on.  In other 
words, we are both the instrument of discovery and the instrument of definition.”440  
Since language is a “prime of the matter” in terms of discovery and definition, Olson 
presses the need to interpret it in the “double sense” of discrimination (logos) and of 
shout (tounge).  The problem here, the result of one legacy we inherited from the ancient 
Greeks, is that we have come to live in a “generalizing time” wherein logos or discourse 
has “so worked its abstractions into our concept and use of language” to the neglect of 
language’s other function, speech.  Olson’s understanding of the functions of language 
appears to mirror that of pragmatic naturalism which holds that language is neither 
wholly descriptive of the logos, nor simply an abstraction from or reflection of 
“reality.”441  Instead, since language is both adjectival and adverbial, it is an instrument 
of human desire and purpose with functions and uses in human experience. Olson 
describes the central distinction here as that between language as the “act of the instant” 
and language as the “act of thought about the instant”.  However, because the habits of 
thought are the habits of action, it is impossible to extricate language from action.  For 
                                               
440 Olson, Human Universe, 3. 
441 William James refers to this as the problem of “vicious intellectualism.”  The claim here is that language 
is descriptive of reality and, when taken as such, results in the falsification of experience.  This “vicious” 
aspect of language led him to the notion of “pragmatic truth” and, later, led Dewey to view language as the 
“tool of tools.”  It is in this context that their notion of instrumentalism comes into play. 
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Olson, this means that “particularism has to be fought for anew….the Greeks went on to 
declare all speculation as enclosed in the “UNIVERSE of discourse”….as though 
language, too, was an absolute, instead (even as man is) an instrument.”442  This 
historical-cultural fact led Olson to conclude that “discourse has arrogated to itself a good 
deal of experience which needed to stay put—needs now to be returned to the only two 
universes that count, the two phenomenal ones, the two a man has need to bear on 
because they bear so on him:  that of himself, as organism, and that of his 
environment.”443 
Over time, using language as an instrument in the discovery of the natural and 
human universe resulted in the expansion of the number of terms used to describe the 
various phases and conjunctions of the fundamental traits of natural existence.  Dewey 
observed that the following are among the most common and familiar terms: 
Structure and process, substance and accident, matter and energy, 
permanence and flux, one and many, continuity and discreteness, order 
and progress, law and liberty, uniformity and growth, tradition and 
innovation, rational will and impelling desires, proof and discovery, the 
actual and the possible, are names given to various phases and their 
conjunction, and the issue of living depends upon the art with which these 
things are adjusted to each other.444  
Regarding my particular interest in developing a theory of well-being that is consistent 
with nature and experience, I wish to draw particular attention to the last part of the quote 
                                               
442 Olson, Human Universe, 4. 
443 Olson, Human Universe, 4. 
444 Dewey, LW 1, 67. 
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above for two reasons.  First, it provides the fundamental rationale for articulating a 
naturalistic metaphysics—our very living depends on it.  If this is the case then a 
naturalistic metaphysics is necessary for human well-being and any such theory must take 
nature as its starting point.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, it illustrates two 
significant claims that are relevant to the current inquiry.  The first claim is that human 
well-being is a consequence of the naturalistic tension that results from the adjustment of 
the naturalistic traits of experience.445  The second claim is that because human well-
being consists in the specific ways in which such adjustments to the natural traits of 
experience are made it is art.446  It is the consequences of man’s attachment to and 
detachment from these natural traits that “involve him in his perplexities and troubles, 
and are the source of his joys and achievements…Interest, thinking, planning, striving, 
consummation and frustration are a drama enacted by these forces and conditions.”447  A 
Deweyan account of human well-being begins with the natural traits of experience and 
follows them, in a naturalistically consistent way, to wherever they lead us. 
However at this point, where we are concluding the inquiry, it may be beneficial 
to look outside philosophy once again to deepen our understanding of this point.  The 
pragmatist turn towards naturalism found similar expression in the work of the modern 
American composer John Cage, who observed 
[w]herever we are, what we hear is mostly noise…When we listen to it, 
we find it fascinating.  The sound of a truck at fifty miles an hour.  The 
static between radio stations.  Rain. We want to capture and control these 
                                               
445 This was the focus of the discussion in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
446 This was the focus of the discussion in Chapter 5. 
447 Dewey, LW 1, 67. 
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sounds, to use them not as sound effects, but as musical instruments…. 
Whereas, in the past, the point of disagreement has been between 
dissonance and consonance, it will be, in the immediate future, between 
noise and so-called musical sounds.448 
 He also described music and the work of composers in naturalistic terms in noting that 
“[m]any composers no longer make musical structures.  Instead they set processes going. 
A structure is like a piece of furniture, whereas a process is like the weather.  In the case 
of a table, the beginning and end of the whole and each of its parts are known.  In the 
case of weather, though we notice changes in it, we have no clear knowledge of its 
beginning and ending.  At a given moment, we are when we are.  The nowmoment.”449  
Perhaps the shift in understanding music and musical composition that Cage describes, 
from a structure to a process, has implications for our understanding of human well-
being.  It may be that in conceiving human well-being as a “structure”, either physically 
or formally (conceptually), e.g., Plato’s “tripartite soul” and Sumner’s establishment of 
certain conditions as necessary and sufficient, is reflective of a larger falsification 
because experience itself does not consist in a fixed relationship among parts. 
The more intriguing part from Cage’s quotation, however, is his observation 
about “The nowmoment.”  Perhaps the “nowmoment” can be helpful in differentiating 
between those times when our pre-reflective habits are operating smoothly and those 
                                               
448 Cage, “The Future of Music: A Credo” quoted in Hamm’s liner notes to Sound Forms for Piano: 
Experimental Music by Henry Cowell, John Cage, Ben Johnston and Colon Nancarrow. 
449 Cage, A Year From Monday, 178.  There has been a continuous extension of Cage’s view of 
composition during the past 30 years.  Examples of the extension of Cages work is found in the work of  
contemporary avant-garde composers such at the game strategy compositions of John Zorn; the 
conductionist compositions of Lawrence “Butch” Morris; and the more recent “turntablist” compositions of 
Christian Marclay. 
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when our reflective habits come into play.  In the former situations, we are able to 
negotiate the existential challenges presented in the course of our environmental 
transactions without engaging our reflective habits.  In such situations, although we 
always in the nowmoment, we are not necessarily aware of being in the nowmoment.  
This is because our awareness of being in the nowmoment is tensional, an awareness that 
is not merely cognitive but also felt in the problematic situation.  We are always in the 
nowmoment pre-reflectively and, sometimes, we are aware of also being in the 
nowmoment reflectively.  However, what serves to differentiate the nowmoment in a 
consummatory experience from pre-reflective and reflective experience in particular, is 
the removal of the tensional situation and the resultant unifying pervasive quality gained. 
Locating the Authentic in Human Well-Being 
 What does it mean to say that under certain conditions human well-being is, in 
some way, “authentic”?  The examination of philosophical theories of human well-being 
in the Western historico-cultural tradition undertaken in Chapter 1 revealed that 
“happiness” is central and “authenticity” is significant in some way.  Perhaps one reason 
happiness has achieved such a prominent place in theories of human well-being is 
because as Wittgenstein observed, if good or bad acts (of will) do alter the world then 
their effect must be that “…it becomes an altogether different world.  It must, so to speak, 
wax and wane as a whole.  The world of the happy man is a different one from the world 
of the unhappy man.”450   If the world of the happy man is indeed different from the 
                                               
450 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 147. What follows Wittgenstein’s observation about happiness is, 
perhaps, even more curious, “So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.  Death is not an 
event in life; we do not live to experience death.  If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration 
but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.”  It is curious in the following 
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world of the unhappy man, then what are the specifiable conditions or features of the 
world that account for this difference?  During the course of this inquiry we have found, 
not surprisingly, that Western philosophy has offered many answers to this question. 
Chapter 1 examined one answer that has appealed to some philosophers as 
exemplified in the accounts of human well-being offered by Plato and Sumner.  Both 
conceive human well-being as consisting in a fixed relationship among parts of an 
epistemic or a cognitive structure (e.g., a soul or a concept) and that well-being is a fixed 
or final-end itself.   It is not surprising, nor should it be, that this conception continues in 
philosophy despite the vigorous and sustained effort by Dewey to put to rest the validity 
of any claim as to fixed states or final-ends.451  Although he sought to accomplish this in 
his typical head-on way, consistent with his grounding in pragmatic naturalism and its 
naturalistically sufficient account of experience, it is obvious that the historical-cultural 
tradition he battled was too strong to overcome.  It is virtually undisputed in Western 
cultural tradition that authentic happiness, however conceived, consists in some fixed 
state or final-end.  If understanding human well-being in this way is false, i.e., not 
consistent with nature and human experience, then it is not authentic on its face.  The 
question then is how should we understand it? 
Here again it may be helpful to step outside the traditional domain of philosophy 
for a moment to examine another area of human experience in which the rejection of 
fixed states and final-ends also finds expression.  John Cage recounted the following 
conversation with an unnamed fellow composer, “I asked him what a musical score is 
                                                                                                                                            
sense: what immediately follows the only place in the Tractatus where Wittgenstein gives any mention to 
happiness is a section about death. 
451 Dewey, MW 12, 119-120. 
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now.  He said that’s a good question. I said: Is it a fixed relationship of parts?  He said: 
Of course not; that would be insulting.”452  Aside from whether or not it is insulting, 
perhaps we can restate Cage’s question in terms of well-being as follows, “Is well-being 
a fixed relationship of parts?”  Following Dewey, perhaps we can say that the 
authenticity of human well-being must be describable as a process of possibility and 
unfolding for which there are specifiable conditions.   The kind of “authenticity” in this 
context is, perhaps, similar to William Carlos Williams’ description of the authenticity of 
a poem, 
Its movement is intrinsic, undulant, a physical more than a literary 
character.  Therefore each speech having its own character, the poetry it 
engenders will be peculiar to the speech also in its own intrinsic form.  
The effect is beauty, what in a single object resolves our complex feelings 
of propriety…When a man makes a poem, makes it, mind you, he takes 
words as he finds them interrelated about him and composes them—
without distortion which would mar their exact significance—into an 
intense expression of his perceptions and ardors that they may constitute a 
revelation in the speech that he uses.  It isn’t what he says that counts as a 
work of art, it’s what he makes, with such intensity of perception that it 
lives with an intrinstic movement of its own to verify its authenticity.453 
The Transactional Self in a Deweyan Account of Human Well-being 
 Experience is not something that “belongs” to a person or self, but is the 
existential matrix in which the self participates.  For Dewey, the human self is an 
                                               
452 Cage, Year, 27. 
453 Williams, Selected Poems, xvi. 
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embodied, acculturated organism whose distinctive activities and sensibilities emerge as 
a result of the complex interaction of:  1) the evolution of the human species, 2) the 
evolution of the particular culture into which one is born, and 3) the unique process of 
this individual being subjected to acculturation in these ways.454  Given this context, the 
self that a Deweyan account of human well-being recognizes is that of an individual 
agent who determines how the interaction is to proceed.  Colapietro argues that Dewey’s 
view of agency can be best understood as an embodied, enculturated agent.  Such a view 
of agency assumes 
 a being whose unity is, at bottom, a function of its continuity.  The self as 
an enduring embodied agent underlies the self as an overarching 
integrative purpose: a being able to project and pursue aims comes, as a 
result of its projects and pursuits, to assure the integration of these as a 
task.  But, in its most fundamental sense (in its metaphysical as distinct 
from moral sense), the self can no more be defined in terms of a function, 
for the execution of the task assumes an agent capable of devoting itself to 
the task.  Thus, for me, what is presupposed at every turn is not the unity 
of an overarching purpose, but the continuity of organic agency.455 
This constitutes a significant factor in the creation of the results of inquiry because the 
inquirer’s own reaction and response to the environment are conditions for the outcome 
of an experience (situation).  An individual does not have “an experience” to which the 
objective elements of the situation are added to where the “real” interaction (a mental 
state) supposedly takes place.  It is not in some private, subjective state but in the 
                                               
454 Dewey stated “even the neuro-muscular structures of individuals are modified through the influence of 
the cultural environment upon the activities performed.” LW 12, 49. 
455 Colapietro, “Embodied, Enculturated Agents”, 70. 
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situation that the various elements are emotionally colored and become integrated into 
the whole by a single quality. It is also essential to sustain this quality because it forms 
the foundation that further serves to define the individual’s “personality,” “character,” 
etc. Further, it is possible to identify this quality with an individual’s “life” because it 
operates not only in the present situation but also determines future activities.   
Nakamura suggests that as the self’s transactions with the environment proceed, 
its viewpoint or purpose takes its shape from this quality, which is further modified and 
refined into an experience in which discrimination and unification are conditioned by a 
series of intelligent perceptions and judgments.456  The crucial point here in terms of the 
refinement of the self, is that what forms the purpose of the “individual”, as a unifying 
point in experience, is understandable only in relation to what actually exists.  In this 
sense, it is possible to interpret the self as a characteristic in a “work of art” rather than 
something that is accidentally or contingently present.  Understanding the process of the 
formation of the self is similar to discovering the intent of the artist by considering a 
succession of works that portrays his or her development over time.  The same 
perspective and experience applies to the self in that its formation and development 
occurs through a series of intelligent perceptions and judgments on the part of the 
perceiver.  The development of the self occurs whenever the particular transactional field, 
in which it participates, is either settled or unsettled.  This field, consisting of the 
environment and the relations or elements brought forward from prior experience, 
becomes transformed in ways that lead to a new transactional field.  As Dewey observed, 
“[i]ndividuality itself is originally a potentiality and is realized only in interactions with 
                                               
456 Nakamura, “The Significance of Dewey’s Aesthetics in Art Education in the Age of Globalization”, 
427-440. 
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the surrounding conditions.  In this process of intercourse, native capacities, which 
contain an element of uniqueness, are transformed and become a self.”457 
Embodied Knowing and the Existential Context of Human Well-being 
Chapter 1 examined philosophical accounts that conceive of human well-being in 
terms of an epistemic or cognitive state.  For Plato, it is something that is non-natural and 
exists outside of nature that can be understood only in terms of some transcendent form 
or truth that resides in some transcendent realm.  Although Sumner avoids the above 
problems, in the end his commitment to formalism and conceptualization of the 
experience requirement suggest an underlying cognitive state bias in his theory of human 
well-being.  The consequence of adopting either theory is that it results in the 
disconnection of human well-being from the press/pull of nature and everyday human 
life.  Surely one might claim that achieving such disconnection from experience is the 
point here, but I’m not sure that a “time out from reinforcement” one might need as a 
result of the transactional tension of lived experience is quite the same as the actual 
withdrawal from the world of lived experience into some transcendent epistemic realm or 
narrow cognitive state.  Surely, one can engage in intense introspective reasoning about 
the transcendent form of “justice” or the necessary and sufficient truth conditions 
required for “authentic happiness” but, sooner or later, one must eat—you may be able to 
“hang out” in the transcendent realm or take refuge in formalism for a while, but you 
simply cannot live there.  Furthermore, human well-being cannot be a consequence of the 
privileged position of the human species in the executive order of events since the only 
legitimate understanding of human well-being is as a part of “nature”. 
                                               
457 Dewey, LW 10, 286. 
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Another problem with adopting a non-naturalistic view of human well-being is 
that it creates a disruption in and falsification of our experience because there is nothing 
in nature that leads us, in any way, to posit the existence of anything in human experience 
that is fixed and final.  It is a disruption because the categories of the “fixed” and the 
“final” are not root categories in nature or experience.  The claim that there can be such 
non-naturalistic grounds for positing their existence is what constitutes a falsification of 
experience.  However, it is possible to resolve this problem by adopting the approach of 
pragmatic naturalism because it recognizes that whatever understanding we have 
regarding the distinctions we make in experience (which we discriminate as values, 
ethics, and aesthetics) must be consistent with nature and human experience.  The five 
themes presented in this Chapter allow for a reconstruction of human well-being 
grounded in Dewey’s distinction between the instrumental (as concerned with knowing) 
and the aesthetic (as concerned with meaning).  Since Dewey’s instrumentalism denies 
the existence of any special realm of “pure” or “formal” thought, it is in Nature, 
understood as a continuously flowing stream, in which thought and language serve as 
instruments (tools) that are used to pass from a given situation full of ambiguities and 
disharmonies to a new and better situation.  Embodied knowing (or embodied cognition) 
consists in forging ideal tools or instruments for use in coping with a given situation and 
the “mind” becomes an active instrument for realizing human purposes. 
Because ideas are plastic and adaptable, they constitute “teleological weapons of 
mind” which owe their stability to the vital functions which they serve, i.e., to be used by 
human beings to solve their problems.  However, the conception of “mind” in play here is 
one that emerges as, and further, is enacted through social cognition.  Neither is there a 
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radical rupture with our bodily experience of meaning because it is not only carried 
forward but is given voice through language and other forms of social symbolic 
interaction and expression.  One function of thought is that it has an adaptive dimension 
in that it serves to mediate interactions with the world.  Whenever one moves into a 
“new” situation, although it contains elements implied in the former, it is richer and better 
because of its new meaning and greater complexity.   
This means that “thinking” becomes inseparable from “doing” and “feeling”’ 
because it is a function of embodied individuals, leading to knowledge about themselves, 
however partial it may be.  Dewey clearly evidences a proper understanding of 
embodiment in his reconstruction of “knowledge” as embodied knowing. 458  What serves 
to characterize such knowing is that it is 
(1)  A result of the evolutionary processes of variation, change, and selection.459 
(2)  “Situated” within a dynamic ongoing organism-environment relationship. 
(3)  Problem-centered and operates relative to the needs, interests, and values of 
organisms. 
(4) Not concerned with finding some allegedly perfect solution to a problem, but 
one that works well enough relative to the current situation. 
(5)  Often social and carried out cooperatively by more than one individual 
organism. 
                                               
458 Johnson and Rohrer, “We Are Live Creatures”, 17-54 
459 Johnson and Rohrer, 22 note: “[t]his evolutionary embeddedness of the organism within its changing 
environments, and the development of thought in response to such changes, ties mind inextricably to body 
and environment… From the very beginning of life, the problem of knowledge is not how so-called internal 
ideas can re-present external realities…[but] to explain how structures and patterns of organism-
environment interaction can be adapted and transformed to help deal constructively with changing 
circumstances that pose new problems, challenges, and opportunities for the organism….mind is never 
separate from body, for it is always a series of bodily activities immersed in the ongoing flow of organism-
environment interactions that constitutes experience.” 
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Dewey’s view of cognition as embodied knowing is radically different from the one we 
are most familiar with in classical cognitive science.  The traditional view assumes that 
cognition consists of the application of universal logical rules that govern the 
manipulation of “internal” mental symbols supposedly capable of representing states of 
affairs in the “external” world. 
It appears that Dewey understood, even at the time he was writing, what 
contemporary biological science now accepts, i.e., that cognition emerges from the 
embodied processes of an organism that is constantly adapting to better utilize relatively 
stable patterns within a changing environment.460  Recent empirical research and 
developments within the cognitive sciences also reinforce his understanding of situated 
cognition, especially evidence about the comparative neurobiology of organism-
environment coupling ranging from the amoeba all the way up to humans, which 
becomes the basis of meaning and thought in human beings.461  The patterns of these 
ongoing interactions constitute image schemas that ground meaning in our embodiment 
and yet are not internal representations of an external reality.462  Not only do they 
“constitute a preverbal and pre-reflective emergent level of meaning.  They are patterns 
found in the topologic neural maps we share with other animals, though we as humans 
have particular image schemas that are more or less peculiar to our types of bodies. 
However, even though image schemas typically operate without our conscious awareness 
of how they structure our experience, it is sometimes possible to become reflectively 
                                               
460 Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 5. 
461 Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 14-24. 
462 Such schema are “stable recurring patterns of sensorimotor experience by which we engage a world that 
we can understand and act within to further our purposes….these image schemas are neurally embodied as 
patterns of activation in and between our topological neural maps. Image schemas are thus part of our non-
representational coupling with our world, just as barn owls and squirrel monkeys have image schemas that 
define their types of sensorimotor experience.” Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 11-12. 
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aware of the image schematic structure of a certain experience, such as when I am 
consciously aware of my cupped hands as forming a container, or when I feel my body as 
being off balance.”463 
Another way of expressing this rootedness of thinking in bodily experience and its 
connection with the environment is to say that there is no rupture in experience between 
perceiving, feeling, and thinking.  Explaining more “complex” or “higher” functions 
(e.g., consciousness, self-reflection, and language use) does not require the postulation of 
new ontological kinds of entities, events, or processes that are non-natural or super-
natural.  Instead, the more complex levels of organic functioning are just that—levels—
and nothing more, although there are emergent properties of “higher” levels of 
functioning.  Dewey referred to this connectedness of all cognition as the principle of 
continuity.  Based on the examination and analysis of this principle in Chapters 2 and 3, 
its implications are that any explanation of the “nature and workings” of mind (even the 
most abstract conceptualization and reasoning) must have its roots in our organismic 
capacities for perception, feeling, object manipulation, and bodily movement.  Although 
all of these arise from our sensorimotor capacities, they are constrained by the nature of 
our bodies, brains, and environments.  From an evolutionary perspective this means that 
we have not developed two separate logical and inferential systems, one for our bodily 
experiences and one for our abstract reasoning (as a pure logic).  Instead, the logic of our 
bodily experience provides all the logic we need in order to perform every rational 
inference that we do.  Furthermore, social and cultural forces are required for human 
                                               
463 Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 14. 
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beings to develop these capacities to their full potential, including language and symbolic 
reasoning.464 
Given the context above, Dewey’s reconstruction of cognition has the potential to 
serve as a full-fledged theory of human cognition because it provides an account of:465 
(1) The emergence and development of meaningful patterns of organism-
environment interactions which, as patterns of sensorimotor experience, are 
shared by all organisms of a certain kind and meaningful for them because they 
are connected to the organism’s attempts to function within its environment. 
(2) How we can perform abstract thinking using our capacities for perception and 
motor response by describing how bodily processes extend sensorimotor concepts 
and logic for use in abstract reasoning.  It also explains how the processes 
embodying such abstract reasoning capacities are learned during the organism’s 
development.466 
(3) How values and behavioral motivations emerge from the organism’s ongoing 
functioning. This explanation includes (a) the physical and social makeup of 
organisms, (b) the nature of their emotional responses, and (c) the kinds of 
environments (e.g., material, social, cultural) they inhabit. 
The theory of human cognition that emerges from Dewey’s work recognizes that 
philosophy and empirical science must develop together, through a process of mutual 
                                               
464 Infants do not speak or discover mathematical proofs at birth; Dewey’s continuity thesis requires both 
evolutionary and developmental explanations. 
465 Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 4-6. 
466 This story has at least two parts: (a) an evolutionary and physiological account explaining how an adult 
human being’s abstract reasoning utilizes the brain’s perceptual and motor systems, and (b) a 
developmental and anthropological account of how social and cultural behaviors educate the sensorimotor 
systems of successive generations of children so that they may speak and perform abstract reasoning.  
 
 
 
  228 
cooperation and criticism if we are ever to achieve an empirical understanding of the 
human mind and all of its marvelous capacities and acts. 
Finally, the principle of continuity also explains how apparently novel aspects of 
thought and social interaction arise naturally via increased complexity of the organism-
environment interactions that constitute experience.  In this context, human beings are 
live creatures who “are acting when we think, perhaps falling in and out of step with the 
environment, but never are our thoughts outside of it. Via our bodily senses the 
environment enters into the very shape of our thought, sculpting our most abstract 
reasoning from our embodied interactions with the world.”467  As such, all of our 
traditional metaphysical and epistemological dualisms (e.g., mind/body, inner/outer, 
subject/object, concept/percept, reason/emotion, knowledge/imagination, and 
theory/practice) are merely abstractions from the interactive (enactive) process that is 
experience.  However, such distinctions are not absolute ontological dichotomies 
because, while they sometimes serve us well, oftentimes they serve us quite poorly 
depending on what problems we are investigating, what values we have, and what the 
sociocultural context is.  The relevance the preceding discussion has for a Deweyan 
account of human well-being is that the process of embodied knowledge is necessary and 
sufficient for living a good life because it is the “means of making goods—excellences of 
all kinds—secure in experienced existence.”468  Such instrumentalism, though, must be 
tempered by a “meliorism” that recognizes while “the specific conditions that exist at one 
moment, be they comparatively bad or good, in any event may be bettered.”469  In the 
                                               
467 Johnson and Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures”, 22. 
468 Dewey, LW 4, 30. 
469 Dewey, MW 12, 181. 
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end, a Deweyan account of human well-being may mean a great deal for education and 
educators.   Perhaps Sidney Hook was correct in claiming that if knowledge is to be used 
to “make a difference in creating a better world or resisting those forces and individuals 
whose actions would result in a worse world, [then] education must find the way.”470 
  
                                               
470 Hook, “Introduction.” in Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, xvi. 
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